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Policy Design and Risks to Compliance: The New Zealand Nursery 
Industry and the HSNO Act 
By S. T. Clinehens 
The regulation of the importation of new plant species underwent a major shift in the 
late 1990's with the implementation of the Hazardous Substances and New Organisms 
Act 1996. Under HSNO plant species entering New Zealand for the first time are 
assessed for their invasive potential. These risks are weighed against the benefits of 
importing the species. HSNO addresses the primary pathway for introduction of 
environmental weeds to New Zealand: intentionally imported horticultural species. 
This thesis explores the effectiveness ofHSNO in regulating the importation of new 
plant species. The research focuses on the response of the nursery industry, a key target 
group, to the Act. Both qualitative and quantitative research methods are used to 
examine nursery industry views of the HSNO Act. Possible problems with 
noncompliance are investigated with the aid of a conceptual framework of policy design 
and compliance behaviour. The analysis suggests that targets may perceive the costs of 
compliance to outweigh the benefits thus undermining calculated motivations for 
compliance. The analysis also indicates that targets may perceive HSNO to be unfair 
and impracticable thus detracting from normative motivations for compliance. The 
implications of these issues for HSNO's effectiveness are discussed and means for 
addressing the problems identified are considered. 
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Chapter One - Introduction 
Thousands of non-indigenous plant species have been introduced both 
purposefully and accidentally to New Zealand since the onset of European 
colonisation. l Some ofthese species are vital to priu1ary industries while others are 
highly desirable as ornamentals in home gardens. Unfortunately, a growing number of 
non-indigenous taxa have naturalised and become invasive weeds.2 The majority of 
invasive weeds in New Zealand have eventuated from plants imported intentionally 
rather than introduced accidentally, therefore, regulation of this pathway is important to 
prevent further undesirable plant introductions (Mack et aI., 2000, p. 691; Sullivan, 
Timmins & Williams, 2001b, p. 3; Williams & Randall, 2002, p. 1).3 With the advent 
. of the Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act 1996 (HSNO) New Zealand 
changed course from the approach taken historically to regulating the importation of 
plant taxa not yet present in New Zealand. HSNO (the Act) requires that all new plant 
species be assessed for their likely environmental, cultural, and economic risks and 
benefits. Approval for importation is based upon this assessment. 
It is unclear how effective HSNO's regulation of new plant species importation 
has been thus far (ERMA, 2003b, p. 60). This thesis seeks to improve understanding of 
the Act's effectiveness by exploring the New Zealand nursery industry's response to the 
regulations. This group was selected for study because commercial nurseries are a 
primary importer of plant material (Williams & Randall, 2002, p. 1; Williams, Nicol & 
Newfield, 2001, p. 104). Concerns about possible problems with noncompliance of 
nursery operators with HSNO identified in the initial, qualitative phase of the research 
were investigated by subsequent, quantitative inquiry. Possible triggers for 
noncompliance of the nursery industry were identified and means of mitigating these 
risks to compliance were considered. 
I A 'non-indigenous' species is one that has been introduced "beyond its native range by human activity" 
(Kolar & Lodge, 2001, p. 200). 
2 A 'naturalised' species is one that has established self-sustaining populations (Richardson & Rejmanek, 
1999, p. 14). An 'invasive' weed is defined by Owen (1998, p. 50) as "a weed that can significantly and 
adversely affect indigenous species and communities.... Whether a species is an invasive weed depends 
on the nature and significance of its existing or potential impacts." 
3 In contrast, invasive microorganisms, insects, and marine invertebrates are chiefly introduced 
accidentally via ballast water or as passenger organisms on imported goods (Mack et aI., 2000, p. 691). 
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This chapter begins by describing the Act and placing it within the context of 
New Zealand's overall policy framework for addressing the problem of pest plants. 4 
Next, existing evaluations ofHSNO's effectiveness and the uncertainties they raise are 
discussed. Conclusions drawn from these evaluations formed the rationale for my 
research objectives and the approach I took to pursuing these. The research objectives 
and methods are then presented. An overview of the chapters ahead concludes the 
introduction. 
HSNO's Regulation of the Importation of New Plant Species 
HSNO's purpose is to "protect the environment, and the health and safety of 
people and communities, by preventing or managing the adverse effects of hazardous 
substances and new organisms" (Anonymous, 1996, s 4). Under the Act 'new 
organisms' refer to plants, animals, micro-organisms, and gel:1etically modified 
organisms (GMO's) that were not present in New Zealand prior to 1998 (Anonymous, 
1996, s 1,2). HSNO aims to prevent introductions of undesirable species by 
considering a species' possible negative effects before importation rather than becoming 
aware of these effects after the species has been released (House of Representatives 
New Zealand, 1994, p. 4603). This approach contrasts sharply with that taken by 
previous importation regulations. Prior to HSNO, importation of new plant species was 
regulated by a 'prohibited list' approach. This meant that all plant species could be 
imported except those that had been identified as major weeds of agriculture (Owen, 
1998, p. 7). 
HSNO takes a 'permitted list' approach to plant importation.5 If a commercial 
nursery operator, for example, wants to import a plant species not yet present in New 
Zealand, she or he must submit an application, outlining the risks and benefits of the 
introduction, to the Environmental Risk Management Authority (ERMA). ERMA is the 
agency established to administer HSNO. ERMA assesses the possible adverse effects 
of the species proposed for introduction to the environment, communities, and human 
4 Legislation and regulations in New Zealand use the term 'pest plant' rather than 'environmental weed' 
or 'invasive plant.' A pest plant is any plant that people seek to control or eradicate for any reason (Dr. P. 
Williams, personal communication, 27 November 2002). 
5 New Zealand and Australia are the only nations to adopt a 'permitted list' approach to date despite the 
fact that globally, ecologists have recommended this approach for nearly a decade as the best means for 
preventing introductions of undesirable species (Ruesink, Parker, Groom & Kareiva, 1995, p. 474; 
Simberloff, 2001, p. 310; Westbrooks, Gregg & Eplee, 2001, p. 303). 
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health alongside any potential benefits.6 Scientific assessment of weed risk, Maori 
views, and, in 'high risk' applications, public opinion through submissions and 
hearings, are taken into account (Sutherland, 1997, pp. 202 - 205). If ERMA approves a 
species for importation then it is added to the Plant Biosecurity Index (PBI), a data-base 
of taxa approved for import. 
HSNO within a Policy Framework 
HSNO is one of a number of policies that are designed, in part, to prevent or 
control weed invasions. Other relevant policies include the Biosecurity Act 1993, the 
National Pest Plant Accord, and several Acts that direct the Department of 
Conservation's (DoC) pest control activities. To demonstrate how these policies 
address weed invasions each policy will be briefly examined in relation to the invasion 
process. Ecologists describe biological invasions as a series of transitions. These are 
entrainment, transport and introduction, establishment, naturalisation, and invasion 
(Kolar & Lodge, 2001, p. 201). 
Species may be 'entrained' in a transport pathway either intentionally or 
accidentally. Intentional entrainment could occur, for example, when a commercial 
grower orders a shipment of clover seed from overseas. Accidental entrainment could 
occur if the clover seed shipment is contaminated with weed seeds. 'Introduction'takes 
place if the entrained species survives transport and is not destroyed by quarantine 
officials at a port of entry. The third transition, 'establishment', is achieved if an 
intentionally introduced species succeeds in cultivation, or an accidentally imported 
species establishes successfully. So far more than 20,000 non-indigenous plant species 
are established within New Zealand (Wilton, 2000, p. 539). If an established population 
continues to reproduce and spread without deliberate and direct human assistance, it is 
considered to have 'naturalised' (Owen, 1998, p. 49). There are approximately 2,000 
naturalised plant species within New Zealand and naturalisation is continuing at a rate 
of approximately 14 species per year (Williams & Randall, 2002, p. 1; Wilton, 2000, p. 
539). The final transition stage, 'invasion,' occurs if a naturalised species begins to 
adversely affect native biodiversity and ecosystems (Owen, 1998, p. 50). These effects 
may include competition with indigenous species and habitat modification such as 
changing fire regimes, nutrient cycles, or hydrology which indirectly harms indigenous 
6 While plant importation regulations in New Zealand have long sought to protect primary industry, 
HSNO is one ofthe first policies in New Zealand to require consideration of adverse environmental 
effects (Owen, 1998, p. 7). 
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flora and fauna (Simberloff, 2003, p. 180). Invasive weeds are the primary threat to 61 
of New Zealand's 125 threatened plant species (Williams & Timmins, 2002, p. 183). 
To date, there are approximately 240 invasive weeds within New Zealand (Owen, 1998, 
p.11). 
HSNO addresses intentional entrainment of non indigenous species by requiring 
assessment of new plant species before permission is granted for their importation. The 
Biosecurity Act focuses on accidental entrainment by aiming to prevent biosecurity 
'risk goods' from entering New Zealand inadvertently (Anonymous, 1993 - 1998,111).7 
Under the Act the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF) develops Import Health 
Standards that specify measures which must be taken to prevent diseases or unwanted 
passenger organisms from accompanying imported goods, including plant material 
(Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 2003a). Countries exporting to New Zealand 
must ensure their certification systems comply with these import health standards 
(Budd, 2000, p. 9). 
Transport and introduction is also addressed by the Biosecurity Act via the 
efforts ofMAF and the Ministry of Fisheries (MFish). MAF Quarantine Service 
screens incoming luggage and passengers, inspects freight, and enforces importation 
regulations to discourage unwanted passenger organisms or smuggled material from 
entering New Zealand (Williams & West, 2000, p. 431).8 MFish develops and enforces 
regulations to prevent introduction of nonindigenous organisms via ballast water and 
boat hulls (Owen, 1998, p. 62). 
Establishment of nonindigenous species is monitored by MAF surveillance, as 
required by the Biosecurity Act, to detect intrusions of undesirable organisms as early 
as possible (O'Hara, 1999, p. 2). HSNO also plays a role by requiring ERMA to 
monitor the impacts of new organisms released with ERMA approval (Anonymous, 
1996). 
Naturalisation and invasion are addressed by a variety of policies. Created in 
2001, the National Pest Plant Accord aims to prevent banned pest plants from being 
sold, distributed, or propagated (Ministry for Agriculture and Forestry, 2001). Regional 
Councils who sign the accord are responsible for monitoring nurseries and garden 
centres to ensure they are not selling banned plants (White, 2002, p. 9). DoC, 
responsible for managing New Zealand's eight million hectare conservation estate, 
7 'Risk goods' are defined as any substance or organism that may harm New Zealand's physical or natural 
resources or hinder efforts to deal with other pest organisms (Anonymous, 1993 - 1998). 
8 In this thesis the term 'smuggling' is used to refer to the intentionally concealing plant materials and 
bringing them into New Zealand. 
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controls invasive weeds at the behest of the Conservation Act 1987, Reserves Act 1977, 
National Parks Act 1980, Wildlife Act 1953, and Marine Reserves Act 1971 (Owen, 
1998, p. 63). DoC's efforts are intended to protect a variety of conservation values on 
the various categories of protected lands under DoC jurisdiction (Owen, 1998, p. 63). 
The Biosecurity Act provides for control of invasive weeds via Regional Pest 
Management Strategies and National Pest Management Strategies (Anonymous, 1993 -
1998, V). Regional Pest Management Strategies are implemented by Regional 
Councils in partnership with private land owners9 (Spurdle, 2002, p. 19). A National 
Pest Management Strategy may be developed by any government department for a plant 
or animal adversely affecting valued introduced species, native flora and fauna, or 
public health (Williams & West, 2000, p. 442). 
HSNO's Effectiveness: Observations and Uncertainties 
Evaluations ofHSNO's effectiveness in regulating the importation of new plant 
species have been inconclusive so far. There are indications that problems may exist 
with compliance. Further research is needed to address unanswered questions and 
provide a more conclusive evaluation ofHSNO's success in regulating new plant 
species' importation. 
Evaluations ofHSNO's effectiveness are provided in a number of Government 
reports, ranging from annual monitoring conducted by ERMA to a report on the 
management of the importation of aquatic plants. Effectiveness has been assessed in a 
variety of ways. ERMA summarises the number and type of applications submitted for 
importation and relays feedback about the HSNO process to the Government from 
applicants, prospective importers and other stakeholders. The number of new species 
released illegally as well as statistics summarising MAF's seizures of illegal plant 
material are also reported. 10 The observations provided and uncertainties raised by 
these various measures of effectiveness will be considered below. 
ERMA (2003b, p. 60) reports that the number of people importing new plant 
species into New Zealand through legal channels has dropped dramatically since HSNO 
9 In addition to Regional Councils, other government agencies and industry groups may take the lead on 
developing Regional Pest Management Strategies as long as they collaborate with all affected parties 
(Williams & West, 2000, p. 442). 
10 One further measure ofHSNO's effectiveness that may be useful in the future is the monitoring of the 
impacts of plant species approved by ERMA for importation. The monitoring strategy currently available 
for this task relies upon an indicator framework. Unfortunately, there are few sources of information that 
summarise the effects of organisms on the values HSNO seeks to protect. So far, only two non GMO 
plant species have been approved for importation and release, therefore ERMA has not yet needed these 
indicators (ERMA, 2003a, p. iv). 
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was implemented. From 1998, when the Act came into effect for new organisms, to 
February 2004, a total of seven applications were lodged for the importation and release 
of new plant species (J. Catley, personal communication, 18 February 2004).11 ERMA 
suspects that due to the cost and effort of applying under HSNO, some plant importers 
are choosing not to bring new species into New Zealand, while others are opting to 
smuggle new species into the country (Nahkies, Loutit & Rogne, 2003b, p. 98). 
Feedback from those interested in importing plants indicates that both of these scenarios 
are possibly occurring. 
Applicants and prospective importers describe the HSNO process as inflexible, 
arduous, and too costly in comparison to the profit expected from sales of the imported 
plant taxa. Further, the 'first applicant pays' approach of the Act has been noted as 
posing a commercial disadvantage to the initial importer (Champion & Clayton, 2001, 
p. 25; Nahkies et aI., 2003b, p. 102; Taylor, Gebbie, Botherway, James & Mormorunni, 
2000, p. 38). In addition to frustration with HSNO another issue identified by ERMA is 
prospective importers' low awareness ofHSNO's regulations (ERMA, 2003b, p. 60). 
Research commissioned by ERMA indicated that only 53 percent of a representative 
sample of the general public were aware of HSNO (Network Communications, 2002a, 
p. 9). Qualitative interviews with 20 potential new organism applicants indicated that, 
apart from those working for a government agency, interviewees were poorly informed 
of HSNO's requirements and ERMA's roles (Network Communications, 2002b, p. 38). 
However, ERMA has not assessed the awareness of a representative sample of 
prospective new organism importers. 
Apart from anecdotal evidence, it is unknown how much smuggling occurs as a 
response to frustration with HSNO or as a consequence oflow awareness of the Act's 
requirements (Champion & Clayton, 2000, p. 21; ERMA, 2003b, p. 60). Assessing 
noncompliance is made difficult by a lack of crucial information. While ERMA tallies 
the number of new organisms intentionally and illegally released (Nahkies et aI., 2003b, 
p. 52) these incidents can only be reported if they have been detected. Detection is 
made difficult by the lack of a complete and accurate inventory of the nonindigenous 
species already present within New Zealand (Champion & Clayton, 2000, p. 41; Wilton, 
2000, p. 539). The PBI (permitted list) is intended to provide this information but is 
fraught with errors and omissions. Neither MAF, DoC, nor ERMA have yet been able 
II Of these seven applications one (for two species) was approved and another was denied. Two 
applications were withdrawn, one stalled, and two applications are currently at the pre-application stage 
(J. Catley, personal communication, 18 February 2004). 
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to undertake the time-consuming task of updating and correcting the permitted list 
(Nahkies et aI., 2003b, p. 52). 
Not only is the list of existing species incomplete, but also data describing 
seized plant material at the border do not always identify the taxa. MAF Quarantine 
Service personnel often lack adequate taxonomic skill and knowledge to provide this 
information (Champion & Clayton, 2000, p. 18). Despite this shortcoming, data 
relevant to noncompliance are available. MAF Quarantine Service reports the number 
of seizures of plant material per annum and indicates the proportion of these seizures 
that were of undeclared material. In 2001, for example, MAF made 5,800 seizures of 
bulbs and live plants (Biosecurity Council, 2003, p. 38). The percentage of seizures of 
undeclared plant material increased from 1999 to 2003 from approximately 20 percent 
to 38 percent of total seizures (ERMA, 2003a, p. 22). 12 Following the recent bovine 
spongiform encephalopathy scare, MAF began screening 100 percent of incoming 
baggage thereby increasing the likelihood of detection (Controller and Auditor-General, 
2002, p. 92). However, ERMA and other government stakeholders are concerned that 
the increase in seizures of undeclared material is caused, in part, by importers trying to 
circumvent the HSNO Act (ERMA, 2003a, p. 22; Nahkies et aI., 2003b, p. 69; Taylor et 
aI., 2000, p. 60). 
The monitoring efforts recounted above indicate that fewer people are importing 
new species through the correct channels since HSNO came into effect. Frustrations 
with the HSNO process as well as a lack of awareness of the rules have been observed. 
A link is suspected, but not established, between these issues and the increase in 
seizures of undeclared plant materials at the border. Lack of crucial information, such 
as an accurate inventory of non-indigenous plant species within New Zealand, hinders 
ERMA's ability to identify unauthorised releases of new plant species. Reports raising 
concerns about HSNO's effectiveness maintain a tentative tone and lack the information 
needed to form firm conclusions regarding these issues. 
The least tentative evaluation of HSNO merits consideration of both its findings 
and the approach taken by the researchers. Champion and Clayton (2000, p. 5; 2001, p. 
5) examined the effectiveness of management systems relevant to the importation and 
surveillance of non-indigenous aquatic plants. The scope of their research extends well 
beyond HSNO, however, a number of their findings address HSNO's effectiveness. In 
order to ascertain what prospective importers thought of the current approach to 
regulating the importation of aquatic plants, the researchers interviewed all major 
7 
importers and distributors of aquatics. 13 To create a more accurate inventory of aquatic 
taxa within New Zealand, the researchers surveyed and identified the plants on the 
interviewees' premises (Champion & Clayton, 2001, p. 7). Doing an inventory of 
aquatic species was feasible because the total number of nonindigenous aquatics 
comprises only a small percentage of the ~ 20,000 nonindigenous plant species 
established within New Zealand. 
Champion and Clayton (2001, p. 25) found that aquatic plant suppliers were 
dissatisfied with importation regulations. Interviewees expressed frustration with 
HSNO's requirements and MAF's quarantine requirements. HSNO's application costs 
were perceived as prohibitive and MAF's regulations too strict. Officials examining 
plant material at the border were criticised for poor taxonomic skills and inadequate 
ability to intercept smuggled plant material (Champion & Clayton, 2000; 2001, p. 20, 
25). Interviewees alleged that frustration with importation regulations were prompting 
people to smuggle (Champion & Clayton, 2000, p. 20). 
The research uncovered evidence of smuggling. For 27 percent of the 181 
aquatic species identified as present in New Zealand no record of legal importation 
could be found (Champion & Clayton, 2001, p. 25). This indicates either that these 
species were imported prior to 1976 when MAF began recording species imported, or 
have been smuggled into New Zealand since then. Aquatic suppliers did not observe 
many of these species in the industry until the 1980's or more recently (Champion & 
Clayton, 2001, p. 15). A series of entry pathways were identified for non-indigenous 
aquatics including mail order seeds passing undetected through the postal system, 
incorrect declaration of species using names from the permitted list, and plant material 
concealed on individual's bodies or in their luggage ('pocket plants') (Champion & 
Clayton, 2000, pp. 18 - 20). Incorrect naming of species and 'pocket plant' smuggling 
were judged to be the most likely pathways for aquatics to enter New Zealand. 
Although interviewees gave accounts of these practices, uncertainty about the 
prevalence of illegal plant importation persists as individuals engaging in this illegal 
behaviour seek to remain covert for obvious reasons (Champion & Clayton, 2000, p. 
20). Champion and Clayton (2001, p. 28) concluded that New Zealand's current system 
has done a poor job ofregulating the importation of aquatic plant species. The 
12 MAF does not yet screen all incoming mail; MAF screened 50 million of the 72 million items of 
incoming mail in 2001 (Controller and Auditor-General, 2002, p. 92). 
13 There are only eight major suppliers of aquatic plants thus it was possible to interview all of them 
(Champion & Clayton, 2001, p. 7). 
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researchers recommended further assessment of HSNO in order to find more effective 
means of managing new aquatic plant species importation. 
Champion and Clayton's (2001, pp. 25, 28) findings about HSNO's 
effectiveness echo those reported elsewhere. However, their research findings are more 
conclusive than those of other evaluations. The approach taken to their research 
bolstered the certainty of the findings. Qualitative interviews with all major aquatic 
plant suppliers improved the reliability of the results. In contrast, other research is 
likely to be less reliable because it was collected from nonprobability samples (see 
Nahkies et al. 2003 and ERMA, 2002b). Champion and Clayton were able to estimate 
the number of species imported illegally because they completed an inventory of aquatic 
species present in New Zealand. They compared these data to importation records to 
determine which species were imported through legal channels in place since the late 
1970's (Champion & Clayton, 2001, p. 15). Despite their robust approach to the 
research, some information remains elusive. The clandestine nature of plant smuggling 
makes it difficult to ascertain the frequency of this behaviour and the reasons behind it. 
Collectively, evaluations of HSNO identify issues that may be compromising 
HSNO's effectiveness .. Further research is needed to produce a complete and accurate 
list of species present in New Zealand, quantify incidents of smuggling, and determine 
if the species involved are new to New Zealand. This would require a large-scale, 
collaborative effort possibly involving ERMA, DoC, MAF, and researchers skilled in 
taxonomy. Better understanding of prospective importers attitudes and beliefs about 
HSNO and linkages between these and their behaviour in response to the Act is also 
desirable in order to ascertain if changes to HSNO and/or its implementation are 
needed. While I lack the taxonomic skills and resources needed to undertake the former 
research priority, I am capable of carrying out the latter. The first phase of my research 
explored HSNO's effectiveness by examining nursery operators' reasons for importing 
plant species, experiences with HSNO, and views of the Act. Possible problems with 
compliance were identified in the qualitative research. These issues were then 
investigated quantitatively. 
Consideration of Champion and Clayton's (2000, 2001) reports offered insight 
into how to approach the quantitative research. Their findings suggest that identifying 
triggers for noncompliance is challenging because people are unlikely to divulge that 
they are smuggling, therefore it is difficult to empirically verify the alleged connection 
between frustrations with HSNO and smuggling. Consequently, I sought a theoretical 
framework that would enable me to identify and assess the likely triggers for 
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noncompliance. The framework contained a theory of policy design that established a 
causal link between targeted individuals' conceptions of a policy and their behaviour in 
response to that policy. An empirically validated model of compliance behaviour was 
also integrated into the framework enabling me to relate conceptions of HSNO to 
motivations for compliance. 
It is important to note that I approached the research from a particular 
perspective. I originally selected HSNO as a focus for research because of my concern 
about the ecological impacts of invasive weeds. Through work experience in invasive 
weed control I had observed the challenges of dealing with established weeds. I became 
interested in learning more about preventing introductions of potentially invasive plants. 
HSNO's regulation of the importation of new plant species captured my interest 
because of its permitted list approach, which has been recommend by ecologists as a 
promising means for preventing the introduction of potentially invasive plants. 
My position in relation to the research shifted as my research progressed. As I 
heard the perspectives of nursery operators and plant enthusiasts about HSNO I found it 
easy to sympathise with the frustrations and difficulties they were experiencing with the 
statute. I retain a strong concern about the ecological impacts of invasive weeds and 
believe that policies to prevent introductions are essential. However, I have developed a 
greater appreciation for the importance of ensuring such policy is palatable and 
workable for those it regulates. 
Research Objectives and Research Methods 
When I began my research I sought what Davidson and Tolich (2003, p. 199) 
describe as "a great depth of information on people, rather than breadth ... with the 
research problem emergent, not fixed." The inductive approach inherent in qualitative 
research (Neuman, 2000, p. 145) was appropriate considering the exploratory nature of 
the first phase ofthe research. 14 
The objective of the initial phase of the research was to explore the effectiveness 
of HSN 0 in regulating the importation of new plant species. While this inquiry could 
be directed in numerous ways, I elected to focus on the response of a key target group to 
the regulations. 'Targets' are those required to change their behaviour so that policy 
14 An inductive approach means that theory is formed from, and substantiated by, the evidence uncovered 
by the research (Neuman, 2000, p. 145). In contrast to quantitative research, which seeks to empirically 
test existing theory, qualitative researchers allow the data to drive the inquiry (Tolich & Davidson, 1999, 
p.32). 
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goals may be achieved (Schneider & Ingram, 1997, p. 82). HSNO's regulation of plant 
importation applies to anyone who wishes to import a new plant species. This may 
include commercial nurseries, seed companies, botanical gardens, garden clubs, home 
gardeners, plant enthusiast societies, and individual plant enthusiasts (Reichard & 
White, 2001). Research has identified commercial nurseries and plant enthusiasts as the 
groups responsible for most plant introductions (Sullivan, Timmins & Williams, 200 I a, 
p. 12; Williams et aI., 2001, p. 104). I focused on commercial nurseries because it was 
most feasible to identify and contact this group. 
The qualitative research was designed to examine attitudes and beliefs of nursery 
operators regarding HSNO's regulation of plant importation. Several research 
questions focused the inquiry: 
• Why do nursery operators wish to import new plant species into New Zealand? 
• What experiences have nursery operators had with HSNO? 
• How do nursery operators view HSNO's requirements and the Act's 
implementation by ERMA and MAF? 
To answer the research questions I interviewed twenty-four nursery operators and 
persons involved in implementing HSNO's plant regulations. My interviewees 
provided their perspectives on HSNO, the nursery sector's interactions with the Act, 
and HSNO's historical, social, and environmental context. In order to collect data high 
in validity I conducted semi-structured interviews (Tolich & Davidson, 1999, p. 34). 15 
Interviewees were selected through a snowball sampling technique. For greater detail 
about sampling, the interview process, and subsequent data analysis see Appendix A. 
Analysis of the qualitative data illuminated possible problems with compliance 
of the nursery industry with HSNO. Themes that appeared to be linked with 
noncompliance included the cost and effort involved in applying to import a plant 
species and a difficult relationship between prospective importers and ERMA and 
MAF. 
The contention that HSNO has pushed plant importation 'underground' was 
prevalent among respondents. Public sector respondents were uncertain about the scope 
of the problem and anxious about the adverse environmental effects that smuggled plant 
materials could bring about. Some nursery sector respondents reported having 
smuggled while others worried that smuggled materials could bring diseases detrimental 
to their industry to New Zealand. 
15 Validity describes the "extent to which an empirical measure adequately reflects the real meaning of 
the concept under consideration" (Babbie, 2001, p.l43). 
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The concerns raised about noncompliance, along with the criticisms of the 
design and delivery of HSNO, led to the emergence of a new set of research objectives. 
These objectives were approached by developing a quantitative questionnaire and 
administering this research instrument to a representative sample of wholesale nursery 
owners and managers. A conceptual framework was utilised to inform this 
investigation. This framework drew upon a theory of policy design and a theory of 
compliance behaviour. The following research objectives were identified: 
• Describe the elements ofHSNO's policy design. This included HSNO's 
goals, implementing agencies, rules, tools and assumptions underlying all of 
these. 
• Describe nursery operators' understandings ofHSNO's elements of policy 
design. 
• Determine how nursery operator's understandings ofHSNO are likely to 
impact compliance. . 
• Consider the implications of the findings for the effectiveness and 
appropriateness ofHSNO's policy design. 
A series of research questions provided a clearer focus and finer level of detail for these 
objectives: 
• To what extent are wholesale nursery operators aware of HSNO's regulation 
of new plant species importation? 
• What experiences have nursery operators had with HSNO? 
• What are nursery operators' interpretations and conceptions ofHSNO's 
elements of policy design? This entailed focus upon targets' views of 
HSNO's goals, agents, implementation structure, rules, and tools and 
assumptions underlying these. 
• Are there statistically significant relationships between targets' 
understandings of HSNO and characteristics such as nursery size and 
enthusiasm for plants? 
• Considering the theory of compliance behaviour, how might nursery 
operator's understandings of HSNO pose risks to compliance? 
• How might these risks to compliance be mitigated? 
The quantitative questionnaire (displayed in Appendix B) was distributed by 
post. The population from which I drew a probability sample consisted of wholesale 
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nursery owners and/or managers throughout New Zealand. I generated a systematic 
sample with a random start from the most inclusive sample frame available, the New 
Zealand Nursery Register (2003). Questionnaires were posted to 950 potential 
respondents. A response rate of 48 percent was achieved. Please see Appendix C for a 
more detailed account of the quantitative research methods used. 
Summary and Looking Ahead 
This chapter has introduced the two phases of research designed to explore 
HSNO's effectiveness. First, a description of HSNO was provided in relation to the 
Act's regulation of the importation of new plant species. HSNO was placed within the 
context of New Zealand's overall policy framework addressing the various stages of 
weed invasions. Next, existing evaluations ofHSNO's effectiveness were discussed. 
The issues and uncertainties expressed in these evaluations provided the rationale for 
my research. Finally, the research objectives, research questions, and methods used to 
pursue these were briefly described. 
In Chapter Two the conceptual framework used to structure and inform the 
research is described and the framework is operationalised. The following chapter 
examines the HSNO Act through a policy design lens to provide a foundation for the 
quantitative analysis. Chapter Four further contributes to this foundation by presenting 
the qualitative research results and explaining how the second set of research objectives 
arose from these findings. The results and discussion of the quantitative research begins 
in Chapter Five with consideration oftargets' social constructions ofHSNO's elements 
of design. The theory of compliance behaviour is used in Chapter Six to identify 
possible risks to compliance. The implications of these risks for the effectiveness of 
HSNO's policy design are discussed. Possible means of mitigating these risks and 
identification of future research priorities concludes the thesis. 
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Chapter Two - Stepping Through the Looking Glass: A 
Conceptual Framework for Understanding Compliance 
This chapter describes and discusses the conceptual framework that structured and 
infonned the second phase of my research. The framework integrates a theory of policy 
design with a theory for compliance behaviour. The causal theory of policy design 
offers a tool for empirical research that can be used to understand policy design, how 
target groups interpret these designs, and how this in tum influences their behaviour 
(Schneider & Ingram, 1990b, p. 78; 1997, p. 72). The theory of compliance identifies 
motivations for compliance thus offering further insight into individuals' decision-
making and behaviour in response to a policy (Winter & May, 2001, p. 676). The 
framework synthesising these theories aided me in examining the risks of 
noncompliance with the HSNO·Act on the part of wholesale nursery operators. 
Theoretical frameworks help policy analysts to simplify, organise, and interpret 
the many complex components and forces constituting public policy by "imposing a 
way of thinking about the world ... creating an order out of what does not have an 
objective order in itself' (Parsons, 1995, p. 57). While frameworks enable researchers 
to tackle complexity, such constructs should not be mistaken for objective reality but 
rather one paradigm among many alternative paradigms (Parsons, 1995, p. 57). 
This chapter begins with an introduction to the policy sciences. The emergence 
.ofpolicy design approaches within the discipline will then be discussed briefly. Next, 
the theory of policy design will be presented, followed by description of the theory of 
compliance. The final section of the chapter discusses the synthesis of these theories 
and demonstrates how the resulting framework was utilised in my research. 
The Policy Sciences 
Public policies are the primary means for solving a society's collective problems 
(Schneider & Ingram, 1997, p. 80). Groups and individuals within government create 
public policies, however these actors do not operate in isolation. The influence of 
contextual factors, such as public opinion, relationships between the private and public 
sectors, and financial resources, help shape public policies (Howlett & Ramesh, 1995, p. 
5; Schneider & Ingram, 1997, p. 80). A public policy can be defined as a "relatively 
stable, purposive course of action followed by an actor or set of actors in dealing with a 
problem or matter of concern" (Anderson, 2000, p. 4). This process can be viewed as a 
series of steps: setting an agenda, identifying policy alternatives, choosing an 
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alternative, implementing the chosen policy or policies, and later evaluating these 
policies (Kingdon, 1984, p. 3).16 Dividing the policy process into phases makes a 
complex reality comprehensible to the analyst. In practice, rather than proceeding 
sequentially through distinct phases, the policy process is likely to unfold messily (Hill, 
1997, p. 20). 
The policy sciences began to develop in the 1950's. This emerging discipline 
aimed to improve the process and products of policy making with the aid of empirical 
research (deLeon, 1988b, p. 302). Harold Lasswell, whose work is widely regarded as 
forming the foundation of the policy sciences, argued that policy analysis should help 
solve real-world problems deemed to be of importance (Howlett & Ramesh, 1995, p. 3). 
As Lasswell (1951, cited in Parsons, 1995, p. 18) explained, the policy sciences should 
address "fundamental and often neglected problems which arise in the adjustment of 
man in society .... " To address these policy problems effectively, he advised 
practitioners to take a multi-disciplinary approach in order to amalgamate various types 
of knowledge relevant to the policy problem (Parsons, 1995, p. 19). 
Since Lasswell first outlined the policy sciences, numerous theoretical 
perspectives have been developed within the discipline (Bobrow & Dryzek, 1987, p. 
5).17 Analysts have strived to improve public policies and the policy process (deLeon, 
1988b, p. 302). Over the past five decides, their efforts have focused on various phases 
of the policy cycle. First, formulation gained much attention followed by evaluation 
and then later, implementation (deLeon, 1988b, p. 302). Theory generation within the 
discipline has been criticised by its own practitioners as lacking coherence and direction 
and failing to produce unified theories (deLeon, 2002, p. 469; Winter, 1990, p. 20). It 
falls outside the purpose of this thesis to provide an overview of the dominant 
standpoints within the policy sciences or address the divergences observed among these 
approaches. For critiques of dominant standpoints see Howlett and Ramesh (1995), 
Ingram and Schneider (1997, pp. 13 - 65), Bobrow and Dryzek (1987), and Dryzek 
(1993, pp. 217 - 222). 
Policy design approaches arose from the implementation strand of the policy 
sciences. Although the importance of studying implementation was highlighted by 
Lasswell in the 1950's it was not until the 1970's that research focused upon this stage 
16 Theorists have generated various conceptualisations of the policy cycle. Lasswell's original rendering 
consisted of seven stages: Intelligence, promotion, prescription, invocation, application, termination, and 
appraisal. For other versions of the policy cycle see Howlett and Ramesh (1995, p. 10) and Parsons 
(1995, p. 78). 
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of the policy cycle (deLeon, 2002, p. 467). The first surge of implementation research 
consisted of case studies of public policies that had failed to achieve policy goals 
(deLeon 2002, p. 468). A 'top-down' perspective to policy analysis emerged as a 
second generation of implementation research. This perspective argued that policy 
success depended upon clarity of objectives, accurate causal theory, legal consequences 
for noncompliance, skilful implementers, and a supportive social and economic context 
(Sabatier, 1986, pp. 23 - 25). Critiques of the top-down approach then developed a 
'bottom-up' perspective which emphasised the role of 'street level' implementers in 
impacting on policy success (Sabatier, 1986, p. 32). 
A third generation of implementation research developed many theories crafted to 
suit specific contexts. The theories were critiqued for their ambiguous variables and 
limited applicability (deLeon, 2002, p. 469). Frustration with implementation literature 
grew as a single, widely agreed upon theory of implementation failed to emerge. It was 
in this context that some theorists sought to address the deficiencies of implementation 
literature by developing a new approach - theoretical frameworks of 'policy design' 
(deLeon, 2002, p. 482). Policy design proponents felt implementation theory had given 
inadequate attention to the contexts surrounding the policy cycle (deLeon, 2002, p. 
302). From a policy design perspective, context is the foremost determinant of policy 
design (Schneider and Ingram, 1997, p. 69). Proponents of policy design argued that 
the impact of context could not be appreciated unless the policy cycle was examined in 
its entirety rather than in stages (deLeon, 1988b, p. 304). 
As with any concept within the policy sciences, scholars provide varying 
definitions for 'policy design.' I follow Schneider and Ingram's (1997, p. 1, p. 2; 
1990b, p. 76, p. 80) definition presented in tandem with their theory of policy design. 
Policy designs are products that emerge from a process. They contain elements 
produced by human agency. One, several, or many people's intentions may shape the 
design. Other elements of the design may be unintentional. Policy designs are 
dynamic, changing as people and contexts change. Culture and values from a policy 
design's context are reflected in the design. Likewise, designs influence context by 
promoting certain values, beliefs, and behaviours. Those targeted by a policy, actors 
designing the policy, and the public at large may interpret a policy in differing ways and 
these interpretations may change over time. 
17 Although the terms 'policy science' and 'policy analysis' are often used interchangeably, deLeon 
(1988a, p. 8) clarifies that 'policy sciences' refer to the discipline while 'policy analysis' refers to the use 
of the methodologies and tools found within policy science. 
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Schneider and Ingram (1997, p. 72) observe that attempts to generate policy 
design theory focused on specific elements of design rather than taking a comprehensive 
view. Further, these efforts failed to provide a model applicable to all designs. To 
address these deficiencies Schneider and Ingram developed a causal model of policy 
design. Their theory is described in the following section. 
A Causal Theory of Policy Design 
Theoretical frameworks for studying public policy should improve understanding 
of policy design problems and identify ways of solving these problems (Schneider & 
Ingram, 1997, p. 7). Schneider and Ingram's causal theory of policy design can be used 
in this way. The theory provides a tool for analysis that addresses its authors' concern 
that many policy designs are damaging democracy in the United States by discouraging 
citizens' understanding and engagement with government, and increasing feelings of 
alienation and frustration (Schneider & Ingram, 1997, p. 5). However, Schneider and 
Ingram point out that their theory can be employed at a less global scale. The 
theoretical model portrays the relationships between societal context, policy problems, 
and policy design (Schneider & Ingram, 1997, p. 74). Analysis can begin with an 
element in the causal model, such as a target group's policy participation, and move in 
either direction through the model, for example, looking at the policy design's impact 
on policy participation (Schneider & Ingram, 1990b, p. 83)18 Figure 1 below portrays 
the causal model.. 
18 'Policy participation' is defined as ''the decisions and actions of direct and indirect target populations 
that impinge on achievement of policy goals" (Schneider & Ingram, ]997, p. 76). 
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Figure 1. Causal Theory of Policy Design 
Designing 
Dyn.arnics 
Framing 
Dyn.arnics 
(Adapted from Schneider and Ingram, 1997, p. 74) 
The societal context is comprised of a nexus among social, political, physical, 
psychological, and historical realms (Schneider & Ingram, 1997, p. 73). When 
examining this vast nexus in relation to policy design, Schneider and Ingram (1997, pp. 
80 - 81) focus specifically on four social-political values they believe are vital to a 
healthy democracy: responsive democratic institutions, respect and equality for citizens, 
active citizens who balance private and public interests, and effective, efficient solving 
of collective problems. Successful problem solving, of most relevance to my research, 
is achieved by policy design that uses natural and human resources efficiently, and 
effectively mitigates the problem addressed by the policy (Schneider & Ingram, 1997, p. 
80). Problem solving is germane to my focus on compliance behaviour because the 
response of the nursery industry to HSNO impacts on the policy's effectiveness in 
evaluating and addressing the risks posed by new plant species. 
Issues emerge from the societal context through processes of social construction, 
referred to as 'framing dynamics,' whereby versions of reality are created and shared by 
groups within society or society as a whole (Schneider & Ingram, 1997, p. 73). As 
groups or individuals experience their societal context, they make sense of these 
encounters by constructing beliefs, stereotypes, and images. If, for example, an 
individual witnesses law enforcement officers assaulting peaceful protesters she may 
construct a stereotype of police officers as hostile towards freedom of expression. If the 
person's social group tells her of police brutalising racial minorities she may then 
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reframe her stereotype of police officers as hostile towards freedom of expression and 
racist. Through exposure to media, academic research, and anecdotes from friends, she 
may construct a belief that policy change is needed to promote more appropriate police 
behaviour. This example demonstrates how people socially construct policy problems 
through their interactions with societal contexts. 
The 'issue context' contains the socially constructed issues that emerge from the 
framing dynamics. Power and institutional culture are influential in determining if 
issues reach the policy agenda as well as in determining how ensuing policies are 
designed (Schneider & Ingram, 1997, p. 75). 19 Power relationships between the parties 
involved dictate which policy actions would be too risky politically and thus not 
feasible for policy makers. Comprised of power dynamics, norms, operational 
structure, and rules, the culture of institutions involved in policy design also influences 
the design ofthe policy (Schneider & Ingram, 1997, p. 76).20 
An example of the influence of institutional culture can be observed in the design 
of New Zealand's electricity policy that emerged in the mid-1980's. The Labour 
Government strove to reduce the role of government and increase the role of the market 
in the electricity industry (BUhrs & Bartlett, 1993, p. 91). Power dynamics in 
government shifted as management of natural resource use was privati sed reflecting the 
belief that past shortcomings of natural resource management would be remedied if 
management was market driven (Buhrs & Bartlett, 1993, p. 96). The energy policies 
that resulted placed electricity generation in the hands of a State Owned Enterprise 
(SOE). Electricity was treated as a private good to be regulated by the market. Under 
SOE management, energy conservation and development of cleaner sources of energy 
did not occur (Buhrs & Bartlett, 1993, p. 97). The institutional culture prompted market 
driven electricity management. The resulting policies produced financial benefits for the 
Government but did not recognise or respond to environmental or social externalities 
because these fell outside a market paradigm. 
The interaction between the issue context, design options, and human agency 
comprise the 'designing dynamics' (Schneider & Ingram, 1997, p. 77). Reframing 
often occurs during this process, for example, an agency may alter the parameters 
defining their targeted population so as to be eligible for a new programme, a designer 
may reconstruct a policy problem to fit a solution she or he favours, or policy analysts 
19 Schneider and Ingram (1997, p. 75) delineate three types of power: direct power to make decisions, 
indirect power to shape the policy agenda or shape an influential institution, and the power to influence 
people's perceptions and desires. 
20 Institutions are interactions and relationships that endure in stable patterns, e.g. parliament, 
governmental ministries, and courts (Schneider & Ingram, 1997, p. 76). 
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may present research that alters understanding of a policy tool's effectiveness 
(Schneider & Ingram, 1997, p. 78). 
Actors within the designing dynamic produce a 'policy design' (Schneider & 
Ingram, 1997, p. 77). Policy designs consist of a set of empirical elements: goals, target 
populations, agents, tools, rules, rationales and assumptions. Policy goals are connected 
to agents, institutions charged with implementing the policy, and populations targeted 
by the policy in two ways. First, by rules, which stipulate actions that must be 
undertaken or avoided and, second,by tools, which aim to promote behaviour in 
accordance with these rules. Likewise, agents are connected to targets by rules and 
tools. Rationales and assumptions underlie the policy's goals, rules and tools 
(Schneider & Ingram, 1997, p. 82). The elements of design are portrayed in Figure 2. I 
have depicted the connection between goals, agents, and targets with double-headed 
arrows because influence may flow both ways. Agents, for example, impose rules and 
tools on targets. Targets' responses to these rules and tools may then prompt the agent 
to modify their administration ofthe policy or make changes to the policy itself. 
Figure 2. Elements and Linkages of Policy Design 
Goals < t )- Agents 
~ ...... !~s, t~oB, ~ .. ? ~ =¥ID~> 
(Adapted from Schneider and Ingram, 1997, p 83; 1990b, p. 82) 
The elements of design affect societal conditions through 'translation dynamics. ' 
In translation dynamics, targeted citizens encounter and react to the policy. As targets 
learn about and experience a policy, they construct understandings of what the policy 
means and how they should act in response. Targets may respond as policy designers 
intended or they may behave in ways that detract from policy goals (Schneider & 
Ingram, 1997, p. 79). When policy participation positively affects the policy goals, the 
target groups are engaging in 'coproduction.' Conversely, if their behaviour detracts 
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from policy goals their behaviour is termed 'counterproduction' (Schneider & Ingram, 
1990b, p. 85). Targets' understandings of policies not only impact their behaviours but 
also their values (Schneider & Ingram, 1990b, p. 79). They may intemalise values 
introduced or reinforced by the policy or they may reject these values (Schneider & 
Ingram, 1997, p. 80). Examining translation dynamics enables analysts to better 
understand target behaviour and consider the impacts of this behaviour on societal 
context. If, for example, targets' encounters with a policy prompt counterproduction 
then the policy may fail to effectively solve the policy problem. This may affect 
citizens' perspectives of government effectiveness or prompt reconsideration of the 
policy problem and its possible solutions. 
To identify the impacts of policy design on policy outcomes, such as behaviour 
of targets, each policy design element should be examined in relationship to targets' 
reactions to that element. Because my research undertakes this analysis, each element 
of design will be detailed below. Although the elements are presented individually, all 
are inter-related from a targets' perspective as they construct an understanding of a 
policy and decide how to behave in response. 
Goals 
Goals convey a social construction of a policy problem and a solution. A 
problem in a society can be interpreted in many different ways (Schneider & Ingram, 
1997, p. 83). Interpretations reflect the societal and issue contexts from which the 
policy arose. The substantive content of goals, they way they are expressed, and the 
way they are operationalised through rules and tools help shape policy outcomes. 
When making sense of these outcomes it is useful to determine if goals were intended to 
be symbolic, instrumental, or disingenuous, concealing other motives (Schneider & 
Ingram, 1997, p. 83). 
Targets 
The groups of people who are called upon to change their behaviours in order to 
achieve policy goals are called 'targets.' When problems are socially constructed, 
certain groups are identified as deserving assistance, as causing problems, or as well 
situated to help solve a problem. Understanding why a given target group is selected 
provides insight into policy outcomes. How the policy problem is perceived and the 
tractability of targets, their political power and status in society often determine target 
group selection (Schneider & Ingram, 1990b, p. 85). If a group whose behaviour does 
not have much bearing on the policy problem is selected then policy goals are unlikely 
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to be achieved. If groups feel unfairly targeted they may resist the policy, resulting in 
unintended policy outcomes. 
Agents and Implementation Structures 
Agents are those entities mandated by a statute to implement the rules and tools 
laid out by the statute, and in some cases, develop additional rules and tools (Schneider 
& Ingram, 1997, p. 89). Ingram and Schneider identify several 'implementation 
structures' differentiated by how authority is distributed between the statutes, agents 
and targets. 'Strong statutes' contain clear goals and give few choices to policy 
implementers, keeping authority to design or modify a policy exclusively with policy 
makers (Ingram & Schneider, 1990, p. 75). In contrast 'grass roots' policies have broad 
goals that implementers and/or targets decide how to reach (Schneider & Ingram, 1990, 
p.79). The 'support building approach' places greater importance on resolving 
conflicts and building support than on the instrumental goals of the policy (Schneider & 
Ingram, 1990, p.81). the 'Wilsonian perspective,' like strong statutes, entails setting 
clear goals. However, this approach enables agents, rather than policy-makers, to 
determine the best means to administer the policy (Schneider & Ingram, 1990, p. 77). 
Rules . 
Rules stipulate how targets should respond to a policy. 'Eligibility'rules 
delineate who is included in the target populations. 'Timing' rules dictate the sequence 
and time frame of policy implementation. 'Boundary' rules determine who can take 
part in decision-making under the policy, e.g. the rules for public hearings. 'Decision' 
rules stipulate how decisions are to be made while 'information' rules determine what 
sort of information is valid input for decision-making. As targets encounter rules they 
may perceive them as fair or unfair, flexible or inflexible, and compatible or 
incompatible with internal values and social norms. These perceptions may in tum 
affect targets' policy participation (Schneider & Ingram, 1997, pp. 97,98). 
Tools 
The purpose of policy tools is to increase the likelihood that targets and agents 
will obey policy rules. In order to be effective, tools must be based on an accurate 
understanding of why targets are engaging in the undesirable behaviour in the first place 
(Schneider & Ingram, 1990b, p. 89). Schneider and Ingram (1990a, pp. 514 - 521) 
classify policy tools in five categories, each defined by an assumption about what 
motivates compliance. 'Authority tools' assume that targets view the government as a 
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legitimate authority and therefore will comply with directives from government. 
'Inducements and sanctions' provide positive or negative incentives for compliance 
such as tax credits or fines for noncompliance. This approach expects that people will 
act out of self-interest and will respond rationally to 'carrots' and 'sticks'. 'Capacity-
building tools' give targets resources they need, such as education or skills, based upon 
the belief that lack of these resources thwarts compliance. 'Hortatory tools' exhort 
people to comply by connecting compliance with widely held values. 'Learning tools' 
aim to encourage innovation and discovery and entrust agents or targets with selecting 
goals based on what they learn. 
Rationales and Assumptions 
Rationales validate a policy by making the case that goals are legitimate and the 
policy design is an effective way to achieve these goals (Schneider & Ingram, 1997, p. 
99). A rationale may be broad, for example, stating that policy goals will promote 
justice or economic prosperity, or'quite specific, for example, justifying an eligibility 
rule for determining the duration of unemployment benefits by citing statistics about job 
availability. Whereas rationales justify a policy, assumptions are the logic that these 
justifications are based upon (Schneider & Ingram, 1990b, p. 81). The assumption 
beneath the eligibility rule for unemployment benefits for instance, might be that 
statistics about job availability are a good indicator of how long a person should expect 
to spend seeking employment. 
Each element of policy design described above has a causal connection with 
policy participation. The model assumes that through encounters with the various 
elements of policy design, targets socially construct understandings of the policy and 
then decide how to behave in response. While outlining broad causal links relevant to 
my research aims, the model alone is inadequate for the task of assessing the risks of 
noncompliance. In order to make sense of policy participation, the model requires an 
accompanying theory of individual decision-making and behaviour (Schneider & 
Ingram, 1990b, p. 89). A theory of noncompliance which is compatible with the causal 
theory of policy design will be discussed below. 
A Theory of Compliance Behaviour 
Schneider and Ingram (1990b, pp. 92 - 93) describe individual behaviour as 
prompted by a diverse array of 'rules of thumb' that individuals refer to when choosing 
behaviour. These include: self image, values and norms, assessment of risks and 
benefits to oneself and others, knowledge of possible choices, and consistency with past 
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choices. In contrast, most theories of compliance rely on expected utility as the sole 
explanation for behaviour (Hatcher, Jaffry, Thebaud & Bennett, 2000, p. 449; Winter & 
May, 2001, p. 676). Expected utility fails to recognize other influences on decision-
making and lacks empirical support (Schneider & Ingram, 1990b, p. 89; Winter & May, 
2001 )?I Expected utility theories characterise decision making as rational while 
empirical research indicates that decision makers may judge over90nfidently with little 
information and may underestimate the harm their actions might cause while over-
estimating the harm caused by others (Schneider & Ingram, 1990b, p. 93). To respond 
to the deficiencies of assuming the primacy of rational expected utility in decision 
making, some theorists have shifted their focus to normative/social motivations (Winter 
& May, 2001, p. 676) while others have incorporated 'non-rational' motivations by 
subordinating them to an expected utility calculus ( See Haab & McConnell, 2002). 
Neither of these options captures the complexity of decision-making. 
Fortunately, an empirically based theory of compliance has been developed that 
recognizes the complexity of factors which influence compliance (Burby, May & 
Paterson, 1998; Burby & Paterson, 1993; Hatcher et aI., 2000; Winter & May, 2001). 
The theory consists of four main motivations for compliance: 'calculated motivations', 
'normative motivations', 'social motivations', and 'ability to comply'(Winter & May, 
2001, p. 676). 
'Calculated motivations' result from an individual weighing the benefits of 
compliance versus the costs and choosing the option that appears to offer the best 
outcome for the individual. This may include considering the risk of getting caught, the 
likelihood that penalties will be awarded, and the size of the penalties (Winter & May, 
2001, p. 676). As explained above, these calculations are unlikely to be purely rational, 
objective exercises. Nevertheless, the idea that decision makers may attempt to weigh 
personal risks and benefits when making decisions is what is important about this 
criterion. 
'Normative motivations' stem, in part, from an individual's moral principles. 
These principles consist of beliefs about the appropriate roles of an individual within 
society as well as all other internalised values within his or her moral framework 
(Winter & May, 2001, p. 677). The second aspect of normative motivations is an 
individual's assessment of whether a regulation is fair in its design and implementation 
and if violating the regulation is likely to cause harm (Winter & May, 2001, p. 678). 
21 'Expected utility' refers to a rational calculation of risks and benefits undertaken to determine which 
choice in a given situation maximises personal satisfaction (utility) for the decision maker (Winter & 
May, 2001, p. 676). 
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'Social motivation' refers to an individual's desire to act in ways that are 
approved by people or social groups who are important to the individual. He or she 
then seeks to behave in accordance with norms of others whether or not these norms are 
internalised (Winter & May, 2001, p. 678). Those the individual wishes to please could 
range from family and friends to agencies implementing the policy or others within the 
target group. 
The final aspect of the compliance theory is 'ability to comply.' If targets know 
little or nothing about a policy, or are confused by the information they have 
encountered then they are less likely to comply. Further, financial capacity dictates 
their ability to comply: if the financial costs of compliance handicaps the individual 
they are less likely to comply (Winter & May, 2001, p. 680). Ability to comply is a 
foundational aspect of compliance which underlies calculative, normative, and social 
motivations.22 
The theory of compliance added an essential component to my conceptual 
framework. While the policy design theory offers a meta-perspective on understanding 
policy participation, the theory of compliance facilitates analysis at a finer, more 
specific level. Integrating the theory of compliance with the theory of policy design 
enabled me to 'step within' the translation dynamics and identify and examine possible 
triggers for noncompliance. The conceptual framework that resulted from this synthesis 
will be explored in more detail as the operationalisation of the framework is discussed 
below. 
Applying the Theories 
I used the conceptual framework presented in this chapter to explore how the 
nursery industry's encounters with HSNO might affect compliance. Concerns that plant 
importers were not complying with HSNO arose during the qualitative phase of the 
research. While identifying and quantifying incidents of noncompliance was not 
feasible, it was possible to identify and analyse factors that may jeopardise compliance 
with HSNO.23 An amalgamation of the causal theory of policy design and the theory of 
compliance behaviour provided the conceptual tools I needed to do this. 
22 Each motivation for compliance identified by the theory links to Schneider and Ingra~'s (1 990a, pp. 
514 - 521) typology for policy tools. Inducement or sanction policy tools assume that calculated 
motivations are in play. Policies sometimes appeal to normative motivations by using hortatory tools. 
Authority tools aim to promote compliance based on an aspect of social motivation. Capacity building 
tools focus on improving ability to comply. 
23 To review why quantifying non-compliance was impractical please see p. 9 in Chapter One. 
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Schneider and Ingram's causal theory of policy design (Schneider & Ingram, 
1990b; 1997) is a useful model for informing and structuring empirical research at both 
broad and specific scales. Analysis can begin with any aspect of the model and move 
through it in either direction (Schneider & Ingram, 1990b, p. 83; 1997, p. 82). In my 
analysis, the elements of policy design and the translation dynamics were the relevant 
aspects of the theory. My analysis was premised on the existence ofa causal link, 
comprised of socially constructed understandings, between the elements of policy 
design and policy participation. 
Compliance or failure to comply with HSNO is a form of policy participation. 
Because the elements of policy design have a causal relationship to policy outcomes, 
such as policy participation, analysis should centre on interaction between targets and 
the elements of design in order to predict policy participation (Schneider & Ingram, 
1990b, p. 83; 1997, p. 79, 82). 
The first analytic task was to define HSNO's elements of policy design using the 
text of the statute, relevant parliamentary proceedings, and evaluations of the Act 
produced by Government and other bodies. The goals of the Act, the agents charged 
with implementing and enforcing the Act, the implementation structure, and HSNO's 
rules, tools, and assumptions relevant to new plant species importation were described. 
Subsequently, the themes from the qualitative data relevant to compliance were linked 
to their corresponding elements of design. 
Quantitative research was then undertaken to address the first research objective; 
to describe wholesale nursery operators' social constructions ofHSNO. This objective 
was based on the assumption that as targets have experiences with a policy and gather 
information about the policy they socially construct understandings of what the policy 
means as well as what actions they should take in response (Schneider & Ingram, 
1990b, p. 86). Targets' understandings included views ofHSNO's goals, agents, rules, 
and tools. As it was not feasible or necessary to investigate every facet ofHSNO's 
design, the research focused primarily upon themes identified as possible triggers for 
noncompliance by the qualitative research. 
From the quantitative data a depiction of wholesale nursery operators' social 
constructions ofHSNO emerged. In order to assess the risks of noncompliance from 
this portrayal the theory of compliance behaviour was employed (Winter & May, 2001, 
p. 676). The theory of compliance identified calculative, normative, and social 
motivations and ability to comply as determining compliance (Burby et aI., 1998; Burby 
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& Paterson, 1993; Hatcher et aI., 2000; Winter & May, 2001). The following research 
objectives were pursued: 
• Determine how nursery operators' understandings of HSNO are likely to impact 
on their compliance. 
• Consider the implications of the findings for the effectiveness and 
appropriateness ofHSNO's policy design. 
The theory offered a means of relating social constructions of HSNO to 
compliance behaviour. By using the theory I was able to identify and assess possible 
triggers for noncompliance. This was achieved by relating targets' conceptions of 
HSNO to the four motivations for compliance. If, for example, my research indicated 
that respondents viewed HSNO's rules about fees as unfair I could then contend that 
one normative motivation was absent and could thus increase the risk of 
noncompliance. Or, as another example, if I found that respondents perceived that 
violators had a high risk of detection I could argue that this aspect of calculated 
motivations was likely to support compliance. Figure 3 below depicts how I applied the 
conceptual framework to the research. 
Figure 3. Application of the Conceptual Framework 
-
Compliance 
-
or ... 
Noncompliance 
In Chapter Six I discuss the risks to compliance identified in the analysis. The 
implications of these risks for the effectiveness ofHSNO's design are then considered. 
By using the conceptual framework to identify and assess the risks of noncompliance I 
am able to offer insights into the appropriateness ofHSNO's design and the 
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effectiveness of HSNO in addressing the problem of invasive weeds being imported to 
New Zealand. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has introduced the conceptual framework that informed and 
structured my research. First, a brief introduction to the policy sciences was provided. 
Next, Schneider and Ingram's theory of policy design was put in the context of the 
discipline. The theory of policy design was then described, with special attention 
granted to the aspects of the theory germane to the research: the elements of policy 
design and their connection to translation dynamics. Following this, I introduced a 
theory of compliance to use in conjunction with the policy design theory. The theory's 
compatibility with Schneider and Ingram's work was considered and the four 
motivations for compliance identified by the theory were described. The final portion 
of the chapter deinonstrated how 11 synthesis of these theories was operationalised to 
pursue the aims of my research. 
With the application of the conceptual framework now clear the next task of this 
thesis will be to put the theory into practice. In the following chapter, HSNO's 
elements of policy design are described. This provides a foundation for subsequent 
assessment of the targets' social constructions of HSNO and analysis of risks to 
compliance. 
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Chapter Three - HSNO through the Policy Design Lens 
This chapter situates the HSNO Act within the causal model of policy design. 
HSNO's elements of design relevant to the regulation of plant importation will be 
described to build a foundation for the analysis that follows. In order to make sense of 
both the qualitative and the quantitative data, a description of HSNO is necessary. The 
chapter begins by providing an account of the social, cultural, and ecological context 
from which HSNO emerged. HSNO's policy design is then outlined. This will include 
a description ofHSNO's goals, agents, implementation structure, rules, tools, and 
several of the rationales and assumptions underlying these. 
Background: the societal context that led to HSNO 
To understand the societal context from which HSNO's regulation of plants 
emerged it is useful to consider how introduction of non-indigenous species was dealt 
with in the past. The social, economic, and ecological components of this history 
provide insight into the subsequent social construction of plant introductions as a policy 
problem. 
European explorers and colonisers believed that familiar species from Europe, as 
well as exotic species from other parts of the globe, would make New Zealand a more 
productive and pleasant place in which to live (Crosby, 1987). A desire to bring 
familiar species from home was shared by settlers throughout Europe's colonies 
(Bright, 1998, p. 135). Homesickness, uncertainty about using unfamiliar flora and 
fauna to meet their needs, and wariness about trying new foods prompted colonizers to 
introduce nonindigenous species. Familiar species were brought to provide food, 
timber, and pasture and to beautify the landscape as ornamentals (Mack, 2001, p. 23). 
Not only did the colonists enthusiastically seek to introduce new species, but also they 
brought many by accident, such as weeds in pasture grasses, insects in ship timbers, rats 
in cargo and pathogens in people, livestock and plants (Mack et aI., 2000, p. 4). 
European explorers initiated the flow of species to New Zealand from around the 
globe?4 Explorers broadcast seeds as they walked through the new landscape in hopes 
of enhancing an unfamiliar and seemingly deficient flora (Crosby, 1987, p. 229). In the 
1770's, James Cook introduced rabbits, pigs, and several food crops and their attendant 
weeds (Crosby, 1987, p. 229). The pace of introductions increased when the first major 
wave of settlers began arriving in the 1840' s. They brought livestock, crops, pasture 
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plants and their associated weed species in order to establish fanning operations like 
those they were familiar with in Europe (Crosby, 1987, p. 222; King, 1990, p.17). 
Beginning in the 1860' s, colonists formed acclimatization societies to organize species 
introductions in hopes of making New Zealand feel more like 'home' (Williams & 
West, 2000, p. 426). 
As time passed, it became apparent that some of these well-intended 
introductions were becoming agricultural pests. From rabbits and stoats to gorse and 
thistles, the colonists were discovering that introduced species did not behave as they 
had in their native habitats (King, 1990, p. 14). Although the settlers tried to control 
introduced pests as they emerged, overall, new species were still perceived as desirable. 
Laws to control problem species were passed alongside those promoting further species 
introductions. One of the earliest pieces of legislation aimed at controlling invasive 
weeds was "The Act to Prevent the Propagation of Certain Plants known as Thistles," 
passed in Wellington in 1854 (Thomson, 1922, p. 543). Gorse and broom soon became 
targets of numerous laws beginning with an ordinance adopted in 1859 in Taranaki 
(Thomson, 1922, p. 543). Simultaneously, laws were enacted to protect introduced 
species, many of which later became hated pests. Statutes such as the "Act to Provide 
for the Protection of Certain Animals, Birds, and Fishes Imported into the Province of 
Nelson," passed in 1861, exemplified the colonisers' aspirations to introduce exotic 
species to New Zealand (Thomson, 1922, p. 544). 
The Noxious Weeds Act of 1900 was the first comprehensive policy to deal with 
a growing array of plants that had become agricultural pests, requiring landowners and 
land managers to control noxious weeds (Thomson, 1922, p. 552). The Act was 
amended several times and many species were added to its schedules. By 1950 the Act 
had grown to include nearly 90 species from the original 25 species in 1900 
(Hilgendorf, 1967, p. 7; Thomson, 1922, p. 553). Despite these changes, the Act's basic 
themes remained constant. Although responding to existing weed invasions, it was not 
anticipatory lacking provisions for surveillance to identify naturalised species that were 
becoming pests. Under the Act, weeds were defined solely as plants that were harmful 
to agriculture; the concept of invasive weeds was absent. 
Efforts to prevent harmful plants and other pest organisms from entering New 
Zealand also focused exclusively on those threatening agriculture, but showed more 
foresight than the Noxious Weed Act. Species known to be pests in other parts of the 
24 The Maoris were the first human beings to bring non-indigenous species to New Zealand. 800 years 
before Cook arrived they brought rats, dogs, and a few food crops. However, these introductions were 
dwarfed by the stream of species that came with Pakeha settlers. 
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world were placed on a list of prohibited species. In 1903, for example, "The Orchard 
and Gardens Pest Act," sought to prevent a range of insects and fungi, some not yet 
present in New Zealand, from entering the country on imported plant material, timber, 
or fruit (Thomson, 1922, p. 550). In assessing the adequacy of these early efforts, one 
author observed in 1922 that, "there is pretty close inspection at all ports of entry of 
seeds, fruits, etc. and few deleterious things pass the inspectors" (Thomson, 1922, p. 
554). In retrospect, the precautions taken at the border and efforts to control agricultural 
weeds appear inadequate. Since colonization began in the 1770's, numerous non-
indigenous plants that have been introduced to New Zealand have become weeds 
impacting not only agriculture but also native biodiversity and ecosystem function. 
The policies established at the tum of the century were maintained for decades. 
New border policies that were implemented over the years, such as the Plants Act 1970, 
continued to rely on a prohibited list approach. Until the 1990's, all plants species 
could be imported to New Zealand as long as they were disease free and were not on a 
'prohibited list' of known agricultural weeds (Owen, 1998, p. 7). With the introduction 
of HSNO in 1996, the prohibited list approach was turned on its head. Under HSNO all 
new species must be evaluated for their risks and benefits before they can be added to 
the 'permitted list' of plants approved for import. 
The Resource Management Act (RMA) foreshadowed the development of 
HSNO by calling for a Hazards Control Commission to manage the adverse effects of 
new organisms. In seeking to "promote the sustainable management of natural and 
physical resources" the RMA recognised that the effects of new organisms must be 
addressed (Sutherland, 1997, p. 203). As it turned out, HSNO was developed as a 
separate statute and the Hazards Control Commission was ultimately abandoned in 
favour of creating an independent body to administer HSNO (Sutherland, 1997, p. 203). 
In the following section, the elements ofHSNO's design are described. This 
description provides background information needed to understand the results and 
discussion in the chapters that follow. While the qualitative and quantitative research 
present nursery operators' understandings of HSNO's elements of design, this chapter 
draws upon HSNO's designers, the text of the Act, and implementing agencies to offer 
the 'official' perspective on HSNO. 
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The Policy Design of the HSNO Act 
HSNO's Goals 
Policy goals express the desired outcomes a policy is to attain within its social 
context. These outcomes represent perceived ne~ds and aspirations which mayor may 
not resonate with target groups or society at large (Schneider & Ingram, 1997, p. 83). 
Assumptions underlying goals may include the cause and significance of the problem/s 
the policy addresses, and beliefs about who should be held responsible for remedying 
the problem/so Some policy goals are specific and instrumental, while others state broad 
visions and are designed mainly to achieve a hortatory effect (Schneider & Ingram, 
1997, p. 84). 
The text ofHSNO states the statute's purpose is "to protect the environment, 
and the health and safety of people and communities by preventing or managing the 
adverse effects of hazardous substances and new organisms" (Anonymous, 1996, S 4). 
'New organisms' are defined as plant, animal, or microorganism species that were not 
present in New Zealand prior to 1998 (Anonymous, 1996, S 2A). As in the RMA, 
'environment' is defined to include natural, social, and cultural components 
(Sutherland, 1997, p. 203). HSNO's goals are 'instrumental,' linking a desirable end-
state with actions that must be taken. Although the purpose of the Act is stated in 
general terms the principles in s 5 describe the desired end-state in more detail. S 5 
states that persons charged with the Act's implementation must acknowledge and take 
into consideration two essential principles: 
a) The safeguarding of the life-supporting capacity of air, water, soil and 
ecosystems; 
b) The maintenance and enhancement of the capacity of people and communities 
to provide for their own economic, social, and cultural well-bein~ and for the 
reasonably foreseeable needs of future generations (HSNO, S 5). 5 
Protection of the environment is placed on an equal footing with protection of 
economic, social and cultural 'well-being.' Because the Act does not specify how 
environment and economy should be weighted, policy designers required that the agent 
develop a methodology (approved by Government) outlining how these values would be 
25 This principle is similar to the principles underlying the purpose of the RMA (See RMA 1991, S 5). 
HSNO shares a number of common principles and term definitions with the RMA. One benefit of this is 
that interpretation ofthe RMA to date can provide guidance for interpreting HSNO (Christensen & 
Williams, 1997, p. 303). 
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considered in relation to one another during decision-making (House of Representatives 
New Zealand, 1996, p. 11902). 
S 6 of the Act sets out a series of desired values which agents must consider when 
assessing the risks posed by new organisms and hazardous substances. The values 
HSNO seeks to protect are: 
(a) The sustainability of all native and valued introduced flora and fauna; 
(b) The intrinsic value of ecosystems; 
(c) Public health; 
(d) The relationship of Maori and their culture and traditions with their ancestral 
lands, water, sites, waahi tapu, valued flora and fauna, and other taonga; 
( e) The economic and related benefits to be derived from the use of a particular 
hazardous substance or new organism; 
(f) New Zealand's international obligations (Anonymous, 1996, S 6). 
HSNO's goals differ from those of previous plant importation legislation in 
several ways. Firstly, the Act requires that the likely effects of a species be assessed 
prior to importation so adverse effects can be minimised either by forbidding 
importation or by imposing controls. Secondly, the Act seeks to protect native flora, 
fauna, and ecosystems whereas previous policy focused solely on protection of primary 
industry (House of Representatives New Zealand, 1995, p. 5). HSNO not only extends 
concern to ecological values but also strives to balance these with economic potential of 
new organisms. Finally, cultural values include those specific to Maori. Previous 
policy sought to protect valued introduced flora and fauna, which has both economic 
and cultural importance but did recognise values uniquely Maori. 
HSNO's Agents 
Agents are the entities identified by a statute that must connect policy goals with 
target actions. Agencies implement rules and tools according to the implementation 
structure imposed by the statute (Schneider & Ingram, 1997, p. 89). Rules instruct 
agents and/or targets to undertake or avoid certain actions. Tools are measures 
designed to increase the likelihood of compliance (Schneider & Ingram, 1997, pp. 93, 
97). 
The HSNO Act states that new organisms and hazardous substances shall not be 
manufactured or imported without the consent of ERMA, the agent created by the 
statute to administer HSNO and make decisions on applications (Anonymous, 1996, S 
14; Christensen & Williams, 1997, p. 301). ERMA consists of three groups: The 
33 
Authority, Nga Kaihautu Tikanga Taiao, and ERMA New Zealand. Figure 4 depicts the 
relationship between these groups. 
Figure 4. Organisational Structure of ERMA. 
t 
(Adapted from ERMA, 200lc, p. 1) 
The Authority is a six to eight member, decision-making body. It considers 
applications for importation into containment or importation for release of new 
organisms and hazardous substances by weighing the adverse effects of a proposed 
import versus its benefits (Christensen & Williams, 1997,1'.305). Nga Kaihautu 
Tikanga Taiao is the Maori Advisory Committee. Its role is to provide the Authority 
with a Maori perspective on all applications. ERMA New Zealand, comprised of a 
Chief Executive and a staff of approximately 90, administers the HSNO Act (Nahkies, 
Loutit & Rogne, 2003a, p. 84). It manages the application process, evaluates 
applications from a scientific perspective, raises public awareness of the Act and related 
biosecurity issues, monitors the Act's effectiveness, and oversees enforcement (ERMA, 
200lc, pp. 1 - 3). 
Enforcement for new plant species is carried out by MAF. MAF is far more 
familiar with the Biosecurity Act and thus far as chosen to prosecute under this Act 
rather than HSNO. MAF notes that the Biosecurity Act gives them greater power in 
enforcement than HSNO and they can make use of case law accumulated from past 
prosecutions (Nahkies et aI., 2003a, p. 99). MAF's enforcement role is arranged via a 
memorandum of understanding as HSNO does not specify a particular agency for 
enforcement of the new organism provisions of the Act (Ministry for the Environment, 
2002, p. 77). An amendment is planned for HSNO that will identify MAF as the 
enforcing agency for new organisms (Nahkies et aI., 2003a, p. 71). 
34 
,,' . .' .,' 
'-','-'- ..... # •••••• 
~~~ ;~l ~ :~t ~~ ;~~:I:, 
- - -'_. --. _.:' 
HSNO's Implementation Structure 
Schneider and Ingram (1997, p. 89) define 'implementation' as the "value added 
to design." 'Value' consists of any alteration to policy design, intended or unanticipated, 
made by agents andlor targets. Statutes shape implementation by specifying the roles 
that agents and targets may play in putting the policy into practice. The relationship 
between agents and targets dictated by a statute is referred to as the 'implementation 
structure' (Ingram & Schneider, 1990, p. 73). 
The implementation structure imposed by HSNO's designers primarily 
resembles the 'Wilsonian' approach but also contains features of a 'strong statute.' The 
former describes policy designs that set out clear goals and instruct agents to determine 
how to pursue these goals (Ingram & Schneider, 1990, p. 77). The rationale for placing 
implementation discretion in the hands of agents is that government involvement often 
taints implementation with politically pressured decision-making. A strong statute 
contains clear goals and objectives as well as providing detailed prescriptions that 
implementers must follow in pursuit of these (Ingram & Schneider, 1990, p. 74). 
HSNO's purpose is stated in broad terms but is made more specific by the 
accompanying principles and values in s 5 and s 6. The Act enables ERMA to develop 
means to achieve the goals of the statute. However, the statute provides a series of 
parameters to shape ERMA's efforts. The Act, for example, requires that the agent 
develop a methodology in order to ensure that a consistent, transparent process is used 
to weigh the risks and benefits of a proposed species introduction (Anonymous, 1996, s 
9). A framework for application requirements and information to be considered in 
decision-making is also outlined in the statute (Anonymous, 1996, s 34 - 38). The 
utilisation of a precautionary approach to deal with technical and scientific uncertainty 
and adherence to the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi is a requirement of s 7 and s 8 
(Anonymous, 1996). 
The combination of discretion and oversight evidenced in HSNO's 
implementation structure is illustrated in the following example. ERMA must strive to 
balance the ecological and economic values set out in s 5 ofHSNO. But the Act does 
not specify how this balance should be achieved. This provides ERMA with a great 
deal of discretion (as well as a very challenging task). By developing a methodology 
ERMA is able to determine how to balance ecological and economic considerations. 
However, a measure of control is imposed upon this discretion by requiring that their 
35 
methodology be approved by Government (House of Representatives New Zealand, 
1996). 
In a Wilsonian approach much emphasis is placed on holding agents accountable 
for their success in achieving policy goals (Ingram & Schneider, 1990, p. 77). Although 
ERMA is held accountable by monitoring and reporting requirements (Anonymous, 
1996, S 20), HSNO simultaneously adopts a 'strong statute' approach by providing an 
avenue for government intervention and accountability. The Act enables the Minister 
for the Environment to over-ride the Authority'S power by 'calling in' application 
decisions if the Minister decides that the organism proposed for import is likely to have 
'significant' effects on the economy, environment, human health, or the global 
community (Anonymous, 1996, S 10,68). The rationale for this design choice was that 
an official accountable to the electorate should be required to make the final decision on 
any politically contentious applications (Upton, 1999, p. 9). 
HSNO's Rules 
A number ofHSNO's rules that direct ERMA's activities were touched upon in 
the account ofHSNO's implementation structure. The rules which nursery operators 
are likely to encounter if they seek to import a plant species not listed on the permitted 
list are described below. 
Part V of HSNO describes how prospective importers may apply to have a new 
organism considered for approvaL This portion of the Act also stipulates what ERMA 
must consider in the assessment process (Anonymous, 1996). Under HSNO, the 
applicant must demonstrate that their organism will bring more benefits than adverse 
effects to New Zealand (Sutherland, 1997, p. 202). Their applications must detail the 
detrimental effects that could arise from the release of the species in question 
(Christensen, 1997, p. 305). 
Anyone wishing to bring a new plant to New Zealand must seek import approval 
from ERMA under Section V of the HSNO Act. 26 The two pathways that applications 
can take under the Act are: rapid assessment applications or full assessment 
applications. In addition, if a species is present in New Zealand but not included on the 
permitted list applicants may request that ERMA determine whether the species is a 
new organism under Section 26 of HSNO. As was mentioned in Chapter One, many 
plant species found within New Zealand are not yet listed on the Plant Biosecurity 
26 In addition to applying for importation approval under HSNO, importers must also meet MAF 
biosecurity standards under the Biosecurity Act to prevent harmful passenger organisms from 
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Index (PBI) even though it is intended to act as a comprehensive plant register (Nahkies 
et aI., 2003a, p. 52). 
Section 26 determinations 
If an iris enthusiast, for example, wishes to import Iris prismatica seeds they 
must first determine if the flower is considered a new organism. If Iris prismatica is not 
listed in the PBI but the importer knows the species is already present in New Zealand, 
they can request the Authority to add the species to the index under Section 26 of the 
HSNO Act. 27 Their section 26 application must provide evidence establishing that the 
iris was present in New Zealand prior to 1998. Such evidence can include records from 
nursery catalogues, botanic gardens, or Landcare Research databases (ERMA, 2000, p. 
3). Section 26 applications are processed without charge, but the applicant must pay for 
any services required in assembling evidence of the species' presence in New Zealand 
(ERMA, 2000, p. 2). 
If the Authority approves the Section 26 determination, the species will be added 
to the permitted list. The iris enthusiast can then proceed with the importation process 
by applying to MAF for biosecurity clearance. So far, the Authority has added 177 
plants to the PBI as a result of Section 26 determinations (Watson, 2002, p. 10). 
Rapid assessment applications 
If a plant species is not on the PBI and there is insufficient evidence that the 
species was in New Zealand prior to 1998, then a Section 26 determination is not an 
option. In these cases the prospective importer must apply for approval to import from 
the Authority. Unlike Section 26 determinations, rapid assessment and full assessment 
applications are processed on a 'user pays' basis under the HSNO Act. But once a 
species gains ERMA approval, subsequent importers may bring it into the country 
without charge. Rapid assessment applications for the release of plants cost $500 per 
species (ERMA, 2003c, p. 2). If ERMA must do further research in addition to 
reviewing the information provided in the application, then the applicant is charged 
either 10 percent of the base fee or $2,500 (the lesser of the two is selected) (ERMA, 
2003c, p. 3). 
accompanying the import. Applicants are encouraged to apply to MAF for biosecurity clearance at the 
same time as they apply to ERMA. 
27 Seeds of species already within New Zealand are sought from overseas to provide new genetic material 
for breeding. Also, seed may be unavailable for species found within New Zealand because market-size 
may make seed production unprofitable. 
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Applicants can determine if a species is eligible for rapid assessment by 
referring to the rapid assessment criteria. Firstly, the species in question must not have 
'unwanted organism' status.28 Expert opinion must then establish that the organism is 
"highly improbable" to form a self-sustaining population in the wild. Finally, experts 
must determine that the organism is unlikely to displace valued species, cause habitat 
deterioration, adversely affect safety and human health, cause or spread disease, or harm 
the environment (Anonymous, 1996, S 35). 
Since HSNO was implemented in 1998 to February 2004, seven rapid 
assessment applications to import new plants for release have been lodged (J. Catley, 
personal communication, 18 February 2004). ERMA approved one application for two 
new species, which have been added to the PBI. 
Full assessment applications 
A full assessment application requires detailed information covering a range of 
subjects including the organism's biological characteristics, a risk and benefit 
assessment examining effects on the environment and public health and safety, and 
incorporation of Maori perspectives (ERMA, 2003e, p. 4). Application fees for full 
assessment of a new plant species for release are $30,000 (ERMA, 2003c, p. 2). In a 
full assessment, ERMA solicits written public comment and in some cases, convenes 
public hearings (ERMA, 2001a, p. 3). 
In compliance with section 36 ofHSNO, the Authority should reject the 
application if the plant species is likely to displace native species, impact on Maori 
cultural values to an unacceptable degree, cause habitat deterioration, adversely affect 
safety and human health, or act as a source or vector of disease or parasites (with the 
exception ofbiocontrol agents). Section 37 provides ERMA with further direction by 
requiring that they determine if the organism could establish a self-sustaining 
population. If this is considered possible, then the feasibility of eradicating such a 
population must be evaluated (Anonymous, 1996, S 36, 37). So far ERMA has not 
received an application to import a new plant species under full assessment. 
HSNO's Tools 
Tools are measures imposed by a statute and/or by agents to increase the 
likelihood of compliance (Schneider & Ingram, 1997, p. 93). Schneider and Ingram 
(1990a) describe several categories of policy tools. Of these, sanctions, hortatory tools, 
28 An 'unwanted organisms' register was created under the HSNO Act. It lists organisms banned from 
sale, import, and/or propagation. 
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and capacity building tools can be identified in ERMA's implementation of HSNO. 
Sanctions provide negative incentives for compliance, such as fines, and are premised 
on the assumption that people choose to comply with a policy based upon a rational 
assessment of the risks and benefits of their behaviour (Schneider & Ingram, 1990a, p. 
515). In contrast, hortatory tools assume behaviour is guided by internal norms. These 
tools create a link between compli~ce with the policy and public values that are likely 
to be seen in a positive light (Schneider & Ingram, 1990a, p. 519). Capacity building 
tools provide resources such as information or skills to targets. This approach is based 
on the rationale that a lack of resources is a barrier to compliance (Schneider & Ingram, 
1990a, p. 517). 
HSNO stipulates strict sanctions for noncompliance. The Act authorises fines of 
up to $500,000 and prison terms of up to three months for violators (Anonymous, 1996, 
S 114). Policy designers assumed that targets would consider the severity of the penalty 
and the risk of detection when choosing whether or not to comply with the Act. During 
design, fines were increased from $100,000 to $500,000 in recognition ofthe fact that 
detecting breaches of the Act would be difficult (House of Representatives New 
Zealand, 1995, p. 10). 
So far, no one has been prosecuted under the HSNO Act for importing new plant 
species without ERMA approval. MAF Biosecurity Authority carries out enforcement 
under the Biosecurity Act rather than HSNO (Environmental Risk Management 
Authority, 2002, p. 2). From 1994 to 2003 MAF prosecuted 40 individuals under the 
Biosecurity Act for making false declarations or intentionally failing to declare plant 
material. Fifteen of these offenders received fines of $1 ,000 or more. The highest fine 
imposed was for $10,000 while most were approximately $1,500 (Ministry of 
Agriculture and Forestry, 2003b). The remaining 25 offenders incurred fines of several 
hundred dollars. MAF's records do not specify if plant material involved in these 
offenses were new organisms or not (Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 2003b). 
Failure to declare plant material when intent to conceal this material appears unlikely is 
punished by instant fines of $200. In 2000, 40 instant fines were issued for undeclared 
nursery stock (Anonymous, 2002, p. 5). These fines were a small portion of those 
awarded overall; During a six month period in 2002, 4,965 people received an instant 
fine (Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 2004). 
ERMA utilises a hortatory tool by appealing to HSNO's values as'a reason for 
compliance. As the agent states, "ERMA New Zealand expects that most people will 
voluntarily comply with approvals because they recognise that they are necessary to 
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achieve a safe environment and ensure safety of people and communities"(ERMA, 
2001b, p. 1). S 11 ofHSNO calls upon the ERMA to "promote awareness of the 
adverse effects of hazardous substances and new organisms on people or the 
environment ... " (Anonymous, 1996). ERMA conducts capacity building in a variety of 
ways. Through the website and printed material they offer a range of guides and reports 
aimed to inform interested parties of HSNO and ERMA, the application process, and 
enforcement. A presence at various conferences and public awareness sessions further 
contribute to the agent's capacity building (Nahkies et aI., 2003a, p. 63). 
Conclusion 
This chapter has placed HSNO within a societal context by briefly considering 
the role nonindigenous plants have played in New Zealand since colonisation and the 
polices that have been developed to regulate their importation. Up until the 1990s, a 
'prohibited list' approach allowed importation of all species except those known to be 
agricultural weeds. with the introduction of HSNO in 1998 a new approach was taken 
to regulating the importation of plant species not yet found in New Zealand. 
HSNO's goals include protection not only of primary industry but also of the 
environment, human health, and cultural values from the adverse effects of new species. 
The principles underlying HSNO's goals require that ERMA balance ecological and 
economic benefits of a proposed species introduction when making decisions under the 
Act. HSNO's implementation structure provides discretion to ERMA while imposing 
parameters to shape their implementation approach. A possibie advantage of the mix of 
oversight and flexibility given ERMA is that the agency should be able to respond to 
fluid public understandings of, and tolerance for, risk, while adhering to the underlying 
principles of the Act. 
HSNO's rules appear to be based on the assumption that the initial importer of a 
new plant species will benefit most from the introduction. Both the user pays approach 
of the application process and the responsibility of the applicant to gather the 
information that addresses the criteria in s 35 and s 36 reflect this assumption. ERMA's 
responsibility is to evaluate the evidence provided that can aid the Authority in 
decision-making. The sanctions included in HSNO suggest that severe fines were seen 
as necessary to deter noncompliance. 
The information provided in this chapter provides a context for the research 
results reported in Chapters Four and Five. Further, the description of HSNO's 
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elements of design provides a basis for the discussion in Chapter Six, which considers 
the implications of risks to compliance for the effectiveness ofHSNO's design. 
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Chapter Four - Exploring HSNO's Effectiveness 
The first stage ofthe research explored how effectively HSNO is regulating the 
importation of new plant species. This inductive, qualitative inquiry focused on how 
the nursery industry, a key target group, viewed HSNO and were responding to the Act. 
Nursery operators' reasons for wanting to import new plant species, their experiences 
with HSNO, and their reactions to the Act were explored via 24 semi-structured 
interviews. The results ofthe qualitative research are presented in this chapter. 
The reasons nursery operators import new plant species are considered 
following a brief description of the interviewees. Respondents indicated that financial 
profit and a passion for plants are important motivations to import new plants. The 
chapter then focuses on nursery operators' views ofHSNO's aims. While most nursery 
respondents were familiar with, and supportive of these aims, a number of those 
interviewed did not perceive that the plants they wished to import posed a risk to the 
values HSNO seeks to protect. Further, many were critical of the means employed by 
the Act to achieve its goals. HSNO's requirements and its implementation by 
government agencies provide the focus for the next section of the chapter and centre 
around three themes: inaccessibility for nursery operators due to the cost of applying, 
difficulty in understanding the application process and providing the information 
required, and issues of distrust and disrespect. The final portion of the chapter is 
devoted to the issue of noncompliance. The research suggests that nursery operators 
may resort to smuggling as a means of circumventing the HSNO Act. The concern that 
plant imports are being 'pushed underground' brings into question the effectiveness of 
HSNO in regulating the importation of new plant species. Investigation of the 
perceived problems with compliance, which formed the basis for the second stage of the 
research, will be discussed in Chapters Five and Six. 
Those interviewed included people within the nursery industry as well as those 
implementing and enforcing HSNO. Twelve interviewees were involved in the nursery 
industry. Eight of these managed and/or owned medium to large wholesale nurseries or 
seed companies. All of these respondents had imported new species into New Zealand 
prior to HSNO and some had imported new plants after the Act came into effect. The 
remaining four nursery industry respondents were plant enthusiasts involved in 
collecting and/or breeding species. They had been engaged in this pastime for between 
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18 to 38 years. Three of these respondents were operating small-scale nurseries on a 
part-time basis and one respondent planned to do so in the future. All four had imported 
new species prior to HSNO. Since HSNO's implementation one had submitted a 
successful Section 26 application and others had considered this option but decided 
against it. 
Eight persons in the public sector were interviewed. They had various roles in 
implementing HSNO, enforcing HSNO, or advising HSNO applicants and ERMA. 
Their HSNO related duties included providing expert opinion on the possible ecological 
impacts of new plant species, processing new organism applications, implementing 
biosecurity at the border, and contributing to scientific and Maori perspectives within 
ERMA's decision-making process. I also interviewed three public sector respondents 
who were not directly involved with HSNO, but had expertise on the impacts of 
invasive species in New Zealand, perspectives on the relationship of the nursery 
industry to the Act, and experience with plant import regulations prior to HSNO. 
In the presentation and discussion of the data collected from the qualitative 
interviews pseudonyms will be used when presenting quotes from my respondents in 
order to protect their anonymity. Respondents from the public sector will be identified 
by 'agent' following their pseudonym. All pseudonyms lacking this suffix refer to 
nursery operators.29 
Motivations for Importing New Plant Species 
I wished to gain insight into why nursery operators import new plant species and 
gauge the importance of new species to them within the context of their professional 
and personal interest in plants. This information could in tum, offer insights into 
targets' reactions to HSNO and help assess the effectiveness ofHSNO's approach to 
regulating plant importation. When respondents were asked what prompted them, and 
others in the industry, to import new plant species, two distinct motives for importing 
new species were identified: financial profit and a passion for plant collecting. 
The research indicates that nursery operators benefit financially from importing 
new species in several ways. New species may be sought to improve 'production 
. efficiencies.' If, for example, a new species propagates more easily or has greater 
29 As was discussed in the methods section of the Introduction, the results ofthe qualitative research are 
valuable for their 'validity' rather than their 'reliability.' Because my sample is not representative of the 
population, I rarely quantify how many respondents expressed a given view, but rather use approximate 
terms such as 'few', 'several, 'a majority' and 'most.' For details of how many respondents expressed 
each view please see appendix D. 
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disease resistance then the grower can produce plants at lower cost. In other instances 
new species are sought as sources of genn plasm for developing species through 
breeding for release on the market. 
Finally, species are imported either for use as parent material or for selling 
directly to retailers or the public. Because the popularity of any given species among 
consumers is in a constant state of flux (Douglas, 2003, p. 13) developing something 
new via breeding or importing new species to sell on without modification, helps 
maintain and/or boost revenue for nurseries. 30 Consumers are willing to pay more for a 
product when it first appears on the market. Ben and Adam explained: 
The consumer is in for new and different things all the time. And so that's 
what's driving the grower and the marketer to lookfor that material because 
we're going to make some money and hopefully instead of 60 cents you can sell 
[each plant] for two or three dollars. 
The main, number one reason [to import a new species] would be to make 
money, sell something that nobody else has got or to be first in with a new 
product. It'sjust normal commercial reality. 
Consumers will pay a premium for something new, not solely for its novelty but 
in order to keep up with fashion trends. A number of respondents identified the fashion 
appeal of new plants. David described the types of plants he sells as "very trendy and 
always expensive" and as having an appealing "style." Josh and Ariana remarked: 
It's a fashion item we've got here ... we need a new colour for winter next year 
you know, it's got to change. 
I think there are fashions in gardening same as in everything else. People want 
a new look. Grasses were 'in' now it's succulents. 
Offering something new is also important to maintain an interested customer base. 
Mitch raised the concern that since accessing new species has become more difficult 
under the HSNO Act the industry risks losing consumer interest: 
It would be like saying, "well from now on there will be no new colours for our 
clothing" ... well that's not going to do terribly much for the fashion industry in 
New Zealand. Well, gardening is exactly the same. We need to have the new 
fad colours, we need to have the plants with better disease resistance, all those 
sorts of things. Yet if we persist with the current system of importation we're not 
going to get those new colours ... so therefore New Zealand gardeners will get 
30 Horticulture, currently a four billion dollar industry (Kerr, Hewett & Aitken, 2002, p. 3), is based upon 
production from exotic species. Throughout its history in New Zealand horticulture has sought out new 
species to keep up with changing markets. The agriculture and forestry industries have followed a similar 
pattern. Introducing new products to maintain sales is not unique to the horticulture industry. Within the 
current economic system expanding one's market and modifying the range of products on offer are vital 
to business survival and profitability. 
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tired ofwhat's already available and move on to doing something that's a bit 
more exciting. 
Nursery people may be especially concerned that limited access to new species could 
decrease consumer interest in gardening in light of other pressures on the industry that 
are currently causing it to contract.31 
Promoting and keeping up with 'plant fashions' and pursuing other means of 
financial profit by importing new species formed the primary, but not sole, motivation 
for importation. Either referring to themselves, their customers, or others in the 
industry, a number of respondents described an avid interest in plant collecting as an 
important motive for importing new plant species. Mitch explained: 
In New Zealand we have a lot of gardeners ... who are interested in a particular 
type of thing. You know, like miniature bulbs or alpines - those sorts of groups. 
A lot of those people are avid plant collectors and they love to import seed of 
new things that they see. 
Describing herself, Mary, a part-time, small-scale nursery operator, observed: 
... really my whole life revolves around plants because I simply love plants. I 
belong to several [plant enthusiast societies] and I garden all the time. I have a 
job as well, but I garden from choice rather than asjust a spare time 
thing ... basically, I'm a 'plants person. ' 
'Plants people' derive great enjoyment from growing new species. One respondent 
fondly remembered obtaining "amazing stuff' by purchasing shares in plant hunting 
expeditions where yet un-named species were collected from wilderness areas overseas. 
Another respondent, Sheryl, commented: 
You can bring these species infrom other parts of the world but they won't 
necessarily always grow in our climate. But collectors will love to have a go. 
That's all part of the fun I suppose, being able to grow something that's grown 
in another part of the world. 
Nursery operators reported that they had encountered plant enthusiasts who were 
baffled by the new regulations and frustrated that nurseries were not providing the 
species they desired. One respondent lamented how HSNO had limited her and her 
peers' access to new species. She vividly explained that being unable to obtain new 
plant species was like forbidding a chef from trying a new recipe or showing a musician 
a new composition but allowing him to play only the "old, familiar stuff." 
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This description not only conveys an artistic passion for plant collecting, but it 
also demonstrates the similarity of plant collecting to other well-loved past-times. 
Mack (2001, p. 30) points out that collecting as a behaviour is not unique to 'plant 
people.' People avidly collect items such as stamps, antique cars, and Lord of the Rings 
action figures. These collectors share a passion for obtaining items that are linked by a 
theme, difficult to obtain, and durable for the life-time of the collector. Plant collectors 
specialise in certain genera or communities of plants such as rhododendrons or alpine 
plants. Plant collecting has a recorded history back to the 6th century B.C. but did not 
become widely popular until European explorers described and brought home novel 
species from their travels (Mack, 2001, pp. 31,32). 
The economic and social/psychological motivations described above shed light 
on why people seek to import new species into New Zealand. As in the production and 
sale of other commodities, offering a 'new model' is seen as vital for nursery people in 
order to capture and maintain consumer interest. Importers driven by a passion for 
collecting appear to gain much personal satisfaction from the acquisition and cultivation 
of new additions to their 'set.' In the rest of this chapter, attention shifts to nursery 
operators' views of the HSNO Act. Keeping in mind the motivations for importing 
plants described above may be of help to understand the views and reactions oftargets 
to the Act. 
Responses to HSNO's goals 
Nursery respondents were asked to comment on their views on HSNO's 
purpose. The research indicated that, on the whole, respondents were moderately to 
strongly supportive ofHSNO's goals. However, three issues emerged that appeared to 
undermine this support. Firstly, several respondents suggested that HSNO might have 
an unstated agenda to block the industry from importing exotic species. Secondly, most 
respondents perceived that the plant species they wished to import posed little risk to 
the values HSNO seeks to protect. Finally, the majority of respondents felt the means 
employed by the Act to pursue its goals were problematic. 
In expressing their support for HSNO's goals several respondents described 
mistakes of the past, where plants were imported that later became pernicious weeds, 
31 These pressures include rising interest in other leisure activities, busier lifestyles and a business 
environment where the industry is increasingly dominated by a few large nurseries, rather than a range of 
business sizes as in the past (Gill Ellis & Associates, 2000). 
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commenting that additional pest plants would be undesirable. David and Ariana 
remarked: 
The reasons for keeping some plants out, the weeds and that, are sound you 
know. We don't have a problem with that. We're very much infavour of doing 
it properly. 
One has only to look at things around the country-side like gorse and broom and 
old man's beard to use the classic examples. There can be really, terribly 
dangerous plants. 
Others perceived the need for biosecurity primarily in terms of keeping pests 
and diseases that could harm primary industry from entering the country as hitchhikers 
on imported plant material. Chris observed: 
We know, being in the plant industry, that there are certainly a lot of pests and 
diseases overseas that we definitely don't want in New Zealand It makes sense 
to me that any new organisms are checked out. I don't have any problem with 
that at all. 
Awareness of plants as a threat to the environment is a relatively new phenomenon in 
New Zealand, becoming wide-spread in the 1980's (Williams & West, 2000, p. 432). 
Agents Tabitha and Richard both noted that plant importation regulation preceding 
HSNO and the Biosecurity Act was "basically a phytosanitary standard not really 
aimed at plants, what it was concerned with was plants' diseases." To the extent that 
the prohibited list approach did exclude plants for weediness, Richard observed it was 
"concerned primarily with agricultural weeds and with bulk imports of seeds for sowing 
to detect contaminants. " 
Respondents who expressed ambivalence or suspicion about HSNO's intent 
mentioned the importance of its stated goals on the one hand but suggested a possible 
unstated agenda. One respondent described HSNO as being "very slanted towards the 
greenies, " while Danielle mused: 
I suppose overall it's to protect the environment ... the people environment, the 
flora and fauna environment, the tourist environment. A lot of us would say that 
it's motivated by the green movement generally who want to keep New Zealand 
native .... I know the green lovers had a big input into the formulation of the Act. 
Josh speculated: 
[HSNO] could be a very indirect way of [stopping plant imports]. , 'Oh look, you 
guys can do it. It's going to cost you an arm and a leg. We know behind the 
scenes it's really unrealistic so you'll never do it. But the avenue is open. ' 
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Many respondents argued that while HSNO's goals were sound, the Act "targets plants 
that are plainly not a problem." Nursery operators perceived that the species they 
wished to import posed little to zero risk to New Zealand as expressed in the quotes 
below: 
There's no way they are ever going to be any kind of hazard of any kind. 
There's no weed potential (Danielle). 
The risk of a particular plant being a problem is certainly, in ornamental 
horticulture, bloody low, almost minimal (Josh). 
Respondents noted that the species or genera that interested them were often "damn 
difficult to grow." They mentioned biogeographical characteristics such as slow 
growth, difficulty in propagation, and poor climate match. Respondents' perception 
that their imports pose little risk alongside their overall concerns about biosecurity is an 
interesting juxtaposition. Research commissioned by ERMA indicated that a 
representative sample of New Zealanders demonstrated a similar attitude to risk. They 
expressed high concern about the adverse effects of new plants and animals on New 
Zealand but strongly supported hypothetical proposals to import a new flower, fruit or 
vegetable species (Network Communications, 2002a, pp. 7, 17). Schneider and Ingram 
(1990b, p. 93) also shed light on this matter when noting that individuals tend to under-
estimate risks of hazards within their control while over-estimating risks of hazards they 
view as external to themselves. 
Several respondents felt that while the relatively low-risk' activity of importing 
new plant species was receiving excess scrutiny under HSNO, other pathways of 
biosecurity concern were being neglected. Adam commented: 
Shipping containers pose a much greater risk. [The current approach to 
biosecurity] is like spending ten thousand dollars putting in security cameras 
and flash locks on the front of your building and then leaving your back door 
open all night. 
The concerns raised about HSNO's possible hidden agenda, the low risk of plant 
imports, and the neglect of other biosecurity risk pathways were dwarfed by another 
issue that emerged repeatedly in the interviews; HSNO's requirements and the 
implementation of the Act were seen as problematic. As Mitch noted: 
I think [HSNO] is a sensible way to make sure that we protect our environment 
and also protect some of the major export crops that we have.... The philosophy 
behind HSNO ... is actually a very good philosophy, I have no problem with it 
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whatsoever. I have a problem with the cost structure and amount of 
administrative work that goes into trying to geta new plant into New Zealand. 
Views of the Act's Requirements and their Implementation 
When discussing the impacts of HSNO, one agent observed that the Act had 
"slammed the door shut" on the "honest importation of plants." My research suggests 
that, at least for those I spoke with, this holds true. Eleven of the 12 nursery 
respondents had decided against importing new plant species under the Act. These 
decisions were based upon their assessments of the Act and its implementation. Their 
concerns can be placed into three categories. First that HSNO is inaccessible to nursery 
operators because of the cost of applying, second that going through the application 
process seems too difficult, and finally that the implementing agencies show a lack of 
trust and respect for the nursery industry. 
Issues with Costs 
Inaccessibility because of cost was the most frequently raised issue among 
respondents. Almost all nursery operators interviewed explained that the application 
fees were too high in relation to the profit that could be anticipated from future sales of 
a new plant species. The smaller nursery operators were especially adamant about this 
point. As Chris explained: 
The problem you have in New Zealand is it's a small market and basically to go 
through the current process doesn't justify the costs involved. I mean we're not 
really big enough to do any sort of numbers. For me to actually go through that 
process I would never get the money back just to put a few hundred plants on the 
market. So it's sort of limited to the bigger commercial people rather than the 
likes of us. 
Plant enthusiasts operating 'backyard' nurseries often import very small 
quantities of seed of a variety of species. Likewise, larger nurseries often trial species 
on a small scale before identifying and marketing one with commercial promise. 
Growers wishing to import species for breeding often have a long lead-time as they 
develop something for the market, thus delaying their opportunity to recoup the cost of 
applying to import the species. In noting that the nursery industry was losing many 
mid-size operators, a respondent noted that a "very small group of real large 
growers ... [are] the only ones that are going to be able to promote new material. " 
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The one respondent who did not find HSNO's fees to be a barrier had submitted 
a low-risk Section V application and was given approval by ERMA to import two new 
species. He explained that from the outset he was confident that he could recover his 
costs and he felt sure that the plants posed such a low risk to New Zealand that ERMA 
was very likely to approve his application. For his type of nursery operation, 
specialising in the sale of trendy specimen trees and shrubs, HSNO's fees were not 
prohibitive. 
Although this nurseryman did not perceive application fees to be a barrier to 
using HSNO, he did join a large number of other respondents in expressing concern for 
another aspect of application fees; the lack of protection for the 'first mover.' That is, 
the person who submits an application to import a new plant species must pay the 
application fee while subsequent importers of that species pay nothing, thus putting the 
first mover at a commercial disadvantage. Adam and David explained: 
I think the big thing for me is the fact that at the end of [the application process] . 
you haven't go/any exclusivity. You spend all that money and you know that 
every man and his dog is going to get straight on it. So that is a powerful reason 
for not [applying to HSNO]. 
The moment you [apply to HSNO] the results of that application are published 
and then everybody has access to your work. Everyone can bring it in then ... 
you've gone and done it for them.... I would like that to be changed because we 
try to stay ahead you know. 
Respondents were divided on the best way to resolve barriers posed by fees. 
Some felt it was best to retain a 'user pays' approach but mitigate the impact of fees by 
decreasing them and lor providing protection for the first mover. In supporting 'user 
pays' they noted that importers have the most to gain from bringing in a new species 
and therefore should pay the cost. Some also saw publicly funded applications as 
"government hand-outs." Other respondents favoured tax-payer funded applications. 
They argued that HSNO endeavours "to protect the environment in New Zealand as a 
whole" and that many New Zealanders reap gardening satisfaction from the presence of 
new speCIes. 
Difficulties with the application process 
Another theme that surfaced frequently during interviews was that-applying 
under HSNO was made difficult by a confusing, technically demanding application 
process and a lack of flexibility or 'common sense' on ERMA's part. Further, HSNO's 
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complexity was intensified by the simultaneous need to comply with MAF importation 
requirements. A number of respondents felt overwhelmed by the technical information 
needed to complete an application. A nursery operator, who in most other respects 
viewed HSNO positively, commented: 
I mean we're only lay people, we're not scientists. Getting the information when 
you don't know where to look - you just have to ferret about, be a bit creative 
(David). 
Commenting on the confusing nature of the application procedure one respondent 
described ERMA as 'untouchable' and explained: 
I don't think ERMA have made any real efforts to get themselves touchable by 
the ordinary person. I mean I've attended seminars, I'm not stupid, this is 
technical stuff. I sit there like a complete dummy. I mean it's so intense (Josh). 
Several respondents seemed to lack accurate understanding ofHSNO's requirements 
and other steps in the importation process because they related information to me during 
interviews that I knew to be incorrect. Others with a good understanding of the 
requirements felt it should be possible to assess the risks and benefits of new species in 
a simpler, more efficient, and less costly manner. 
Respondents who argued that the species they wished to import were low-risk 
found ERMA inflexible and unable to assess plants using "common sense." ERMA's 
lack of common sense was sometimes attributed to the agency being too "idealistic" at 
the expense of being "broadminded' and "user friendly." Some felt that low-risk 
genera should be identified and added to the PBI rather than requiring each species to be 
assessed separately. 
Another aspect of HSNO's implementation that concerned most respondents 
was the fact that the PBI is an incomplete list of plant species present in New Zealand 
prior to 1998. In order to import a species omitted from the data-base, importers must 
submit an application to ERMA to determine if the organism is present in New Zealand 
(a Section 26 application). Although there is no application fee for adding a species to 
the PBI, assembling the evidence may be costly and time consuming. A number of 
respondents felt it was unfair that they had to remedy omissions in the PBI made by the 
government. Preparing a Section 26 application was described by respondents as "a 
slow process of finding information" and as "very difficult." Chris commented: 
[An incomplete PBI] makes [importing] difficult because as a 'plimts person' 
you can know that a particular species has been here and you try to introduce 
another variety from overseas of the same species, then you've got to go to the 
process of proving that the species does exist in New Zealand .... 
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Respondents' difficulties with HSNO appeared to be compounded by the fact 
that they found the importation process as a whole to be complex. MAF import 
requirements were seen as confounding, burdensome, and constantly in a state of flux. 
In the importer's mind distinctions between regulations such as HSNO, the Biosecurity 
Act, and Import Health Standards seemed blurred. All playa part in the importation 
process and are experienced as a whole. The frustration directed towards MAF may 
have coloured perceptions of HSNO and ERMA for nursery operators who, so far, had 
not had direct experience with the Act or its implementing agency. 
Respondents raised a variety of issues pertaining to MAF. Some reported 
imports delayed or blocked by a shortage of quarantine facilities and a backlog of 
import health requirements yet to be updated and reissued. Others noted that with 
greater emphasis on detecting plant pathogens and better technical capabilities MAF 
scientists are identifying a wider range of pathogens on imported plant material. Once 
identified, it takes MAF time to determine which of these already exist in New Zealand. 
The behaviour of inspectors on the ground was criticised as pedantic and lacking 
common sense. An example of this was related to me by a respondent who had recently 
imported a container of plants in which inspectors had located several snails. The 
importer suggested removing the snails by hand, crushing them and then keeping the 
plants in quarantine for several months to monitor for newly hatched snails. However, 
the inspector rejected this option stating that destroying the snails before they reached 
maturity would make it impossible to identify them. Identification was necessary 
because if the snails were new organisms then their presence in New Zealand would be 
a contravention ofthe HSNO Act. As a result the importer shipped the plants back to 
the port of origin. 
Issues of Respect and Trust 
The final major theme that surfaced from the research related to respect and 
trust. When discussing a number of issues many respondents indicated doubts about 
ERMA's trust and respect for members of the nursery industry. Those interviewed 
who had learned of HSNO after its implementation seemed irritated or hurt that their 
input had not been sought when the Act was being formulated. Others spoke of the 
expertise that they and others in the industry possessed and lamented the fact that 
ERMA was "inflexible" and failed to take their knowledge into consideration. 
Similarly, some felt that experts at ERMA and MAF were closed-minded towards 
expert opinion from overseas. ERMA and MAF's "very narrow field o/view" was 
52 
""':'-"'-." 
thought to lead to poor and belaboured decision-making. Several respondents sensed 
that concerns of the ornamental growers were less important to MAF than the concerns 
of larger constituencies such as agriculture or forestry. Others questioned if ERMA was 
charging fairly and felt adequate risk assessment could be completed for a lower fee. 
More problems with trust and respect were raised regarding MAF than ERMA. 
This could be because MAF is the agency respondents interact with most. MAF is often 
the first port of call for inquiries about HSNO because MAF implements other 
importation regulations, and enforces all biosecurity regulations. Furthermore, MAF 
has been in existence for many more years than ERMA. Some respondents felt MAF 
should strive to improve relations with the nursery industry. Mitch explained: 
I would like to see a closer relationship between MAF and the industry so that 
they know I am not going to be pulling the wool over their eyes. It's within our 
interest to make sure that diseases don't come into the country. It's the last thing 
we want ... we're not going to pull a swifty on them. 
Other respondents had felt humiliated by interactions with MAF staff, for instance, by 
being treated with suspicion at the border. Another nursery operator felt treated 
disrespectfully by MAF since inviting a MAF inspector to join her family for lunch 
after he had examined plants on her premises. She was hurt when she later discovered 
that he included the time lunching as her guest on the invoice charging her for his time. 
The issues raised by interview participants about HSNO and its implementation 
are wide ranging. Greatest concern was expressed about application fees. Both the 
level of the fees and the lack of protection for first movers were perceived as making 
new plant species inaccessible to many. The difficulty in undertaking the HSNO 
process also troubled most respondents. Whether vexed by assembling evidence for a 
Section 26 application or irritated by perceived inflexibility in decision-making on 
ERMA's part, these issues held in common the sense that complying with the Act was 
arduous. Although less widespread among respondents, concerns about trust and 
respect from ERMA and MAF were also relevant. 
What can be concluded from the themes discussed above in regards to HSNO's 
effectiveness? It is not unusual for members of an industry to view regulation 
negatively. Nursery industry publications reveal a number of other policies and laws 
that the industry finds burdensome, restrictive, and generally problematic ( See 
Anonymous; 2003; Bourne, 2002; Gargiulo, 2003; Kennedy, 1999). While disparaging 
comments about regulation should not be equated with policy failure, the issues raised 
should be considered when evaluating the policy. How might the criticisms and 
concerns shared by those I interviewed impact on HSNO's effectiveness in regulating 
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the importation of new plant species? Insights relevant to this question can be found in 
respondents' views of how these concerns might affect compliance with HSNO. Nearly 
every respondent commented that nursery operators frustrated with the Act were likely 
to resort to smuggling in order to get new plant species into New Zealand.32 This issue 
will be explored below. 
Smuggling: an Unintended Outcome of HSNO? 
Many respondents suggested plant importers are likely to smuggle because there 
are few incentives to comply with HSNO and several incentives not to comply. Most 
agents were concerned that enforcing HSNO was difficult thus making smugglers less 
likely to be deterred by fear of being caught and punished. The perception existed 
among some agents that it was "dead easy" to smuggle seeds into New Zealand via 
mis-labelling declared seed or failing to declare plant materials. concealed in mail or 
luggage. A nursery operator commented: "[Smuggling] is actually very easy and I've 
had plenty of people offer to bring in plants for me which you shouldn't bring in" 
(David). 
One agent argued that HSNO is "unenforceable" and it would be difficult to 
"get a prosecution ifsomeone broke the law ... you are never actually going to catch 
them." She supported this view by explaining that it can be challenging to detect 
smuggled material and difficult to prove culpability for material received through the 
post. Further, once a speCies is in cultivation it is hard to prove it entered New Zealand 
after HSNO came into effect. Several respondents felt that the only incentive for 
complying with HSNO was "knowing you've done the right thing" and looking after the 
"good of the country. " 
However, other respondents were more confident that smuggling could be detected, at 
least at the border. One agent commented: 
[MAF Quarantine Service are] really doing the best they can .. " I'm sure 
there's loopholes on how to get around it because they do have people smuggle 
things in and out of the country. But I don't know how they'd do it. They'd have 
to be quite clever (Lisa). 
32 About two thirds of respondents initiated discussion of the smuggling issue when discussing their views 
on HSNO and its implementation. I prompted others by saying, "some people have suggested that plant 
importers might resort to smuggling as a means of getting around the HSNO Act. What do you think 
about that?" 
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Another agent explained that while MAF Quarantine Service must screen a large 
volume of passengers, mail, and luggage, they are aided by a dedicated staff, skilled 
detector dogs, and a good X-ray system. 
Despite these strengths, the agent noted that increases in passenger numbers and 
their baggage were putting a strain on border screening.33 Further, in recent years he 
had observed that people were being more creative in concealing plant material, for 
example, attaching plants to their bodies or secreting seeds inside the tabs of Panadol 
packets. This respondent and several others also pointed out that seed can be difficult 
to identify, thus increasing the risk that falsely labelled seed could pass inspection. 
The concern and uncertainty felt by agents regarding compliance was well 
expressed by Richard (agent): 
It'sjust a huge question mark as to whether the legislation is being complied 
with. We have no idea how much smuggling is going on. We have some idea as 
to what's detected at the border in terms of the frequency of interception of 
goods, seeds and stuff, that don't comply. But as incredible as it might 
seem ... we actually don't undertake an analysis of what that stuff is. 
Due to the challenges in detection and enforcement it could be argued that 
positive incentives for compliance are quite important.34 However, many respondents 
indicated that positive incentives to comply with HSNO were few. Tabitha (agent) 
commented: 
I honestly believe that until you can 99 or even 95 percent guarantee that you'll 
catch people who try to import seed illegally ... you cannot have a system that is 
so punitive. 
The aspects ofHSNO that she and other respondents perceived to be punitive were 
prohibitively high application fees, complex, technical, and demanding application 
requirements, and disrespect for the nursery industry. Nursery operators commented: 
What ERMA have to be careful of . . [is] if you regulate in an unreasonable way, 
an uneconomic way, in a completely untouchable way, you might increase the 
incidence of people trying to get material in another way (Josh). 
By bringing in the fee structure, and bringing in draconian regulations, what it's 
going to do is just force people to be inventive ... it's going to drive plant imports, 
seed imports, underground (Rob). 
33 In 2003, approximately 3.7 million international arrivals were processed through New Zealand's 
airports (Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 2004). Six years earlier, passengers per anum totalled only 
1.4 million (Taylor et aI., 2000, p. 50). 
34 For presentation and discussion of the data available about detection and enforcement of sanctions 
under HSNO please refer to Chapter Three, p. 39 
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It's just too inflexible so what's going to happen is people are going to smuggle 
(Sheryl). 
A few nursery operators admitted that they had smuggled while others distanced 
themselves from this behaviour. The latter described themselves, and others like them, 
as ''professionals, "specialists", or "bigger people" and explained that they had too 
much to lose to risk smuggling. As Adam put it: 
"It's not worth it. We can make money doing the safe stuff. .. you [smuggle] and 
you get caught - that's everything down the gurgler. 
These respondents suggested that small nurseries, amateurs, plant collectors, and 'bad 
apples' were the likely smugglers. Respondents made many comments about 
smuggling such as: 
New plant material is coming into New Zealand. It appears all of a sudden on 
the marketplace. I'm sure it hasn ;t come through legitimate channels and that 
really does concern me ... (Mitch). 
[Smuggling] is happening, yes ... there are various ways, which I'm not going to 
go into, but yes ... the inventiveness o/New Zealanders is still there (Wade). 
When I know in my mind that there are no dangers with a particular species I 
really wouldn't hesitate to bring it in (Danielle). 
A lot of people are angry and frustrated and regularly tell [ERMA] that 
mislabelling and smuggling occurs as a direct result of[HSNO] and the time 
and cost involved in processing applications (Becky; agent). 
People have found the cost prohibitive and have been looking to find other 
means to bring material into the country ... and I've had nurserymen on the 
phone being quite upset because they know that people have brought material 
into the country that isn't supposed to be here. They're worried about whatever 
diseases might have come affecting their trade (Zeke; agent). 
What should be made of the criticisms, concerns, and confessions recounted 
above? Although the majority of my respondents argued that frustrated plant importers 
were likely to tum to smuggling there is no easy way to corroborate these claims. The 
research did not rule out the possibility that the smuggling concerns revealed were 
simply ungrounded fears on the part of agents anxious to protect New Zealand's 
biosecurity or spurious speculation from nurserymen frustrated with HSNO. Those who 
confessed to smuggling could well be in the minority. On the other hand, it is possible 
that my research underestimated the magnitude of noncompliance. Discussing a 
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sensitive subject such as smuggling could make nursery people cautious in what they 
reveal about their views and behaviours. 
To investigate concerns about compliance further, it was feasible to take a closer 
look at what might trigger noncompliance. What began as an exploratory examination 
of the effectiveness of HSNO generated new questions about the relationship between 
the target group, HSNO's requirements and implementation, and the risks to 
compliance. 
This chapter has chronicled an exploratory examination of the effectiveness of 
HSNO. This stage of the research was approached by focussing on a key target group's 
reactions to the Act. The qualitative data presented in this chapter provides one 
depiction of nursery operators' views of HSNO. Problems with the cost of compliance, 
the ease of compliance, and the relationship between targets and implementing agencies 
were revealed in the data. To varying degrees most respondents linked these issues to 
noncompliance. In order to explore how aspects of HSNO and its implementation 
might increase the likelihood of noncompliance I undertook a second stage of research. 
To assess the possible triggers for noncompliance I gathered quantitative data and 
analysed these data with the aid of the theoretical framework discussed in Chapter Two. 
The results of this phase of the research are presented and discussed in the chapters that 
follow. 
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Chapter Five - Socially Constructed Understandings of 
HSNO 
Chapter Four discussed possible problems with noncompliance illuminated by 
the qualitative data analysis. Most respondents suggested that aspects ofHSNO's 
design and implementation may be prompting noncompliance. The primary 
disincentives identified were the cost and complexity ofthe application process, a lack 
of flexibility in implementation, a lack of trust and respect for the nursery industry on 
the part of agents, and ineffective enforcement. The relevance of these factors to 
noncompliance as well as the prevalence of noncompliance could not be determined by 
the qualitative research. While further research identifying incidents of smuggling and 
learning why people chose to smuggle in those instances was infeasible, research 
assessing possible triggers for noncompliance was practicable. 
To explore the possible problems with noncompliance, quantitative research was 
undertaken.35 This research investigates the issues identified in the qualitative research 
with the aid of a theoretical framework. The framework, discussed in Chapter Two, 
incorporates a causal theory of policy design (Schneider & Ingram, 1997) with a theory· 
of compliance behaviour (Winter & May, 2001). This chapter focuses on the policy 
design component ofthe framework. The 'translation dynamics' within the causal 
theory of policy design explain the relationship between HSNO's elements of design 
and nursery operators' policy participation. HSNO's goals, rules, tools, and agents are 
cast as independent variables. As nursery operators encounter the Act they construct 
understandings ofthe policy which in tum, affects how they choose to behave in 
response to it. Their policy participation then affects the societal context. For instance, 
noncompliance may compromise the Act's effectiveness in managing the adverse 
effects of introduced plant species while compliance may bolster the Act's effectiveness 
in addressing this problem. The quantitative phase of the research sought to answer 
three research questions: 
• What are nursery operators' interpretations ofHSNO's elements of design? 
• How are these interpretations likely to impact on compliance? 
• What are the implications of the findings for the effectiveness and 
appropriateness ofHSNO's policy design? 
35 Although the second phase of the research is primarily quantitative, some qualitative data was collected 
as well. These data are integrated with the quantitative results. 
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The first of these questions is addressed in this chapter while Chapter Six attends to the 
latter two. This chapter is structured around the series of descriptive and analytical 
tasks outlined below. 
1. Describe sample characteristics. 
Target groups are elements of policy design. Targets' social, economic, political, and 
cultural characteristics affect their interpretations of a policy and their subsequent 
actions in response (Schneider & Ingram, 1990b, p. 77). Painting a clear picture of 
'who' nursery operators are as a population may provide insights into their 
understandings of HSNO. Measuring their interest in importing new species as well as 
their past experience engaging in this behaviour provides an indication of their 
relevance as targets. 
2. Describe the experiences nursery operators have had with HSNO. 
3. Describe nursery operators' awareness ofHSNO's requirements for the 
importation of new plant species. 
Nursery operators may have direct experiences with the Act andlor may gather second-
hand information about HSNO. Based upon these encounters operators form 
understandings ofHSNO. Describing the popUlation's awareness of and experiences 
with HSNO provides information used in later analysis to ascertain if relationships exist 
between these characteristics and interpretations of HSNO. 
4. Describe nursery operators' interpretations of HSNO by examining their 
attitudes and beliefs towards its goals, agents, rules, and tools. 
Themes from the qualitative data identified as posing a risk to compliance directed 
focus to specific aspects ofHSNO's design. Several open ended prompts were also 
included in the questionnaire to allow for the discovery of issues beyond those revealed 
in the first phase of the research. A portrayal of nursery operators' constructed 
understandings of HSNO will provide the information necessary to determine how these 
interpretations might affect compliance. This analysis, undertaken in Chapter Six, will 
utilise the second component of the conceptual framework. The theory of compliance 
behaviour will be used to identify possible triggers for noncompliance. 
5. Determine if there are statistically significant relationships between targets' 
conceptions of HSNO and characteristics of nursery operators. 
The qualitative research suggested that nursery size and enthusiasm for plants were 
related to compliance behaviour. The quantitative research seeks to determine if 
relationships exist between characteristics of nursery operators and particular views of 
HSNO. This will be useful in the analysis of possible triggers for noncompliance. The 
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statistical analysis began with determining if hypothesized relationships existed between 
variables. This was done by conducing chi-square tests for relatedness. If a significant 
result was found then post-hoc testing was carried out on all possible pairs of variables. 
Characteristics of the Sample and Population Parameters 
Data were gathered from a representative sample of nursery operators via a 
quantitative, postal questionnaire. Respondents.en = 346) were comprised of a random 
sample of wholesale nursery owners and/or managers throughout New Zealand who had 
imported plant material in the past and/or who were interested in doing so in the future. 
Screening questions excluded those who did not meet this criterion. Selecting 
respondents in this way ensured data were collected only from nursery operators whose 
past behaviour or future intentions suggested they were relevant targets of HSNO. 
Questionnaires were sent to a random sample of 950 nursery operators. A total of 346 
valid questionnaires were returned while 218 nursery operators communicated that they 
were ineligible. Seventeen questionnaires were undeliverable by the postal service. 
This resulted in a response rate of 48 percent. 36 As few data describing wholesale 
nursery operators are available (1. Kennerly, personal communication, 15 August 2003; 
D. Shillito, personal communication, 24 March 2004), it was not possible to compare 
sample statistics with known popUlation parameters. 
Nursery owners and managers were targeted by the research because of their 
role in decision-making within a nursery. Most respondents both owned and managed 
their nursery (63 percent) while 25 percent of respondents were nursery owners and 12 
percent nursery managers. 
To determine the size of nursery operations gross annual revenue (GAR) was 
measured placing respondents in one of seven size categories. These are depicted in 
Figure 5 below. 
36 The response rate is calculated by dividing number of respondents by sample size. Sample size equals 
the number of questionnaires posted to respondents minus the sum of the number returned who were 
ineligible and the number returned by the postal service marked undeliverable. 
60 
. . 
' ... , -.... ,: .. :: 
Figure 5. Nursery Size by Gross Annual Revenue (GAR) 
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The distribution above shows that the industry is composed primarily of smaller 
llurseries with 58 percent of the sample indicating gross annual revenues of less than 
$150 k per annum. The distribution mean lies between the $50 to 149k and $150 to 
$499 k categories. 
Most of the nurseries' revenues were generated from plant sales domestically: 
Seventy-six percent of respondents sold plant material exclusively on the domestic 
market while 21 percent catered to both domestic and export clients. Only three percent 
of respondents sold for export only. Whether selling domestically or for export, most 
nursery operators produced plant material for use in home gardens and/or amenity 
plantings. Seventy-one percent of respondents focused solely on plants with this end-
use. A variety of other end-uses were also reported, as shown in Table 1 below.37 The 
fact that the majority of respondents sold plants for use in gardens and amenity 
plantings and focused solely upon a domestic market indicates that wholesale nursery 
operators are a relevant target of HSNO; Ornamental plants imported for distribution 
within New Zealand have thus far been the primary source of environmental weeds 
(Sullivan et aI., 2001b, p. 3). Information about the end-use of plants sold by each 
nursery was also collected in order to determine if assessments of the risks posed by 
plants differed based upon the end-uses of a nursery operator's plants. Subsequent 
analysis did not identify an association between this variable and assessments of the 
risks plants pose. 
37 While the qualitative research sought respondents who produced plants for home gardens and amenity 
plantings, the quantitative research had a wider scope. All wholesale nurseries listed in the sample frame 
were drawn upon to form a random sample. 
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Table 1. End users for plants sold by wholesale nurseries. 
End Uses for Plant Material Freq 0/0 
Home gardens /amenity plantings 267 80% 
Agriculturelhorticulture 100 30% 
Shelter belts 65 20% 
Other (cut flowers = 14, native revegetation = 13) 49 15% 
Forestry 38 11% 
Erosion control 35 10% 
The number of years operators had been involved in the industry was measured 
so that the policy environments with which respondents were likely to be accustomed 
could be identified. Respondents involved in the industry for longer than six years were 
present during the shift from the prohibited list approach to HSNO, while respondents 
joining the industry from 1998 to 2003 became involved once HSNO was already in 
place. 
Figure 6. Number of years in the nursery industry. 
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N = 340.00 
The sample distribution has a range of one to 60 years with a mean of 19.5 
years. The median is 17 years and the mode is 20 years. As these measures of central 
tendency suggest, most respondents experienced the transition to HSNO; only 12 
percent of the sample had entered the industry since 1998. 
In addition to ascertaining length of time in the industry, the reasons for 
respondents' involvement were also explored. The qualitative research suggested that 
two primary motivations existed for involvement in the industry: economic livelihood 
and interest in plants. The quantitative data indicates that both motivations were 
important to most nursery operators (See Table 2 below). 
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Table 2. Primary reason for involvement in the nursery industry. 
Item Strongly Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
Primarily in the industry to make a 45% 35% 12% 7% 1% 
living (n = 342) 
Primarily in the industry because 40% 41% 14% 4% 3% 
passionate about plants (n = 340) 
It was hypothesized that respondents could be divided into two populations based upon 
their motivations for being in the nursery industry: those engaged primarily for 
economic reasons and those involved because of their passion for plants. However 
analysis did not reveal a statistically significant relationship between these variables. 
Respondents were also described in regards to their status as plant enthusiasts. 
They were asked if they collected or bred plants in their spare time. Sixty-seven percent 
ofthe sample reported doingso. The qualitative results suggested that plant enthusiasts 
were more likely to smuggle. Ascertaining which respondents were plant enthusiasts 
made analysis oftelationships between this characteristic and views of HSNO possible. 
Membership in plant enthusiast clubs and professional bodies such as the NGIA was 
also measured. Fifty-six percent of respondents were members of garden clubs or plant 
societies. Participation in professional bodies that advocate for the interests of the 
nursery industry was less common with 44 percent of respondents indicating 
membership. 
Data were also collected about interest in importing plants and the activity of 
plant importation. These indicate that while most respondents have imported plant 
material into New Zealand far fewer have imported species that are new to New 
Zealand. Seventy-one percent (n = 341) had imported plant material in the past. In 
contrast, 21 percent reported importing new species. An additional nine percent 
indicated they were unsure if the species they had imported were new to New Zealand 
or not. Plant collectors and members of plant enthusiast groups were more likely to 
have imported new plant species (X2 = 14.83; DF = I;P =.001) and (X2 = 10.45; DF =1; P 
=.001). 
Seventy-five percent of respondents expressed interest in importing new plant 
species in the future. A relationship was noted between having imported species in the 
past and wishing to import species in the future, with past importers less likely to 
indicate interest in importing in the future (X2 =4.22; DF =1 ;P =.04). 
Those interested in importing new species indicated that both the economic 
benefit of new species and being "keen on plants" were reasons for this interest. 
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Economic reasons were reported more frequently than being 'keen on plants' as is seen 
in Table 3, although this relationship is not statistically significant. 
Table 3. Reasons for importing new species. 
Item Strongly Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Agree Disagree 
Import new species for economic 41% 34% 18% 5% 4% 
reasons. (n = 343) 
Import new species because "keen 36% 35% 18% 7% 5% 
on plants" (n = 340) 
Qualitative responses to an open ended prompt in the questionnaire emphasised 
economic justifications for importing new species. Comments such as these were 
typical: 
We need plant imports, including new species, to have a competitive industry. 
New plant material should be welcomed by the government because the economic 
benefits are huge. 
There are still new species being found and only by triaZZing them in a variety of 
locations will their potential economic value be ascertained 
[New J species could provide megabucks export. New Zealanders are very 
enterprising and if you have a hunch that certain plants could provide a new 
export opportunity we should be allowed [to import]. 
The importance of exotic species in primary industry was noted and it was suggested 
that under HSNO, kiwi fruit would not have been approved for import due to its weedy 
characteristics. 
A few respondents justified new species importation as a means of conserving 
rare species from abroad. The enjoyment of growing new species was also mentioned 
by several nursery operators. One noted that an affordable, accessible plant importation 
system was needed so ''plantsmen have access to plants from throughout the world so 
that new cultivars and species can be enjoyed by all." 
A few respondents (six percent) indicated that they did not wish to import new 
species in the future. Nearly a fifth of the sample (19 percent) chose "neutral" as a 
response to this item on the questionnaire. Qualitative comments made by a number of 
nursery operators offered insight into why they did not plan on importing new species in 
the future. Reasons included a focus on New Zealand natives, interest in importing new 
cultivars only, and possession of an adequate range of species from past imports. One 
respondent commented that shelhe had "made a positive decision not to import or 
export ... to limit the possibility of dispersing environmental weeds and pests. JJ For 
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others, deciding not to import new species was in response to the complexity of 
importation regulations. Comments included: 
It seemed impossible to import so we dropped it. 
Most people throw importing plant material into the 'too hard' bin. 
When we started our business importing seed was a main part of building a 
unique business, however, with the number of seeds we have had held by MAF we 
now rarely consider buying seed from overseas. This is a shame for dedicated 
plant lovers. 
Awareness of HSNO 
The questionnaire sought to determine if respondents were aware of HSNO's 
plant importation regulations. A briefdescription ofthe Act, ERMA and the PBI were 
provided and respondents were asked to indicate if they had heard of each. Table 4 
below summarises responses to these questions. Two-thirds of respondents were aware 
ofHSNO and its role in regulating plant importation. Respondents learned of HSNO 
from a variety of sources, the most commonly cited being MAF (27 percent) while 
professional bodies (13 percent), horticulture publications (five percent), and friends 
(five percent) were also prevalent sources. Awareness of ERMA was higher than of 
HSNO and awareness of the PBI fell mid-way between the two. The PBI is an 
operational aspect of the Act. While nursery operators may not know the name or 
details of the legislation underlying the PBI, awareness of the approved plants database 
demonstrates understanding of at least one aspect ofHSNO in practice. 
Table 4. Respondents awareness of HSNO. 
Item Freq. % 
Aware ofHSNO (n = 343) 228 67% 
Aware of the Plant Biosecurity Index (n = 343) 262 76% 
Aware of ERMA (n = 342) 293 86% 
Several qualitative comments conveyed uncertainty about HSNO, ERMA, and import 
requirements in general. One respondent mentioned having heard of ERMA solely in 
the context of the debate on the GMO crop moratorium. 
Two characteristics describing respondents were found to have a relationship 
with awareness ofHSNO: membership in a plant enthusiast group and membership in a 
professional body. Members of plant enthusiasts groups were more likely to be aware 
ofHSNO (i = 10.45; DF = 2; P =.000) as were members of professional bodies ("l = 
16.13; DF = 2; P =.000). 
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Experiences with HSNO 
Respondents' intentions and behaviour relating to importing species under the 
HSNO Act were investigated. As displayed in Table 5, approximately a third of 
respondents indicated that they had wanted to import a plant species not listed on the 
PBI. However, few respondents reported pursuing this interest by submitting a Section 
27 application or an application to import a new species. 
Table 5. Importation of plants and HSNO. 
Item Freq. % 
a) Respondents who reported wanting to import a plant species not listed 105 31% 
on the PBI (n = 340) 
b) Respondents who had submitted a Section 26 application (n = 236) 21 6% 
c) Respondents who have submitted an application to ERMA to import a 15 4% 
new plant species (n = 344) 
Since the implementation of HSNO in 1998, ERMA has received only seven 
applications for importation of new plant species for release (J.Cately,personal 
communication, 23 April 2004). The 15 respondents who answered 'yes' to item 'c' in 
Table 5 above are more than double the number of ERMA's plant applicants. 
Therefore, some respondents must have misunderstood the question about submitting an 
application to import a plant species. Section 26 applicants, GMO applicants, or those 
who requested an import permit to bring in a plant species already on the PBI may 
account for the extra responses. To address the ambiguity in the data it is more accurate 
to state that between six to ten percent of respondents have made an application of some 
sort to ERMA. 
Clearly, few respondents have had direct experience with HSNO as applicants. 
The nursery operators who wanted to import a non-PBI species but have not submitted 
an application may have had some encounters with the Act such as making enquiries to 
ERMA or checking the PBI to determine if their species of interest was listed. It is 
unknown what direct encounters, if any, the remaining respondents have had with 
HSNO. 
Whether by first hand experiences with HSNO or via 'the grapevine', nursery 
operators interpret HSNO based upon the information they gather about the Act and its 
implementing agencies. As targets encounter a policy they develop views about its 
aims, logic, fairness, and usefulness, as well as its importance to them personally 
(Schneider & Ingram, 1997, p. 79). These impressions are drawn upon when targets' 
decide how to behave in response to a policy. Nursery operators' socially constructed 
understandings ofHSNO's elements of design are explored in the pages that follow, 
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beginning first with HSNO's goals and values. Each element of design will be 
introduced briefly before respondents' views are presented. 
Social Constructions of HSNO 
Understandings of HSNO's Goals 
The desired outcomes of a policy are expressed in policy goals (Schneider & 
Ingram, 1997, p. 83). HSNO's goal is "to protect the environment, and the health and 
safety of people and communities by preventing or managing the adverse effects of 
hazardous substances and new organisms" (Anonymous, 1996, s 4). A series of 
principles are included to guide pursuit of this goal. The Act requires that ERMA 
balance ecological and economic values when making decisions under the Act. The 
specific values that must be protected and provided for include public health, resources 
important to Maori, native flora and fauna as well as valued introduced species, the 
intrinsic value of ecosystems, and the economic benefits to be derived from the new 
organism proposed for importation (Anonymous, 1996, S 6). Applicants must address 
each of these values in their application to import a new plant species. 
The quantitative research examined how important HSNO's values were to 
respondents and if they perceived new plant species as posing risks to these values. As 
can be seen in Table 6 below, most of those sampled concentrated their responses in the 
'very important' or 'important' categories. Question design may have contributed to 
this pattern. The list of values presented to respondents were likely to be viewed 
positively, especially because costs and trade-offs of protecting each value were not 
posited. Even if some respondents held certain values in lesser regard, socially 
acceptable responses may have felt easiest and safest. In hindsight, an alternative 
question design requiring respondents to rank the values in relation to one another might 
have been more revealing.38 
Despite this shortcoming in question design, several interesting observations can 
be made from the data. Most of the values HSNO seeks to protect were shown high 
regard, with primary industry receiving slightly more support than the other values. 
Respondents viewed the importance of protecting resources valued by Maori less 
positively. When asked about the importance of assessing new plant species for any 
38 During questionnaire design a format which required respondents to rank the values in relation to one 
another on a vertical scale was considered. However, during pre-testing this approach was found to be 
confusing. 
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risks posed to each value, respondents indicated that this was less important than 
protecting these values in general. Examining the data below illustrates this shift. 
Table 6. Views of the values HSNO seeks to protect. 
Item Very Important Neutral Unimportant! 
important very unimp. 
Importance of protecting human health 78% 19% 2% 1% 
from pests and diseases (n = 345) 
Importance of assessing the negative 63% 31% 5% 2% 
effects of plants on human health (n = 
341) 
Importance of protecting native plants, 77% 20% 2% 1% 
animals, and ecosystems from pests and 
diseases (n = 345) 
Importance of assessing the negative 63% 31% 5% 2% 
effects of plants on native ecosystems 
(n = 342) 
Importance of protecting primary 85% 14% .5% .5% 
industry from pests and diseases (n = 
345) 
Importance of assessing the negative 75% 21% 3% 1% 
effect of plants might have on primary 
industry (n = 342) 
Importance of protecting resources 30% 27% 26% 18% 
important to Maori from pests and 
diseases (n = 337) 
Importance of assessing the negative 27% 30% 27% 17% 
effect of plants on resources important 
to Maori (n = 336) 
Relevant qualitative data from the questionnaires offers further insights into the 
quantitative results displayed above. Strong support for protecting New Zealand from 
pests and diseases was expressed in comments such as these: 
It is important to have strict controls over imports so our native flora is protected. 
Preventing more potential weeds from coming into the country safeguards against 
increasing costs of pest control. We should learn from past mistakes, not repeat 
those. 
Others showed support for HSNO's purposes but were critical of the means employed 
to achieve these goals. Comments included: 
In principle I have no problem with ERMA, I have no wish to introduce plant 
pests. However, [ERMA's] systems and administration are often difficult to cope 
with. 
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I agree with the basic concepts. There are already far too many plant species 
escaped into the wild threatening indigenous biodiversity. [However, HSNO] 
makes it difficult to import plant materials for the bonafide 'known' operators. 
I believe the Act, administering authority, and index are all vitally important for 
control and protection in New Zealand [however] I am fully aware of problems, 
costs, and delays of others due to MAF administration. 
Both ERMA and the nursery industry have the same goals, but are miles apart in 
terms of implementation. 
Explanation of the low support for protecting "resources important to Maori" 
was provided by numerous comments written in the questionnaire's margins. 
Distinguishing Maori concerns from the other values was seen as offensive, racist, or 
unnecessary: 
I do not like how risks to resources important to Maori were separated from those 
of the whole community. 
I am unaware of dnyresources that are important to Maori that aren't also 
important to other New Zealanders. 
Resources are important to all races, not just one! 
Racist statement. 
The discrepancy in the quantitative results between the importance placed on 
protecting HSNO's values and the importance of screening new plants for potential 
adverse effects on these values was addressed by the qualitative comments. Some 
respondents indicated that the risks of plants were exaggerated by HSNO leading to 
unnecessarily strict scrutiny. They commented: 
HSNO has unsettled law- abiding citizens by making them out to be criminals for 
importing plant seeds, plants which would never be a biological threat to the 
country. 
The vast majority of ornamental plants that people want to introduce are unlikely 
to be a biological or pest threat to New Zealand's economy .... We wish to 
introduce rare and difficult plants ... 
Other respondents indicated that the threat of plants was exaggerated under HSNO 
while other risk goods and import pathways received inadequate attention. They argued 
that shipping containers, GMO's, tourists entering with risk goods, and produce 
importation should be accorded as much, or greater, biosecurity emphasis. Respondents 
observed: 
It is ironic that ERMA is so keen to keep potentially harmful species out of NZ but 
supports applications for field trials ofGE crops. 
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Of concern is fruit and foodstuffs ... which often is a greater danger. The people 
handling this often have little respect for the dangers they carry. 
The quantitative research also explored whether respondents thought HSNO 
was achieving its goals. Two questionnaire items focused on protection of the 
environment and economy from pests and diseases. A third related to HSNO's aim to 
protect or bolster economic vitality. Table 7 depicts the responses to these 
questionnaire items. 
Table 7. Assessments of HSNO's outcomes. 
Item Strongly Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Agree disagree 
With HSNO in place I feel confident 8% 31% 24% 27% 10% 
that plants which could become 
environmental weeds will be kept out 
ofNZ. (n =337) 
With HSNO in place I feel confident 8% 28% 27% 26% 12% 
that plants and diseases that could 
harm primary industry will be kept out 
ofNZ. 
(n = 335) 
HSNO is restricting the growth of the 26% 28% 33% 11% 2% 
nursery industry. 
(n = 336) 
Respon~es reflect that respondents are roughly equally divided in their assessments of 
HSNO's protection of both primary industry and the environment. Comparing the 
percentage of respondents that strongly agreed with each statement shows that only a 
small percentage of the sample were confident that HSNO was protecting the 
environment and primary industry while more than three times as many respondents 
were adamant that the policy has restricted growth of the nursery industry. 
Understandings of HSNO's Agents 
Agents are the bodies identified by a statute that must implement policy. Agents 
implement rules and tools according to the implementation structure imposed by the 
statute (Schneider & Ingram, 1997, p. 89). 
ERMA administers HSNO and makes decisions on applications (Christensen, 
1997, p. 301). ERMA is made up of the Authority, Nga Kaihautu Tikanga Taiao, and 
ERMA New Zealand. The Authority makes decisions on applications (Christensen & 
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Williams, 1997, p. 305). Nga Kaihautu Tikanga Taiao provides the Authority with a 
Maori perspective for decision-making. ERMA New Zealand administers HSNO by 
managing the application process, evaluating applications, raising public awareness of 
the Act and related biosecurity issues, monitoring the Act's effectiveness, and 
overseeing enforcement (ERMA, 2001c, pp. 1 - 3). In practice, enforcement for new 
plant species is carried out by MAF under the authority of the Biosecurity Act (Ministry 
for the Environment, 2002, p. 77). 
As targets encounter MAF and ERMA in relation to HSNO, impressions of the 
agents and the Act are developed. Questionnaire respondents sometimes used 'HSNO' 
and 'ERMA' interchangeably, suggesting that as ERMA gives the policy a 'face,' 
distinctions between legislation and those delivering it are blurred. Respondents'views 
of ERMA and MAF were solicited primarily via an open response item in the 
questionnaire. A total of 142 nursery operators commented about the agents in response 
to the prompt.39 While estimates of population parameters cannot be generated from 
this non-representative sample, the data's high validity provides insight into the 
complexity of views relating to HSNO's agents. 
Several comments conveyed respect for MAF and ERMA describing their role 
as essential in furthering biosecurity. The agents were characterised as helpful and 
cooperative. Concern was expressed that the tasks given to these agents were 
overwhelming. As one respondent said, "MAF are not resourced to cope with the 
demands of importers." Within these positive comments it was suggested that better 
communication between the nursery industry and MAF could decrease 
misunderstandings between these parties and improve MAF's reputation within the 
industry. 
In contrast to the positive comments described above, the majority of feedback 
indicated a less salubrious view ofHSNO's agents. The main concerns were that 
ERMA and MAF lacked the skill and expertise relevant to plant importation and 
secondly, that the agents displayed a lack of respect for the nursery industry. 
Comments relevant to the former criticism described MAF staff as "unfamiliar with 
their own rules," possessing "limited training and no experience," and incompetent. 
One respondent observed: 
It can be very time consuming to develop a new product range and part of 
the headache is a lack of consistency with MAF through lack of their own 
knowledge. 
39 Some of the themes expressed fit best in the discussion of respondents' views of rules and tools and 
will be presented under those sub-headings. 
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Some nursery operators shared stories of receiving inconsistent treatment and 
advice in identical import scenarios. Others cited ERMA or MAF's lack of 
knowledge about particular genera. One respondent suggested that decision-
makers within MAF should draw upon experts outside the agency rather than 
relying on internal expertise. Some felt valuable expertise could be tapped via 
better communication with the nursery industry. Along simnar lines, another 
respondent proposed: 
Ifeel we should have one organisation solely for dealing with the 
importation and quarantineprocess and the body should have a mixture of 
horticulturists, arborists, DOC, and generally people with 'hands on 
experience, ' not paper pushers. 
The sentiment that agents did not respect the nursery industry was manifest in a 
variety of comments made by respondents. Some felt that nursery operators' and plant 
enthusiasts' input into importation regulation had been ignored. One operator advised 
that MAF should "visit nurseries and discuss the concerns and issues from a grower's 
point of view." Additional opinions consistent with this theme were that the industry 
had not been consulted during HSNO's design and that ERMA showed little interest in 
communicating with the industry. Similarly, others commented: 
We spent many hours with MAF in the 1990's discussingfuture plant and 
seed importations. All our input was totally ignored 
[ERMAIMAF] never ask us which plants within our particular area of expertise 
could pose a threat to New Zealand and should be considered for a list of 
excluded plants.... Specialized plant societies and specialist growers know their 
plant far better than botanists in an office. Consulting them would be much better 
than making things stupidly difficult for them. 
Specialist growers and societies ... have a very good idea of what those species are 
likely to do here. The blanket 'nothing new' approach relegates their knowledge 
to the sidelines. 
The saddest part of this whole process is the way MAF/ERMA, in their arrogance 
have alienated so many citizens -mainly their attitude to the "list" as being 
comprehensive when it is not - and their general unwillingness to entertain listing 
at the generic level in some plant families - to the (sad) result that many citizens 
lose respect for the bureaucrats. It is the citizens that MAF/ERMA have to rely on 
to honestly label the seeds/plants they import. In most plant families it is 
practically impossible to identify what species a seed/seedling is, and we all suffer 
when people misname imports because of their contempt for the system. 
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A quantitative item on the questionnaire examined whether nursery operators felt 
thatthe concerns of the nursery industry had been overlooked during HSNO's 
design. More than half of respondents felt this was the case. Twenty-nine percent 
of respondents 'strongly agreed' with this statement and 24 percent 'agreed.' 
Only six percent of respondents disagreed however, 40 percent chose a 'neutral' 
response. 
Some nursery operators perceived that ERMA and MAF treated importers 
with mistrust. One respondent said that merely being a member of the industry 
made agents perceive him as "guilty by association". Others spoke of being 
treated with suspicion by quarantine officers at the airport when declaring plant 
material or when listing an occupation within the horticulture industry on their 
landing card. Comments were made such as: 
[MAF Quarantine Officers] penalized me for being honest! I was dragged 
through 'hell' on this particular occasion when others on the same flight 
walked through 'Scot free' with illegal plants. 
MAF and ERMA treat legitimate importers like criminals when we are 
trying to do things 'by the book' and-keep pests, diseases, and weeds out of 
NZ. 
The qualitative research also revealed a peripheral, but important issue: 
frustration with the import system as a whole. The system was described as "topsy 
turvey" and as experiencing a "logjam." Some respondents were unable to import 
species because of the shortage of Level 3 quarantine facilities. Others were waiting for 
the backlog of import health standards to be revised and issued. Those who had 
recently imported species expressed the frustration that new regulations were overly 
strict. More comprehensive virus testing and the requirement that stock be inspected 
during the previous growing season were cited as examples. Inasmuch as HSNO is a 
one component of the import system as a whole, concerns about MAF and their 
regulations are relevant. As was noted when similar issues were discussed in Chapter 
Two, nursery operators perceive HSNO as just one component of the importation 
process. 
Understandings of HSNO's Rules 
Rules direct agents and/or targets to undertake or avoid certain actions in order 
to facilitate achievement of policy goals (Schneider & Ingram, 1997, p. 97). HSNO sets 
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out rules to structure the process by which importers may apply to have a new organism 
considered for approval. The quantitative research on HSNO's rules focused upon 
issues suggested to be relevant to compliance identified in the first phase of research. 
Firstly, the application process as a whole was perceived to be confusing, technically 
complex, and requiring much effort. Secondly, the cost of applying was seen as 
prohibitively high and the way the costs were allocated judged unfair. Finally, the 
means for adding species already present in New Zealand to the PBI was found to be 
problematic. Respondents expressed frustration that the PBI is incomplete and that 
applicants must provide the evidence that a species is present in New Zealand rather 
than the agencies responsible for creating and maintaining the list. The rules relating to 
these issues will be briefly introduced prior to considering the relevant quantitative 
results. 
The application requirements for release of a new plant species, detailed in a 33-
page user guide (ERMA, 2003e), can be considered 'information rules' from a policy 
design perspective because they specify what evidence applicants must provide and how 
the evidence should be communicated to ERMA. Applicants are advised to consider 
how the proposed import might affect the values listed in s 5 and s 6 of HSNO in their 
application. Some of the information required in the application includes a taxonomic 
description of the species, its biological and ecological characteristics, details of the 
proposed release (i.e. how many, where, when), and discussion of the species' risks and 
benefits (ERMA, 2003e). The latter requirement is guided by Section 35 ofHSNO 
which calls for evidence regarding the likelihood that the species will form a self-
sustaining population in the wild, displace valued species, cause habitat deterioration, 
adversely effect safety and human health, cause or spread disease, or harm the 
environment (Anonymous, 1996, S 35). 
Section 21 of HSN 0 mandates ERMA to recover costs for the duties and 
functions they perform under the Act. ERMA must decide who should be charged, set 
the rate of charges, and notify the public of these arrangements (Anonymous, 1996 S 
21). ERMA charges application fees to those seeking approval to import new plant 
species. If the agent approves the species for import then future importers do not pay 
any fees to ERMA. From a policy design perspective the rules ERMA has developed in 
response to Section 21 are best classified as 'eligibility rules'. Eligibility rules delineate 
who receives the benefits or burdens of a policy (Schneider & Ingram, 1997, p. 97). In 
this case the 'burden' of covering some of ERMA's costs are allocated to HSNO 
applicants. 
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The final rule seen as related to compliance in the qualitative research can be 
termed as both an eligibility rule and a 'boundary rule'. Boundary rules specifywho 
has decision-making power (Schneider & Ingram, 1997, p. 98). If someone wishes to 
import a plant species not listed on the PBI but present in New Zealand then he/she 
must provide evidence of the plant's presence and request that ERMA determine if the 
species is a new organism (Anonymous, 1996 S 26; ERMA, 2003d, p. 2). ERMA 
makes this decision based upon the evidence supplied by the applicant. In the 
qualitative research respondents expressed frustration that the PBI is incomplete and 
that the burden of proof fell to the applicant rather than the agencies responsible for 
creating and maintaining the list. The eligibility aspect of the rule places responsibility 
on the applicant to prove their species does not require scrutiny under Section V of 
HSNO. 
Respondents' views of the rules introduced above were explored through a 
series of items on the quantitative questionnaire. Table 8 below summarises the first set 
of results. 
Table 8. Prospective importers views of HSNO's rules. 
Item Strongly Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
~ree Disagree 
a) Respondent has not submitted an 58% 23% 17% 8% 0% 
application because the costs are too 
high 
b) Respondent has not submitted an 50% 19% 25% 6% 0% 
application because the application 
takes too much effort 
c) Respondent has not submitted an 30% 17% 44% 5% 3% 
application because the rights of the 
'first mover' are not protected 
d) Respondent has not submitted an 32% 26% 31% 9% 2% 
application because the species was 
already in NZ - although missing 
from the PBI 
In examining the data depicted in Table 8 above, I sought to determine if aspects 
ofHSNO's rules discouraged people from submitting a HSNO application. Responses 
from nursery operators who had indicated that they had wished to import a plant not 
listed on the PBI are presented above. These respondents will be heretofore referred to 
as 'prospective importers.' While 92 percent of the sample indicated that they wished 
to import new species in the future, only 31 percent of the sample reported having 
wanted to import a specific species not listed on the PBI. 
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The effort required to complete an application and the cost of applying were the 
most frequently cited reasons for not submitting an application. For the most part 
qualitative comments regarding rules did not make a direct connection between views of 
the rules and a decision not to submit an application. However, these comments 
provided valuable insight into why some respondents took issue with certain rules. 
Qualitative comments addressing the effort of applying described the application 
process as 'exhausting,' 'too involved,' and 'inflexible' and called for a simpler system. 
Other comments focused on application fees: 
Fees for importation certainly favour big business over smaller, adventurous 
nursery enthusiasts. 
Fees are prohibitive for small growers. 
The greatest incentive to compliance with regulations is to make costs affordable 
(preferably free) so that one of the major difficulties to importation, costs, make 
illegal importation less likely. 
Ifeel ERMA has put ridiculous prices on their services - simply a revenue 
gatherer. 
In my opinion the greatest incentive to comply with regulations is to make the 
costs affordable. 
The 'first mover' issue was cited by just under half of prospective importers as a reason 
not to submit an application. Comments made about this included: 
I will never commit the time and money to the [application] process if I cannot 
control the right to the plant or get a contribution from all those who will take 
advantage of my work at a later date. 
As it stands, the person who takes the whole ERMA, HSNO pathway makes 
a huge investment. With approval granted to import any other person can 
jump in and take advantage of the work! 
Omissions from the PBI were indicated as a reason for not applying under HSNO by 
approximately half of prospective importers. Many qualitative comments addressed this 
issue. Some stated: 
ERMA's biosecurity list is not very accurate. A lot of species are in NZ but not on 
their list. 
ERMA does not even have an up-to-date list of all the [a plant family] that is 
current. This was proposed some six years ago but is still delayed. How can you 
control the importation of [this plant] when you don't know what is in NZ 
already? Do the science first, then the paperwork. 
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There are many species present that are not on the list but it's too difficult for me 
as a nurseryman to put the time, expense, and effort into proving this. 
Respondents were asked to indicate if they were likely to profit from importing a 
new species considering the application fees. These responses are presented in Table 9 
below. 
Table 9. Views of HSNO's rules. 
Item Strongly Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Agree disagree 
The application fees for rapid 41% 25% 20% 12% 2% 
assessment make it unlikely that 
respondent could profit from bringing 
in a new plant species (n = 336) 
The application fees for full 70% 21% 7% 1% 1% 
assessment make it unlikely that 
respondent could profit from bringing 
in a new plant species (n = 337) 
New Zealand was better off with the 23% 28% 29% 17% 3% 
'prohibited list' approach (n = 336) 
A strong majority of respondents felt the full assessment fees would preclude 
profits while close to two thirds felt the rapid assessment fees would make profits 
unlikely. It should be noted that at the time the quantitative data was gathered 
(November 2003) ERMA estimated application fees for rapid assessment at $1,500 to 
$3,000 and full assessment fees were estimated at $30,000 to $45,000 (ERMA, 2002, p. 
2). The questionnaire responses are based upon these fee estimations. A new fee 
schedule with more precise estimates came into effect in December 2003 (ERMA, 
2003c, p. 1). Currently, rapid assessment applications for the release of new plant 
species cost $500 per species plus additional fees if ERMA must gather further 
information (ERMA, 2003c, p. 3). 
Respondents' overall assessment of HSNO was gauged by ascertaining if 
nursery operators felt New Zealand had been "better off with the prohibited list." A 
majority of respondents felt this was the case. A fifth of the sample disagreed with the 
statement and close to a third responded with 'neutral.' Relevant qualitative comments 
were made such as: 
[ERMA should not assume] a species is a problem just because it is not here. 
As there is a wealth of literature on weeds, ffeel it would be much better to 
revert to the old system whereby everything was allowed in except for those 
that were specifically banned. 
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The final set of questionnaire items relating to rules were directed to respondents 
who had submitted a Section 26 application. These items investigated the views of the 
applicants about their experience. Of the 21 nursery operators who indicated having 
submitted a Section 26 application, 19 responded to the items evaluating their 
experience. Figure 10 below depicts the resultant data. The frequencies of each 
response are noted beneath the percentages because 19 respondents are too few to make 
inferences about the population of Section 26 applicants as a whole. 
Table 10. Views of Section 26. 
Item Agree Neutral Disagree 
The Section 26 application process was easy to understand. 37% 26% 37% 
(n = 19) (7) (5) (7) 
The Section 26 process took too much effort. (n = 19) 63% 21% 16% 
(12) (4) (3) 
The effort involved in submitting the application was worth 39% 22% 34% 
the benefits gained from having the plant species added to the (8) (4) (6) 
PBI. 
(n = 18) 
Respondents were evenly divided in their assessments of ease of understanding the 
application process. They were similarly split in their views on the effort being worth 
the benefits. In contrast, a majority of applicants felt the process required too much 
effort. 
Understandings of HSNO's Tools 
Tools are measures put in place to provide incentives for compliance (Schneider 
& Ingram, 1997, p. 93). HSNO's tools include sanctions, in the form of fines of up to 
$500,000 and possible prison sentences. The Act also makes use of a hortatory tool by 
appealing to targets to comply because it is the 'right' thing to do. ERMA's public 
awareness activities can be identified as capacity building tools. 
In the qualitative research a number of respondents questioned the effectiveness 
ofHSNO in deterring smuggling. Some suggested it was easy to smuggle because 
detection and the ensuing penalties were unlikely. It was suggested that 'doing the right 
thing' was an insufficient incentive for compliance. The quantitative research sought to 
explore these issues further. 
Perceptions about the likelihood of being caught smuggling were measured. 
Seven percent of respondents strongly agreed with the statement, "MAF is unlikely to 
detect smuggled material" (n = 340). A much larger group, 35 percent, agreed with the 
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statement while a similar proportion (31 percent) chose disagreed. Neutral was the 
response chosen by 27 percent of the sample. 
Respondents' views about the effectiveness of HSNO's sanctions are shown in 
Table 11. 
Table 11. Views of HSNO's sanctions. 
Item Good Ineffective Too 
deterrent deterrent severe 
Penalty of $500,00 allowable under HSNO Act 75% 11% 14% 
(n = 340) 
Penalties of approximately $4,000 that have 49% 47% 5% 
been awarded thus far (n = 340) 
A clear majority of the sample assessed the $500,000 penalty as an effective deterrent. 
However, respondents were divided in their assessment of the typical penalty that has 
been imposed thus far. Approximately half of respondents viewed $4,000 as an 
effective deterrent while nearly as many felt it was ineffective. Many nursery 
respondents were emphatic that the penalties as currently applied are inadequate: 
Never heard of anyone being fined $500,000 (maybe that's the problem). 
Smugglingfor commercial gain should be severely punished. Several hundred 
dollars fine is no disincentive. The ability to impose large fines exists but they 
need to be applied. 
If the courts upheld the full weight of the fine e.g. hundreds of thousands [of 
dollars] then potential smugglers may be more wary.... If the statute has strong 
penalty provisions, then the judiciary should apply them. 
[MAFIERMA] have little effect on the importation of unwanted organisms, an 
example of this - the ReD virus was introduced illegally and no one was 
prosecuted. 
The law should be applied in a firm manner to anyone caught smuggling plant 
material into the country. Is the law being applied hard enough? 
All plant material smuggled into NZ should result in a heavy fine of no less than 
$10,000. 
Some felt fines should be higher for commercial people caught smuggling than for plant 
enthusiasts or home gardeners. The latter were described as likely to be unaware of the 
importation regulations and therefore less culpable for their actions. 
HSNO's hortatory tools were assessed in relationship to sanctions and other 
possible motivations for compliance. This assessment was designed to see how 
respondents ranked 'soft' tools versus financial penalties. Nursery operators were asked 
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which of four motivations they felt most discouraged people from smuggling plant 
material. Table 12 below displays respondents' first and second choice ranking. 
Table 12. Motivations for compliance. 
Item Most important Second most important 
Financial penalties for smuggling (n = 345) 50% 16% 
Desire to do the right thing (n = 345) 36% 10% 
Embarrassment of being caught (n = 345) 14% 18% 
Other reasons (n = 345) 6% 8% 
The results indicated that respondents perceive financial penalties to be the 
strongest deterrent against smuggling with 66 percent of respondents selecting this as 
the first or second most important motivator. This is consistent with qualitative 
comments expressing the need for more frequent and better-publicised penalties. 
'Doing the right thing' also ranked highly with 46 percent of the sample selecting this 
normative motivation as their first·or second choice. 
Understandings of Noncompliance 
While most of this chapter has been devoted to respondents' understandings of 
HSNO's element of design this final section addresses nursery operators' views of one 
ofHSNO's possible outcomes: noncompliance. To gauge the prevalence of 
noncompliance respondents were asked if they were aware of instances wliere new plant 
species or species not listed on the PBI had entered New Zealand illegally. The 
question was worded carefully so as not to imply that the respondent themselves was 
smuggling. Thirty-two percent of respondents (n = 342) indicated that they were aware 
of instances where new species had entered New Zealand illegally. However, limited 
conclusions can be drawn from this statistic as both under-reporting and over-reporting 
may have occurred. Respondents may have been reluctant to indicate knowledge of 
smuggling for fear they could be identified as smugglers or that their industry would be 
placed in a negative light. It is also possible that more than one respondent may have 
reported the same incident of smuggling. 
A more valuable aspect of this questionnaire item was the follow-up question 
which asked respondents to specify the main reasons that this smuggling occurred. 
These results relate to particular elements ofHSNO's design. 
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Table 13. Reasons for smuggling. 
Item Most important 2nd most important 
Process was too bureaucratic 45% 16% 
Fees too high 21% 14% 
Not know that they must declare 15% 6% 
Do not know reason 16% 3% 
Other reason 29% 4% 
Some of the explanations in the 'other category' were quite eclectic while others 
cropped up repeatedly. Six respondents said the plant material was smuggled because it 
was already present in New Zealand but missing from the PBI. One nursery operator 
commented, "Importer knew the species already existed in the country and was not on 
the index. This is the biggest source of frustration to the industry." Ignorance of the 
rules was given as a reason by four respondents. Financial gain, desire for novel 
species, and confidence"that the plant posed no risk were also given as reasons for the 
smuggling incident. 
The open-ended prompt in the questionnaire was found to contain many 
comments concerning smuggling. Some respondents remarked that that plant 
enthusiasts rather than nursery operators were more likely to smuggle. Others made 
connections between the difficulties of importation under HSNO and smuggling 
behaviour: Comments were made such as: 
Unfortunately, home gardeners continue to try and smuggle in material because 
of their ignorance and zeal for gardening. 
I am aware of seed smuggling by the small-hobbyists in the groups I belong to but 
none in the industry. 
Unfortunately ERMA have turned the importation of plants into a black market. I 
know many collectors that receive seed, tubers, corms etc. from all over the world 
that should not be in the country. This concerns me with disease and insects 
coming in. 
I think that most seed [of new species] that comes into the country is brought in as 
other seed that is already on the biosecurity index. 
The hoops and hurdles [of import policy] simply encourage smuggling- or 
renaming of plants material new to this country ... commonplace practice we 
understand. I have no confidence that border control can recognize the 
difference. [HSNO is] well intended legislation that fails to achieve its aims. 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter the results of the second phase of research have been presented. 
A quantitative questionnaire administered to a representative sample of wholesale 
nursery operators investigated their understandings of HSNO's design. The theory of 
policy design identified the elements of design as independent variables which influence 
policy participation through translation dynamics. This theory enabled me to 
investigate concerns about possible problems with compliance identified in the first 
phase of research. Experiences with and information encountered about a policy forms 
targets' understandings of the statute. This understanding influences their behaviour in 
response to the policy. In order to understand what might trigger noncompliance with 
HSNO, I examined nursery operators' social constructions of HSNO. The results of the 
questionnaire presented in this chapter provide a view of "who" nursery operators are as 
well as depicting how they view the HSNO Act. 
Respondents (n= 34-6) consisted of wholesale nursery owners and/or managers 
whose operations focus almost exclusively on the domestic market. Nearly two-thirds 
of respondents specialise in plants for use in home gardens or amenity plantings while a 
minority of nursery operators deal in plants for a variety of other end-uses including 
agriculture, horticulture, forestry, native revegetation, and cut flowers. Nursery size 
ranges from operations with gross annual revenues ofless than $50,000 to gross annual 
revenues of more than five million. Smaller nurseries predominate, with 70 percent of 
the sample reporting gross annual revenue ofless than $500,000. Time spent in the 
industry ranged from one to sixty years. The median length oftime spent in the 
industry was 17 years. Only 12 percent of the sample had joined the industry since 
HSNO came into effect. Awareness of the HSNO Act was moderately strong among 
the sample, with approximately two-thirds of respondents having heard of HSNO's 
requirements for plant importation and three-quarters of the sample familiar with the 
PBI, an operational aspect of the Act. 
All nursery operators included in the sample were past or potential targets of 
HSNO. However, examining respondents' importation behaviour suggests about a third 
of the sample appears more likely to import than the rest. Seventy-one percent of the 
sample had imported plant species in the past but only 21 percent indicated that the 
species they had imported were entering New Zealand for the first time. Seventy-five 
percent of the sample indicated interest in importing new plant species in the future but 
only 31 percent had wished to import a specific species that is not currently listed on the 
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PBI. These respondents, approximately a third of the sample, appear most likely to 
import as they have a specific species in mind and are aware it is not listed on the PBI. 
The results indicate support for HSNO's goals. Respondents showed strong 
support for protecting the environment, human health, and primary production from 
biosecurity threats. The only value that did not resonate with respondents was 
protecting resources important to Maori. Many perceived it unnecessary to have a 
specific focus on Maori concerns and took offence to this group being singled out from 
the rest of New Zealanders. Assessing plants for their adverse effects on human health, 
the environment, and primary production also received strong support although a 
smaller proportion of respondents rated this as 'very important' in comparison to 
protecting these values from biosecurity risks generally. Respondents were divided in 
their assessment of the contribution HSNO is making to keep undesirable pests and 
plants out of New Zealand. Just over half of the sample felt the Act was having an 
undesirable impact on the nursery industry and a similar proportion felt New Zealand 
was better off with the 'prohibited list' approach. 
While a few respondents expressed positive views about HSNO's agents, the 
bulk of comments made about ERMA and MAF resonated with the negative views 
expressed in the qualitative interviews. Respondents were concerned that agents, 
particularly MAF, lacked knowledge and training to perform their jobs well. The 
importation system agents are responsible for was described as "topsy turvey," 
characterised by quickly changing rules, a backlog of unissued import health standards, 
and a lack of quarantine facilities. Some respondents felt MAF and ERMA were 
dismissive of nursery operators' expertise on plants and ignored feedback from the 
industry. Others described feeling "guilty by association" with the nursery industry and 
described the importation process as an unpleasant experience because of the suspicion 
with which MAF treated importers. Some qualitative comments addressed ERMA and 
HSNO specifically but many applied to the importation process as a whole. The range 
of issues raised suggests that much frustration towards agents and the plant importation 
system they administer is not specifically directed towards HSNO. 
Questionnaire results revealed concerns about HSNO's rules. Most prospective 
importers were discouraged from applying under HSNO by the application fees and the 
effort required to complete the application process. More than a third of this group also 
found the lack of protection for first movers to be a barrier. Two-thirds of nursery 
operators indicated that low-risk application fees made profit from a new species 
unlikely. 
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Regarding tools, most respondents viewed the maximum fine allowable under 
HSNO as an effective deterrent to compliance. Views were split regarding the 
effectiveness of a typical fine awarded of $4,000. Respondents commented that current 
enforcement was too "soft" and that more severe fines should be charged to those 
caught importing plant material illegally. A number of respondents felt it unfair that 
they went through the expense and effort of complying, while smugglers received fines 
of only a few thousand dollars. 
Nearly a third of the sample indicated awareness of specific instances where 
plant material has entered New Zealand illegally. Reasons given for these incidents 
included the desire to avoid the 'bureaucracy' of the HSNO process, the perception that 
application fees were too high, lack of awareness of the rules, and the contention that 
the plant was already present in New Zealand and posed no threat to the country. 
The results described above depict nursery operators' understandings of 
HSNO's elements of design. While the theory of policy design establishes a connection 
between sod ally constructed understandings and ensuing policy participation, the 
model requires an accompanying theory that connects specific aspects of targets' 
perceptions and their resultant compliance behaviour. The theory of compliance 
behaviour is used in Chapter Six to address the final two research questions. The risks 
of non-compliance are assessed according to four factors which motivate compliance. 
Elements of policy design relevant to the risks to compliance are scrutinised in the 
discussion that follows, to improve understanding of their effectiveness and 
appropriateness. 
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Chapter Six - Risks to Compliance: Discussion and 
Conclusions 
This thesis has two distinct phases to its research. The second phase of the 
research examined nursery operators' understandings ofHSNO's policy design by 
investigating attitudes and beliefs about aspects ofHSNO's goals, agents, rules, and 
tools. These results were presented in the previous chapter. This chapter analyses these 
results and focuses on two research questions. The first research question to be 
addressed is: How are targets' understandings of HSNO likely to influence their 
compliance behaviour? 
To answer this question the second component of the conceptual framework, the 
theory of compliance behaviour, is used. This theory identifies four factors that 
influence compliance: calculative, normative, and social motivations and the ability to 
comply. Calculative motivations are based upon cost benefit calculations. One's morals 
and internal assessment of a regulation's importance and fairness (normative 
motivations) alongside a desire to please others (social motivations) also direct 
compliance behaviour. Finally, the ability to comply refers to having adequate 
knowledge and financial resources in order to meet the requirements of a regulation 
(Winter & May, 2001, p. 676 - 680). The relationship of the factors to each other is not 
addressed by the theory. Further, the relative importance of these factors is assumed to 
vary depending upon context (Winter & May, 2001, p. 693). Therefore, the theory does 
not offer an a priori ranking of these motivations, but simply describes an internal 
framework for decision-making that can aid in identifying risks to compliance. 
The factors influencing compliance behaviour are used as a lens through which to 
examine nursery operators' understandings of the Act described in Chapter Five. The 
analysis will consider how targets' understandings ofHSNO are likely to undermine or 
support each compliance factor. Evidence that a motivation for compliance or the 
ability to comply is compromised is seen as a 'risk to compliance.' With this analytic 
task complete it is then possible to address the final research question of this thesis: 
What are the implications of the risks to compliance for the effectiveness of HSNO 's 
policy design? 
The meta-perspective provided by the theory of policy design makes it possible to 
relate the risks to compliance to the elements of design. The theory establishes a causal 
link between policy design and policy participation. As targets encounter the policy and 
interpret it, this in tum influences how they behave in response. The theory of 
compliance behaviour offers insight into how interpretations of the policy are likely to 
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influence policy participation. Policy participation then shapes policy outcomes, such 
as effectiveness in problem solving within the societal context. The chapter concludes 
with consideration of ways to mitigate the risks to policy compliance. 
Risks to Compliance 
Ability to Comply 
'Ability to comply' refers to targets' awareness of a policy's requirements and 
financial capacity to comply. Targets must have sufficient information about what a 
policy requires of them in order to comply. They must also possess adequate financial 
resources to meet any costs associated with compliance. 'Ability to comply' can 
impede compliance even when targets have strong calculated, normative, and/or social 
motivations to comply (Winter & May, 2001, p. 679). This aspect of compliance 
behaviour validates the following assumption: If nursery operators are aware of 
HSNO's requirements and have adequate financial capacity then they can comply with 
the policy. 
Awareness 
Awareness of HSNO is moderately high among nursery operators. Just over two 
thirds of the sample (67 percent) indicated awareness ofHSNO's rules for importing 
new plant species. Those most likely to be aware of the Act were respondents who had 
imported plant material in the past, with 74 percent of past importers aware of the Act 
compared to 48 percent of non-importers. Respondents from nurseries with a gross 
annual revenue below $150,000 were less likely to have heard ofHSNO than larger 
operators. Respondents who were not members of professional bodies or plant 
enthusiast groups were also less likely to have heard of the Act. Awareness of the PBI, 
at 76 percent, was higher than of HSNO itself. This is a good indicator of awareness of 
HSNO's requirements; if nursery operators know they are allowed to import only 
species on the 'permitted plants' list then they can avoid accidentally violating the Act's 
requirements. 
Lack of awareness of HSNO was cited as a reason for smuggling by 21 percent 
ofthose reporting specific instances of illegal plant importation.4o Detail was provided 
about some of these incidents citing "enthusiast gardeners," ''private collectors," and 
"ethnic home gardeners with seeds from native country" as the perpetrators rather than 
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commercial nursery operators. Members of plant enthusiasts groups were more likely 
to report smuggling incidents than non-members with 39 percent of group members 
reporting these incidents compared to 23 percent of non group members. 
If a nursery operator is unaware of HSNO's requirements they are likely to learn 
of them during the importation process unless they are intentionally concealing plant 
materials. MAF's requirements such as import permits, phytosanitary certificates, and 
the need to declare plant materials at the border enable the agency to intercept species 
not listed on the PBI and inform importers ofHSNO. Twenty-seven percent of 
respondents who were aware of HSNO learned of the policy from MAF.41 The 
relatively high awareness ofHSNO and the PBI combined with the likelihood that MAF 
will inform unaware importers suggests that lack of awareness ofHSNO poses a minor 
risk to compliance. 
Financial Capacity 
Statistics describing targets' beliefs about the impact ofHSNO's application 
fees provide insight into financial capacity. Sixty-six percent of the sample indicated 
that they would be unlikely to profit from importing a new species because of the 
amount they would pay in low risk application fees ($1,500 to $3,000). Respondents 
from nurseries with gross annual revenues ofless than $ 1 million were more likely to 
indicate that, given the application fees, profiting from a new plant species was 
unlikely. Operations within this size range comprised 84 percent of the sample. Ninety 
one percent of the sample stated that full assessment fees of$30,000 to $45,000 would 
prevent profits. Application fees were cited by 81 percent of prospective importers as a 
reason they had not yet submitted an application under HSNO. 42 While these statistics 
suggest that financial capacity could be a problem for nursery operators it is not certain 
that application fees prevent nursery operators from applying under HSNO. Thus it is 
not possible to conclude whether lack of financial capacity poses a risk to compliance or 
not. The statistics above are a better indication of how respondents are likely to weigh 
application fees within a calculation of the costs and benefits of compliance. This will 
be explored further below. 
40 Thirty-two percent (n = 342) of the sample reported awareness of instances of illegal plant importation. 
41 The second largest source of awareness was professional industry bodies at 13 percent. 
42 'Prospective importers' is used to refer to the segment of the sample that reported having wanted to 
import a species not listed on the PBI. 
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Calculated Motivations 
Calculated motivations are based upon an assessment of the costs and benefits of 
compliance. The likelihood of being caught and penalised as well as the magnitude of 
the potential penalty may be weighed. Compliance costs and financial incentives for 
compliance may also be taken into account (Burby & Paterson, 1993, pp. 755, 756; 
Winter & May, 2001, p. 677). Targets choose the behaviour which they anticipate will 
offer them the maximum net benefit. Although much of the theoretical literature on 
compliance behaviour assumes that targets are capable of instrumental rationality as 
they carry out these calculations, empirical evidence portrays a less rational approach to 
cost-benefit calculation (Schneider & Ingram, 1990b, p. 93; Winter & May, 2001, p. 
677). The calculated motivation aspect of the theory of compliance behaviour supports 
the assumption that if nursery operators perceive that the benefits of compliance 
outweigh the costs, then they are more likely to comply with HSNO. 
Examining targets' perceptions ofHSNO's tools gives an indication of the extent 
to which avoiding sanctions is likely to be seen as a benefit of compliance. Avoiding 
financial penalties was viewed as a strong motivation for compliance by a majority of 
respondents. Sixty-six percent of the sample ranked financial penalties as an important 
reason for choosing not to smuggle.43 Nursery operators' assessments of penal~ies for 
smuggling suggest that typical fines awarded to date may be viewed as an ineffective 
deterrent.44 Reactions to an actual fine of $4,000 awarded under the Biosecurity Act 
were divided between the 49 percent of respondents who saw the fine as a good 
deterrent and the 47 percent who felt it was inadequate. In contrast more than three 
quarters of respondents saw the maximum fine allowable under HSNO of $500,000 to 
be an effective deterrent. 
Many respondents indicated that the fines awarded were "not harsh enough." 
Nursery operators propounded the need to apply "strong penalties" and give ERMA 
"more teeth." One respondent noted that the Government's failure to prosecute those 
who smuggled the RCD virus into New Zealand prior to HSNO had sent the message 
that smuggling is tolerated. Better publicity of the potential fines ("not many people 
would know o/the $500,OOOjinel") and of actual fines awarded was recommended. The 
statistics and qualitative comments reviewed above suggest that penalties of several 
43 Social and normative motivations were seen as important to deterring smuggling by a smaller 
£roportion of the sample. The relevance of these results will be discussed later in the chapter. 
4 To date, no one has been fined for breaching the HSNO Act by smuggling new plant species. For this 
reason I used a fine awarded under the Biosecurity Act for knowingly possessing unauthorised plant 
materials when entering New Zealand. 
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thousand dollars are less likely to be viewed as severe enough to deter noncompliance. 
This reduces the positive value placed on avoiding fines in cost benefit calculations. 
The positive value of avoiding fines may be further eroded for those who 
perceive detection of smuggled plant materials to be unlikely. Forty-two percent of the 
sample perceived that MAF is unlikely to detect smuggled plant material. This is of 
concern because perceived risk of detection has been shown in most research to bear 
more weight in utility calculations than views about the likelihood of receiving 
sanctions or views about their severity (Winter & May, 2001, p. 677). 
Any costs associated with compliance may be factored into cost benefit 
calculations. Looking at the role fees played in prospective importers' decisions not to 
apply under HSNO provides insight into the weight given the costs of compliance. Fees 
appear to have a negative weight for the eighty-one percent of prospective importers 
who indicated that application fees were a reason they had not submitted an application. 
It can also be argued that the Act imposes a significant cost to compliance by taking a 
'first applicant pays' approach. Described by critics as a "tax on innovation" (Nahkies 
et ai., 2003a, p. 64), charging 'first movers' while offering no commercial protection 
may undermine calculated motivation to comply. Forty-seven percent of prospective 
applicants indicated that the lack of protection for 'first movers' was one reason they 
had not submitted an application. 
Financial incentives may also be included in the cost-benefit calculation. 
However, HSNO does not offer targets remuneration for compliance. The profits 
nursery operators hope to earn from sales of new species could provide a strong 
financial incentive. However, the majority of respondents predicted that profit would be 
unlikely given the low-risk and full assessment application fees. 
The discussion above identifies several factors that may undermine nursery 
operators' calculated motivations to comply with HSNO. Detection is seen to be 
unlikely by approximately half of the sample. A similar proportion view the severity of 
fines as inadequate. For more than three quarters of the sample the costs of compliance 
are seen to be high and financial incentives to comply are seen to be low. These factors 
pose risks to compliance. 
Normative Motivations 
There are two aspects to normative motivations for policy compliance: Firstly, 
an individual's internalised values and principles, including the moral obligation to 
comply with laws, which are developed through socialisation and are quite stable over 
time, and secondly, an individual's evaluation of the importance and appropriateness of 
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the specific policy and its requirements (Winter & May, 2001, p. 677). The latter 
entails assessment of a regulation's reasonableness, fairness, the importance of its aims, 
and the potential that noncompliance will cause harm (Winter & May, 2001, p. 678). 
To what extent are nursery operators likely to be motivated by a moral 
obligation to comply with HSNO? When asked to rank several motivations for 
compliance with the Act according to the importance of each, thirty-six percent of 
nursery operators indicated that the "desire to do the right thing" was the most 
important prompt for compliance while ten percent chose this as the second most 
important reason. 45 This statistic is most meaningful when viewed in relationship to the 
other motivations listed as possible responses. Sixty-six percent of respondents 
identified financial penalties as the foremost or second-most important reason for not 
smuggling. Desire to do the right thing was the second most commonly chosen 
motivation and "embarrassment of being caught" ranked third with 14 percent of the 
sample viewing it as most important and 18 percent viewing it as second most 
important. This latter motivation can also be interpreted as normative because it 
suggests the presence of an internal sense that disobeying rules is shameful. These 
statistics suggest that approximately half the sample view a moral obligation to comply 
as influential. 
There is evidence that nursery operators' internalised values include those that 
HSNO seeks to protect. HSNO's aim to protect the environment, people, and 
communities from the adverse effects of hazardous substances and new organisms is 
guided by a series of values ERMA must consider in their decision-making. 
Accordingly, prospective importers must address each of these in their applications to 
ERMA. Overall, support for the values HSNO seeks to protect appears to be strong. In 
the questionnaire a majority of the sample indicated that protecting human health, native 
flora, fauna and ecosystems, and primary industry from biosecurity risks was 'very 
important' . Primary industry was important to the largest proportion of nursery 
operators (85 percent). A value that received support from a minority of the sample was 
"protecting resources important to Maori" with 30 percent indicating this was 'very 
important' . 
Nursery operators appear to hold the economic values that HSNO seeks to 
provide for as important. ERMA must strive to balance protecting New Zealand from 
the adverse effects of new organisms with maintaining and enhancing New Zealand's 
45 The limitation of this statistic is that nursery operators were responding to an item on the questionnaire 
that was posed in the third person (see Appendix B). It was considered inappropriate to ask respondents 
what most discouraged them personally from smuggling plant material into New Zealand. 
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economy. This entails considering the economic benefits anticipated from new 
organisms proposed for importation. As might be expected, the economic benefits of 
new plant species were important to most nursery operators. Seventy-five percent of the 
sample cited economic reasons as underlying their desire to import new plant species. 
An additional value important to nursery operators, but not included in HSNO, is the 
psychological value of obtaining new species. Seventy-one percent ofthe sample 
indicated that "being keen on plants" was an important reason for their interest in 
importing new species. The normative dimensions of the economic and psychological 
value placed on new species were intimated in qualitative comments such as: "Trialing 
a new plant species with potential economic benefits should be facilitated and 
encouraged," and "New plant material should be welcomed by government because the 
economic benefits are huge". Other comments spoke of the importance of obtaining 
new species "to be enjoyed by all" and noted that current barriers to accessing new 
plants were "a shame for dedicated plant lovers." The importance targets place on the 
values HSNO seeks to protect and'provide for, as evidenced in the questionnaire results 
could provide a normative motivation for compliance. However, the importance 
nursery operators place on these values is likely to positively affect compliance only if 
they perceive that HSNO plays a role in protecting and providing for these values. 
One indication of whether this is the case or not is found in statistics describing 
the importance respondents place on ERMA considering the possible negative effects of 
plant species on human health, native flora, fauna, and ecosystems, primary production, 
and resources important to Maori. The majority of these values were very important to 
most respondents. Assessing adverse effects of plants on primary production was 
perceived as 'very important' to the largest proportion of respondents (75 percent) while 
considering adverse effects on Maori resources was 'very important' to only 27 percent 
of the sample. Support for screening of plant species included comments about the 
undesirability of ''plant species escape[ing] into the wild threatening indigenous 
biodiversity," the need for "strict controls," and the importance of learning "from past 
mistakes." Others questioned the importance of scrutinising plants for their adverse 
effects by commenting that this places a barrier to importing plants that "would never be 
a biological threat to the country," and focuses on a low-risk pathway in comparison to 
shipping containers, and imported fruit and produce. 
Respondents placed slightly less importance on assessing the adverse effects of 
plants on the list of values than they placed on the overall importance of protecting 
these values from biosecurity risks. The proportion of respondents rating the former as 
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'very important' dropped by ten to fifteen percent for each value. While this trend 
could suggest that respondents do not perceive plants as posing as great a risk to these 
values as other biosecurity risks, the discrepancy is too slight to draw firm conclusions. 
Another indication of the normative importance of HSNO can be observed in 
views of the desirability of the prohibited list approach which preceded the Act. Fifty-
one percent of respondents indicated that New Zealand was "better off with the 
prohibited list approach." Nearly a third of respondents took a neutral stance on this 
question while 20 percent indicated that the current approach under HSNO is preferable. 
Respondents who had been in the industry for more than 20 years were more likely to 
express preference for the prohibited list approach than those joining the industry more 
recently. 
Statistics describing nursery operators' views ofHSNO's impact on New 
Zealand's biosecurity also provide an indication of the perceived importance of HSNO. 
Approximately a third of respondents felt confident that with HSNO in place pest plants 
and diseases which could harm the environment or primary industry will be kept out of 
New Zealand. A similar proportion disagreed that this was the case. There was greater 
consensus on views ofHSNO's impact on the nursery industry. Fifty-four percent of 
respondents perceived that HSNO is restricting the development of the industry. This is 
reinforced by the related finding that fifty-three percent of the sample felt the concerns 
of the nursery industry had been overlooked during HSNO's design. 
Views expressed about HSNO's rules, tools, and agents suggest that some 
nursery operators perceive problems with HSNO's appropriateness in terms offairness 
and practicability. Many prospective importers, comprising 30 percent of the sample, 
perceived submitting an application under HSNO "takes too much effort," with 69 
percent of this group citing this as a reason for not applying to ERMA. For the 
remainder of the sample only 36 percent felt that applying under HSNO requires too 
much effort. The most common explanation given for the 108 smuggling incidents was 
that the importer had viewed the application process as "too bureaucratic." This was 
given as the primary reason for 45 percent of smuggling incidents and the secondary 
reason for an additional 16 percent of incidents. Prospective importers' concerns about 
application fees and lack of protection for first movers reported in the discussion of 
calculated motivations may undermine perceptions of HSNO as practicable and fair. 
Practicability may be jeopardised by nursery operators' perceptions ofthe PBI. 
Omissions from the list were seen as frustrating because these omissions created work 
for nursery operators if they wished to get a species added to the permitted list. 
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Indications that some nursery operators may assess HSNO's fairness negatively 
can be observed in respondents' views about how agents treat the nursery industry. 
Many of these sentiments extended beyond HSNO, applying to MAF and the 
importation system as a whole. A sense of alienation was evidenced in comments that 
MAF had ignored submissions from nursery operators and that plant specialists' 
knowledge had been "relegated to the sidelines". ERMA was described as insular, 
arrogant, uncooperative, and lacking understanding or support for the nursery industry. 
One respondent suggested that ERMA had alienated importers to the extent that they 
were likely to smuggle out of "contempt for the system." Interactions with MAF while 
complying with importation regulations led some operators to comment that they felt 
penalised for their honesty by being treated with suspicion and scrutiny by MAF 
officials, which one respondent described as "being dragged through hell." Some 
nursery operators expressed frustration that while they had chosen the arduous route of 
compliance, smugglers were treated with a slap on the hand. 
Thirty-two percent of the sample was aware of incidents where new plant 
species or those not listed on the PBI came into NZ illegally. Respondents who were 
members of plant enthusiast groups were more likely to indicate awareness of specific 
incidents of smuggling than other nursery operators. Thirty-nine percent of those who 
are members of plant enthusiasts groups reported incidents of smuggling while 23 
percent of non-members reported incidents of smuggling. It is possible that awareness 
of others smuggling could make this behaviour seem more common and acceptable. 
The results indicate strong support for the values HSNO seeks to protect and 
provide for. However a mixed message can be observed about nursery operators' 
perceptions of the importance of HSNO. Many respondents indicated that it is 
important that ERMA screens plants for their potential adverse effects on a variety of 
values while approximately half of the sample suggested that New Zealand was better 
off with the prohibited list, an approach that allowed all species into the country unless 
they were known agricultural weeds. The analysis above suggests that nursery 
operators may have normative concerns about the fairness and practicability of HSNO. 
The degree to which the presence of one aspect of normative motivations is likely to 
affect the absence of another cannot be determined in this analysis. The theory of 
compliance behaviour does not provide guidance on how to view the possible 
interaction between the components of normative motivations. This makes it 
challenging to take a comprehensive view of the observations shared above. However, 
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it can be concluded that the questionnaire results raise concerns about normative 
motivations for compliance. 
Social Motivations 
Social motivations are present when an individual desires to please others. 
Groups or individuals who are important to the target can prompt compliance if the 
target expects this behaviour to generate respect or approval (Winter & May, 2001, p. 
678). Whether or not the regulation resonates with the target's values is unimportant. 
Rather, compliance is attractive because it results in favourable feedback from others 
(Burby & Paterson, 1993, p. 756). The concept of social motivations logically supports 
the assumption that if nursery operators desire approval from a particular group or 
individual then they will be more likely to comply with the Act. It is possible that peers 
within the nursery industry provide social motivation either supporting or detracting 
from compliance. However, my research focuses on targets' understandings ofHSNO's 
policy design and does not include examination of nursery operators' perceptions of 
their peers. ERMA and MAF could also provide social pressure for compliance or 
noncompliance. However, this seems unlikely as there appears to be little opportunity 
for ERMA or MAF to offer respect and approval to nursery operators for their 
compliance, especially for those nursery operators whose compliance consists of 
choosing not to import new plant species rather than choosing to go through the HSNO 
process. 
In the sections above the ability to comply and the three motivations for 
compliance have been considered in relationship to nursery operators' socially 
constructed understandings ofHSNO. Lack of awareness of HSNO was not viewed as 
a problem area because most nursery operators indicated awareness of the Act. Further, 
the position of HSNO within the overall system for importing plants makes it likely that 
MAF will inform those unaware of the Act if they attempt to import a species not listed 
on the PBI. Indications of financial capacity did raise concern because a majority of 
nurseries perceive that making a profit from new plants is unlikely after paying the low-
risk application fees. This issue was further explored in considering calculated 
motivations for compliance. Evidence that the cost of complying may be perceived to 
exceed the benefits raises concern about calculated motivations for compliance. 
Regarding normative motivations, results relevant to internal values and principles 
suggested a moderate level of support of the concept of complying with HSNO because 
it is the "right" thing to do. Strong support was observed for HSNO's values among 
nursery operators. Results relevant to the importance and appropriateness ofHSNO 
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raised the possibility that views about the Act's impact on the nursery industry 
undermine the perceived importance ofHSNO. Furthermore, concerns about 
practicability and fairness ofHSNO's design and implementation may detract from 
normative motivations for compliance. Findings relevant to social motivations were not 
included in targets' understandings ofHSNO's elements of policy design. 
A limitation of the theory of compliance behaviour is that it dpes not offer 
insights into the relative importance of a given motivation nor does it attempt to 
describe how the degree to which a given motivation is present or absent will affect the 
others. In Winter's research (2001) this short-coming was compensated for by 
quantifying incidents of noncompliance with an environmental regulation and 
examining how the four factors for compliance were associated with these behaviours. 
In my research it was not possible to quantify noncompliance and subsequently uncover 
the motivations for these incidents. While I was still able to use the theory of 
compliance behaviour to identify issues of concern to compliance, my conclusions must 
be cast as possible risks to compliance rather than factors that have been empirically 
verified to trigger noncompliance. 
Further analysis of the possible risks to compliance identified in the analysis will 
be undertaken below. What do the issues raised suggest about the effectiveness of 
HSNO's policy design? The causal links between the elements of design, targets' 
understandings of the policy, and policy participation make it possible to relate risks to 
compliance to the appropriateness of the policy design. The theory of policy design 
establishes causal links between policy design, targets' understandings of policy, the 
effect this has on their behaviour, and the subsequent impact of their behaviour on 
policy outcomes. This understanding of relationships binds the aims of the quantitative 
research to the overall concern of this thesis: to explore the effectiveness of HSNO in 
addressing the problem of future undesirable plant introductions by regulating the 
importation of new plant species. 
Implications for the Effectiveness of HSNO's Policy Design 
Policy Design and Risks Related to Calculated Motivations 
Perceptions regarding the likelihood of detection, severity of sanctions, and 
costs of compliance raise the concern that nursery operators may perceive the costs of 
compliance to exceed the benefits. These concerns are relevant to HSNO's rules 
concerning fees and sanctions for noncompliance. 
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Concerns about the level of fees and the lack of protection for first movers 
directs attention to s 21 ofHSNO and ERMA's resultant decisions on fee levels and 
parties liable for these charges. S 21 requires that ERMA recover costs of application 
processing by deciding how much to charge for these services and deciding who to 
charge (Anonymous, 1996). 
Examining the assumptions and rationales underlying HSNO's and ERMA's 
approach to fees sheds light on the appropriateness of this rule. The contention that the 
prospective importer should pay application fees appears to be built upon the rationale 
that the importer is the sole beneficiary of the new plant species they wish to import and 
should therefore bear the cost of application processing. However, this rationale is 
illogical because the initial importer does not retain exclusive commercial rights to the 
new plant species. Plants are a commodity within a free market. Once the plant is 
added to the permitted list aU nursery operators who subsequently import the species 
benefit from its inclusion on the PBL The current rules penalize initial importers. 
Furthermore, the rationale underlying the 'user pays' approach overlooks the 
benefits that New Zealanders collectively enjoy from having a robust system in place 
that ensures species enter the country only if they are unlikely to adversely affect the 
environment, people, and communities. In this sense the services that ERMA provides 
are a public good. In contrast, the previous prohibited list system did not require 
consideration of possible adverse effects and charged the importer nothing. In this 
scenario the importer enjoyed the benefits of importing the species without paying fees 
while the New Zealand public bore the risk of adverse effects with no assurance that 
these had been assessed and weighed against the probable benefits. 
Regarding the level of fees charged it appears that the financial capacity of 
nursery operators was not taken into account when determining this level. One of 
HSNO's purposes is to allow for the importation of new organisms which are likely to 
bring economic benefits and unlikely to adversely harm the environment, people, and 
communities (Anonymous, 1996, s 6). If fees make applications under the Act 
prohibitive for nursery operators then HSNO poses a barrier to nurseries, making them 
unable to pursue the economic benefits of new organisms. However, the argument 
could be made that in order to give adequate consideration to the possible adverse 
effects of a new species ERMA must undertake a costly process. If the economic 
benefits do not exceed the cost of taking into account the 'externalities' of plant 
importation then perhaps it does not make economic sense to import the species. 
Another possible explanation for the high level of application fees is the approach 
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ERMA has taken to reviewing applications. Nahkies (2003b, pp. 44, 59) raises the 
criticism that ERMA has taken a prescriptive, legalistic approach to their duties under 
the HSNO Act. This approach not only increases the complexity of the application 
process for prospective importers but it may also increase ERMA's costs. 
The view of approximately 40 percent of nursery operators that MAF is unlikely 
to detect smuggled plant materials directs attention to MAF's enforcement operations at 
the border as well as ERMA's role in publicising seizures of plant materials. These 
same aspects of policy design and implementation are relevant to the view of half of the 
sample that fines of $4,000 are an ineffective deterrent to smuggling. While HSNO has 
provisions for detecting and punishing noncompliance, the current approach to 
enforcement may be too weak thus decreasing the perceived costs of compliance. 
Mitigating the Risk 
One way to improve the cost~benefit ratio within calculated motivations is to 
reduce the costs of compliance. The user pays approach taken under HSNO is likely to 
be resistant to change; however, sharing fees between the plant importer and the 
government may be feasible. The strategy for funding the operation of biosecurity 
systems currently adheres to a 'user pays' approach. This approach, called the 
"cascading decision rule," states that agencies should first seek funding by recovering 
costs from individual users of their services. If this is not possible then levies should be 
imposed on groups who are the beneficiaries of the services provided. Tax payer 
funding should be sought if neither of these options can be pursued (Biosecurity 
Council, 2003, p. 32). By retaining user fees HSNO would be in adherence to the first 
priority of the cascading decision rule. By increasing government support to make the 
fees more affordable for applicants HSNO could simultaneously recognise the 
importance of considering financial capacity to comply with regulation. 
Persuading ERMA to make significant reductions in fees without providing the 
agency alternative financial support may not be feasible. Although ERMA is currently 
aware of applicant concerns about application fees they have indicated it is not possible 
to reduce low risk application fees significantly at this time (Champion & Clayton, 
2001, p. 25; ERMA, 2003a, p. 35; Nahkies et aI., 2003a, pp. 64,66). 
An alternate strategy to make compliance more affordable would be to 
encourage the nursery industry to share the costs of importation. This could entail joint 
research on commercially desirable plant species and cost sharing of application fees. 
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Nurseries who contribute to the importation of a given species could then share the 
commercial rights to the species for a specified time period. 
This would require that the industry become more cohesive than at present. The 
industry is known to be diverse and fragmented (D. Shillito, personal communication, 
24 March 2004). There is wide variation in the types of plants sold as well as nursery 
size. A nursery with gross annual revenue of less than $50,000 that specialises in rare 
alpine species is likely to have different importation interests from an operation 
grossing several million dollars and selling a diverse range of ornamentals. Despite 
these differences, a cooperative approach has the potential to ease some of the barriers 
and frustrations the industry is currently experiencing. My research indicated that forty-
four percent of nursery operators are currently members of professional bodies within 
the industry. However this membership is spread among a range of groups. One 
potential strategy for cost sharing would be to build a committee consisting of 
representatives from each of these groups.with leadership assumed by the group with 
greatest capacity. This committee' could address common concerns about fees while 
accommodating the independent nature of the industry. If possible it would be 
advisable to include plant enthusiast groups in the committee as this would capture 
many of the smaller operators who do not belong to professional bodies. Membership 
in these types of groups among nursery operators is currently at 56 percent. 
Policy Design and Risks Related to Normative Motivations 
Perceptions of HSNO as unfair and impracticable raised the concern that some 
nursery operators may lack adequate normative motivations for compliance. The strong 
support expressed for HSNO's values suggests that if concerns about the Act's fairness 
and practicability were addressed it would be likely that normative support for HSNO 
would be strong. 
Concerns about fairness and practicability relate to the requirements ofHSNO's 
application process and the interaction between agent and targets. HSNO's ambitious 
goal to balance economic and ecological/social values seems partially responsible for 
the complexity ofHSNO's application requirements. The possible adverse effects and 
benefits of a species on the values HSNO seeks to protect must be considered. The 
provision of robust information covering each aspect of these risks and benefits enables 
ERMA to make good decisions. 
While recognising the complex and challenging nature of the decisions ERMA 
and the Authority are required to make, it is possible that their approach makes the 
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process more complex than necessary. Nahkies et al. (2003, pp. 64, 66) is critical of the 
extremely prescriptive approach taken by ERMA in administering HSNO and points out 
that this prescription may be due to ERMA's fear that they will be legally challenged on 
a decision they make. The Wilsonian approach to implementation evidenced in HSNO 
makes ERMA accountable for their implementation efforts. It is possible that the 
pressure placed on ERMA by this accountability stifles their capacity for flexibility. 
Respondents' concerns about the effort of applying related not only to the 
application process, but also to omissions from the PBI. Implementing HSNO with the 
PBI incomplete and requiring nursery operators to provide evidence of a species' 
presence in New Zealand has frustrated nursery operators. DoC, MAF, and ERMA 
have all indicated that they do not have the resources to complete the PBI in the near 
future (Nahkies et aI., 2003a, p. 52). This is unfortunate because HSNO's credibility 
has been undermined by the problems with the permitted list. 
Poor rapport between targets and ERMA and MAF appear to relate in part to the 
wider context of plant importatiorrregulation which is outside the influence ofHSNO's 
policy design. However, specific criticisms of ERMA were made describing the agency 
as insular and lacking respect and regard for the nursery industry. HSNO provides 
ERMA a tool for addressing problems with rapport by requiring that the agency build 
public awareness and appreciation for HSNO's purpose and requirements (Anonymous, 
1996). 
Mitigating the Risks 
Perceptions that HSNO is unfair and impracticable could be dealt with in a 
variety of ways. One way to address the perception that applying is arduous and 
improve rapport between targets and agent would be to undertake a stakeholder 
familiarisation process as suggested by Nahkies et al (2003, p. 46). One objective of 
this process could be to communicate application procedures as clearly as possible to 
potential applicants. A second objective could be to clarify why HSNO is important to 
New Zealand's biosecurity. A final objective, and possibly the most important, would 
be to develop better rapport between ERMA and the nursery industry by encouraging 
dialogue. 
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Conclusions 
The intent of this research was to improve understanding ofHSNO's effectiveness 
in regulating the importation of new plant species by exploring the response of the 
nursery industry to the regulations. Pursuing this objective entailed two phases of 
research. An inductive enquiry sought to answer the following questions: 
• Why do nursery operators wish to import new plant species into New Zealand? 
• What experiences have nursery operators had with HSNO? 
• How do nursery operators view HSNO's requirements and the Act's 
implementation by ERMA and MAF? 
Qualitative semi-structured interviews conducted with nursery operators, policy 
implementers, and other stakeholders provided answers to these questions. A passion 
for plants and economic motivations were found to underlie new species importation. 
Nursery operators and policy implementers alike spoke of nursery industry discontent 
with HSNO. The cost, complexity and effort of applying to import a new plant species 
were identified as possible prompts for noncompliance. A lack of respect and flexibility 
from agents towards nursery operators as well as inadequate enforcement were also 
connected with noncompliance by those I interviewed. 
To investigate the possible problems with compliance a second stage of research 
was undertaken. Data were gathered from a representative sample of wholesale nursery 
operators throughout New Zealand via a quantitative questionnaire.46 The following 
research questions were the focus of the second stage of the research: 
• What are nursery operators' interpretations of HSNO's elements of 
design? 
• How are these interpretations likely to affect compliance? 
• What are the implications of the findings for the effectiveness and 
appropriateness ofHSNO's policy design? 
A conceptual framework incorporating a theory of policy design and a theory of 
compliance behaviour was employed to structure the research and analysis. 'Policy 
design' refers to a response to a problem in society that is crafted by individuals or 
groups whose social constructions of the problem, its causes, and its possible solutions 
shape the elements included in the design. These elements and their implementation 
affect those targeted by the policy who in tum produce policy outcomes which may 
affect society as a whole (Ingram & Schneider, 1990, p. 72; Schneider & Ingram, 
46 Although primarily quantitative, the questionnaire also included several open response items. The 
resultant qualitative data was incorporated in the subsequent analysis. 
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1997pp.1,2). The theory of policy design describes the elements and dynamics that 
generate policy designs and that produce outcomes from these designs. Target group 
behaviour in response to a policy, or policy participation, can be best understood by 
examining the elements of design, how these elements are understood by targets and 
how, in tum, these understandings influence policy participation such as compliance or 
noncompliance (Schneider & Ingram, 1997, p. 79). While the theory of policy design 
provided a meta-perspective for my research, the theory of compliance behaviour 
specifically addressed individual decision-making in response to a policy (Winter & 
May, 2001). I used this theory to analyse the data describing nursery operators' 
understandings ofHSNO in order to determine if the way targets perceive the policy 
posed any risks to compliance. 
Conclusions about the Conceptual Framework 
The conceptual framework I used was both appropriate and useful for my 
research. The frainework incorporated two complementary theories that addressed 
different levels of analysis. The policy design theory provided the 'big picture.' The 
causal relationships it described illustrated the impact that policy design has on policy 
effectiveness through the vehicle of targets and their behaviour. The links between the 
elements of design, targets' understandings of these elements, and their ensuing 
behaviour provided a means to identify factors that influence compliance behaviour 
without actually measuring incidents of noncompliance. This was an essential feature 
of the framework as it was not possible for me to quantify noncompliance given the 
clandestine nature of plant smuggling. 
One minor challenge I encountered in using the theory of policy design was that 
my research concern was quite different to Schneider and Ingram's thus offering me 
few insights into applying the theory. Schneider and Ingram are interested in how 
policy design impacts on a wide range of values important to democracy (Schneider & 
Ingram, 1997, p. 82). Their work is concerned particularly with the social construction 
of target groups and knowledge and how these constructions affect democratic values 
(Schneider & Ingram, 1997, p. 191). 
On its own the theory of policy design would have been inadequate as its broad 
perspective did not offer me the detail I needed for identifying risks to compliance. The 
theory of compliance behaviour offered insight into what individuals consider when 
deciding whether to comply with a policy or not. 
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In retrospect, an alternative way of using the theory of compliance behaviour 
might be worthwhile. As has been noted earlier in this chapter, the theory does not 
offer insight into the relative importance of each motivation for compliance nor does it 
attempt to explain how interactions between the motivations might affect will and 
ability to comply. Winter's (2001) use of the theory was able to overcome these 
limitations by collecting empirical data about incidents pf noncompliance and testing 
the influence of each motivation on these behaviours. However, my research did not 
offer that possibility. If research similar to mine is undertaken in the future I 
recommend incorporating the assumptions of the theory of compliance behaviour into 
the design of the research instrument rather than using them as a tool for data analysis. 
The comprehensive approach I took to investigating nursery operators' understandings 
ofHSNO's design was valuable given the dearth of information on this industry and the 
fact that no one to date has looked at the reactions of this key target group to HSNO. 
However, a narrower approach that tested each assumption of the theory of compliance 
behaviour might make analysis less cumbersome. 
Key Findings and Future Research Priorities 
The analysis identified issues that may undermine calculated motivations for 
compliance. These issues suggest that nursery operators may perceive the costs of 
compliance to outweigh the benefits. Issues were also identified that may undermine 
normative motivations for compliance. While strong support for HSNO's values was 
evident, views of HSNO as impracticable and unfair appeared likely to detract from 
normative motivations. 
The implications of concerns identified in the analysis were considered in 
regards to the effectiveness of HSNO's policy design. Two key limitations of the 
design were identified. Firstly, HSNO's fee rules are based on the illogical assumption 
that the first importer of a plant species benefits most from importing the species. This 
'first mover pays' approach overlooks the benefits enjoyed by subsequent importers 
from that species. Further, it ignores the contribution ERMA makes to the public good 
by ensuring species likely to be deleterious to New Zealand are not imported. The level 
of fees was also seen to be problematic as it appears likely that the financial capacity of 
nursery operators was not taken into account when determining how much ERMA 
should charge applicants. The costs of compliance could be decreased either by cost 
sharing between the applicant and the Government or by cooperation within the 
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industry to share costs among nursery operators. Future research exploring the 
feasibility and desirability of these means of mitigating the costs to compliance would 
be beneficial. 
Concerns about the fairness and practicability of HSNO relate to the application 
process and the rapport between agents and nursery operators. The complex and 
challenging nature of achieving HSNO's goals to balance ecological/social and 
economic values may explain the complexity of the application process. However, 
evaluations of ERMA have suggested that the agency takes an unnecessarily 
prescriptive and legalistic approach to implementing the Act. This may make 
unnecessary work for HSNO applicants. The poor rapport between nursery operators 
and agents appears to be caused in part by problems with plant importation regulations 
under the Biosecurity Act and MAF. HSNO's policy design is not culpable for these 
tensions. However, comments directly criticising ERMA suggest that steps could be 
taken by the agency to improve rapport. A stakeholder familiarisation process as 
recommended by Nahkies (2003) could be structured to address both the effort of 
applying and the rapport between the regulator and those regulated. A priority for 
future research would be to explore the benefits of conducting stakeholder 
familiarisation. Finding ways of addressing the concerns about compliance raised in 
this thesis could bring New Zealand a step closer to a more effective approach to 
regulating the importation of new plant species. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Qualitative Research Methods 
Nonprobability sampling entails identifying 'essential cases,' or respondents 
whose roles or perspectives are relevant to the focus of the research (Davidson & 
Tolich, 2003, p. 119). Theoretical sampling is useful for inductive research where 
validity is more important than reliability (Davidson & Tolich, 2003, p. 118)47 and 
where the population is small, unevenly dispersed, and diverse (Swaffield, 1998, p. 
498). My two initial contacts, a weed ecologist and a leader of one of New Zealand's 
professional bodies for the nursery industry, were aware of who the 'players' were in 
regards to HSNO's plant import regulations and the nursery industry. They suggested a 
range of people to include in the sample. Once interviews were arranged with these 
essential cases the snowball technique was used to identify additional respondents. This 
technique involves asking respondents to recommend others whose perspectives they 
think are important to include in the research (Swaffield, 1998, p. 498). This approach 
led to interviews with a total of 24 people from the nursery industry and the public 
sector located in various towns and cities throughout New Zealand. 
After potential respondents had been identified as described above, initial 
interview schedules were developed based upon informal interviews with a nursery 
owner and a weed ecologist. The interview questions addressed motivations for 
importing plants, the respondent's experiences with ERMA and HSNO, and the 
respondent's assessment ofthe Act's strengths and weaknesses. The interview schedule 
evolved as unanticipated themes arose.48 These emergent themes included the issue of 
smuggling, perceptions of plants' invasive potential, and frustration with the Plant 
Biosecurity Index (the interview schedules are presented in Appendix B). 
The interviews ranged in length from 20 to 90 minutes and took place in the 
respondents' offices or by telephone. Two-thirds ofthe respondents were interviewed 
by phone because they were located throughout New Zealand and extensive travel was 
unaffordable. I tape recorded the interviews and took written notes. After each 
interview, I transcribed the recorded dialogue so that I could reflect on the content and 
47 Research techniques that have high reliability are those that generate consistent results when the 
technique is replicated (Davidson & Tolich, 2003, p. 32). 
48 In qualitative, semi-structured interviewing the interview questions are provisional and may be 
modified based upon what is learned in each interview (Glesne & Peshkin, 1999, p. 64). This flexibility 
is important in inductive research. 
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make necessary changes to the interview schedule. Transcribing also enabled me to 
note my strengths and weaknesses as an interviewer. 
Qualitative methodology emphasises the role of the researcher as a research 
instrument (Gillham, 2000, p. 25). Reflection on this role helped me become more 
proficient in conducting interviews. I was aware that to develop good rapport with 
respondents it was important to have a professional and appreciative attitude. I found 
that listening attentively and expressing shared appreciation for the points my 
respondents were making encouraged them to talk. In my early interviews, upon 
reflection, I think I sometimes spoke too much and struggled to refocus the conversation 
if my respondent deviated from the topic. I also encountered difficulty in allowing 
silences in the conversation to linger in order to encourage the respondent to expand 
further on their answers. 
Once all the interviews were completed the data were analysed. 49 This process, 
which Strauss and Corbin (1998, p. 13) describe as "the interplay between researchers 
and data," entailed interPreting the data and imposing a structure upon it that made 
sense to me. After reading the transcriptions several times I highlighted text that 
appeared relevant to my research. I next developed themes and sub-themes to describe 
the content of the highlighted dialog and displayed the identified themes in a diagram. 
The diagram depicted the relationship between themes and noted which respondent 
expressed each theme (interview transcripts were differentiated by a letter and number 
label). As new insights about how best to interpret and categorize the data came to 
mind, the themes were revised. 
49 I followed the data analysis steps described by Gillham (2000, p. 63 - 66). 
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Appendix B: Cover Letter and Questionnaire 
Dear «First Name»: 
I am a Master of Resource Studies student at Lincoln University. I am interested in the 
perspectives of nursery owners and managers on the current regulations for importing new plant 
species into New Zealand. 
I appreciate that this is a busy time of year for you, but would be very grateful if you could 
complete the enclosed questionnaire and post it to me in the reply paid envelope provided. 
Your nursery was selected through a random sample of wholesale nurseries throughout New 
Zealand. Filling in the questionnaire should take approximately 20 minutes. Please sign the 
consent form at the end of the questionnaire. 
To express my thanks for your help, all respondents will enter a draw to win a mixed case of 
wine from Giesen. To enter the draw, fill out the enclosed reply paid postcard and post it to me 
separately from the questionnaire. 
Your responses to the questionnaire will be completely confidential. Your name, nursery name, 
or contact details will not be recorded on the questionnaire. Upon receiving your completed 
questionnaire I will detach the consent form. All questionnaire responses will be combined and 
this body of information will be used, only for statistical analysis. 
The research results will be included in my thesis and a summary ofthe results will be 
forwarded to the Nursery and Garden Industry Association of New Zealand. If you would like 
to receive a summary of the research results please tick the box on the enclosed postcard. 
Feel free to contact me if you have any questions. Thank you very much for your help. 
Yours sincerely, 
Sarah Clinehens 
Environment, Society and Design Division 
Lincoln University, Canterbury 
P. O. Box 84 
03-325-3838 ext. 8449 
03-325-3328 (home) 
clinehs l@lincoln.ac.nz 
My thesis supervisor is: 
Simon Kerr 
Environment, Society and Design Division, 
P.O. Box 84 
Lincoln University, Canterbury 
03-325-2811 ext. 8781 
kerrs@lincoln.ac.nz 
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Section A 
Please respond to the following questions by ticking the response that best represents 
your answer. 
1. Have you ever imported seeds or nursery stock into New Zealand? 
YES 0 
NO 0 
2. Would you like to import seeds or nursery stock into New Zealand in the future? 
YES 0 
NO 0 
3. Have you ever imported new plant species into New Zealand? 'New plant 
species' reJer to species that are entering New Zealand for the first time. 
YES. 0 
NO 0 
UNSURE 0 
If you answered NO to all oj the above questions, you do not need to answer any further 
questions. However, please return tlte questionnaire in the reply paid envelope 
provided so I know that you are not interested in importing plant material. Thank you 
Jor your assistance. 
Otlterwise, please continue filling in tlte questionnaire. 
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Please respond to the following statements by ticking the response that best represents 
your answer. 
4. I would like to import new plant species into New Zealand in the future. 
STRONGLY AGREE ..................... , 0 
AGREE ............................................ , 0 
NEUTRAL ....................................... , 0 
DISAGREE ...................................... , 0 
STRONGLY DISAGREE ... :........... 0 
5. I am interested in importing new plant species for the economic benefits 
they offer me. 
STRONGL Y AGREE ...................... 0 
AGREE ............................................. 0 
NEUTRAL ........................................ 0 
DISAGREE ... ~.; ................................ , 0 
STRONGLY DISAGREE ............... 0 
6. I am interested in importing new plant species because I am keen on plants. 
STRONGL Y AGREE ...................... 0 
AGREE ............................................ , 0 
NEUTRAL ....................................... , 0 
DISAGREE ...................................... , 0 
STRONGLY DISAGREE ............... 0 
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7. I work in the nursery industry primarily to make a living. 
STRONGLY AGREE ..................... , 0 
AGREE ............................................ ' 0 
NEUTRAL ....................................... , 0 
DISAGREE , ..................................... , 0 
STRONGLY DISAGREE .............. , 0 
8. I work in the nursery industry primarily because I am passionate about plants. 
STRONGLY AGREE ..................... , 0 
AGREE ............................................ ' 0 
NEUTRAL ....................................... ' 0 
DISAGREE ...................................... , 0 
STRONGLY DISAGREE .............. , 0 
Please respond to the following questions by ticking the response that best represents 
your answer. 
9. Do you manage or own a nursery? 
MANAGE 
OWN 
BOTH 
NEITHER 
o 
o 
o 
o 
10. How many years have you worked in the nursery industry? 
___ years. 
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11. What is the end-use of the plants which your nursery sells? 'Your nursery' refers 
to the nursery that you own or the nursery where you currently work. 
You may tick more than one. 
Agriculture/horticulture crops ..................... D 
Erosion control ,............................................. D 
Forestry crops ............................................... D 
Home garden/amenity.................................. D 
Shelter belts ................................................... D 
Other (Please specify) _____________ _ 
12. What is your nursery's market? 
Domestic market ............................... D 
Export market ................................... D 
Both ................................................... D 
13. Which of the following best describes the gross annual revenue of your nursery? 
Less than $50,000 ............................. D 
-$50,000 - $149,000 .......................... D 
$150,000 - $499,000 ........................ D 
$500,000 - $999,000 ........................ D 
$1 m (million) to $1.9 m .................. D 
$2 m to $4.9 m .................................. D 
$5 m and above ................................. D 
14. Do you collect and/or breed plants in your leisure time? 
YES D 
NO D 
15. Are you a member of any plant societies, garden clubs, or other plant enthusiast 
groups? 
YES D 
NO D 
16. Are you a member of any professional bodies related to the nursery industry? (e.g. 
NOlA, lPPS, etc.) 
YES D 
NO D 
Section B 
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Questions in this section explore the nursery industry's familiarity with importing 
new plant species. 
17. The Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act (HSNO) is a law that came 
into effect in 1998. If a person wants to import a plant species that is not yet 
present in New Zealand, HSNO requires that they submit an application outlining 
the risks and benefits of importing the species. 
Before reading this questionnaire, had you heard ofHSNO's rules for importing 
new plant species? 
YES 
NO 
o 
o 
Go to Question 18 
Go to Question 19 
18. How did you hear about HSNO? (e.g. from MAF, NGIA, a friend, etc.) 
19. The government created an agency called the Environmental Risk Management 
Authority (ERMA) to run the HSNO Act. ERMA assesses applications for 
importing new plant species and decides if the species may be imported or not. 
Before reading this questionnaire, had you heard of ERMA? 
YES 0 
NO 0 
20. The Plant Biosecurity Index (also called the 'permitted plants list') is a list of 
plant species that are not considered prohibited plants and were present in New 
Zealand prior to 1998. Species on this list may be imported without having to 
apply to ERMA. 
Before reading this questionnaire, had you heard of the Plant Biosecurity Index? 
YES 0 
NO 0 
21. Please write any comments you would like to make about HSNO, ERMA, or the 
Plant Biosecurity Index below. You may also comment about other aspects of the 
import process. (e.g. import health standards, MAF etc.) 
22. Have you ever wanted to import a plant species that was not listed on the Plant 
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Biosecurity Index or the list of prohibited plants? 
YES 
NO 
o 
o 
Go to Question 23 
Go to Question 27 
23. Have you ever submitted an "application to determine if an organism is present in 
New Zealand" (also called a 'Section 26 determination' under the HSNO Act)? 
YES 
NO 
o 
o 
Go to Question 24 
Go to Question 27 
Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statements by 
ticking the response that best represents your answer. 
24. The 'Section 26' application process was easy to understand. 
STRONGLY AGREE ..................... , 0 
AGREE ............................................ , 0 
NEUTRAL ....................................... , 0 
DISAGREE ...................................... , 0 
STRONGLY DISAGREE .............. , 0 
25. The 'Section 26' application process took too much effort. 
STRONGLY AGREE ..................... , 0 
AGREE ............................................ , 0 
NEUTRAL ....................................... , 0 
DISAGREE ...................................... , 0 
STRONGL Y DISAGREE .............. , 0 
26. Overall, the effort involved in submitting the application was worth the benefit of 
having the species added to the Plant Biosecurity Index. 
STRONGLY AGREE ...................... 0 
AGREE ............................................ , 0 
NEUTRAL ........................................ 0 
DISAGREE ...................................... , 0 
STRONGLY DISAGREE ............... 0 
27. Have you ever submitted an application to ERMA to import a new plant species? 
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YES 
NO 
o 
o 
Go to Question 32 
Go to Question 28 
Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statements by ticking 
the response that best represents your answer. 
28. I have not submitted an application to import a new plant species because 
the cost of submitting an application was too high. 
STRONGLY AGREE ...................... 0 
AGREE ............................................. 0 
NEUTRAL ........................................ 0 
DISAGREE ....................................... 0 
STRONGLY DISAGREE ............... 0 
29. I have not submitted an application to import a new plant species because the 
application process takes too much effort. 
STRONGLY AGREE ...................... 0 
AGREE ............................................. 0 
NEUTRAL ........................................ 0 
DISAGREE ....................................... 0 
STRONGLY DISAGREE ............... 0 
30. I have not submitted an application to import a new plant species because the 
rights of the 'first mover' are not protected. 
STRONGL Y AGREE ...................... 0 
AGREE ............................................. 0 
NEUTRAL ........................................ 0 
DISAGREE ....................................... 0 
STRONGLY DISAGREE ............... 0 
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31. I have not submitted an application to import a new plant species because I knew 
that the species was already present in New Zealand although it was not on the 
Plant Biosecurity Index. 
STRONGLY AGREE ..................... , 0 
AGREE ............................................ , 0 
NEUTRAL ....................................... , 0 
DISAGREE ...................................... , 0 
STRONGLY DISAGREE ............... 0 
Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statements by ticking 
the response that best represents your answer 
32. I feel that the concerns of the nursery industry were overlooked when 
HSNO's plant importation regulations were designed. 
STRONGL Y AGREE ...................... 0 
AGREE ............ , ..... ;........................... 0 
NEUTRAL ....................................... , 0 
DISAGREE ....................................... 0 
STRONGLY DISAGREE ............... 0 
33. It is important to screen plants coming into New Zealand to determine what 
harmful effects they may have on New Zealand. 
STRONGL Y AGREE ...................... 0 
AGREE ............................................ , 0 
NEUTRAL ....................................... , 0 
DISAGREE ...................................... , 0 
STRONGLY DISAGREE ............... 0 
34. New Zealand was better off with the 'prohibited list approach' that allowed 
plant species to be imported unless they were included on the prohibited list. 
STRONGLY AGREE ...................... 0 
AGREE ............................................. 0 
NEUTRAL ....................................... , 0 
DISAGREE ....................................... 0 
STRONGLY DISAGREE ............... 0 
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35. With HSNO in place I feel confident that plants and diseases that could harm 
primary industry will be kept out of New Zealand. 
STRONGLY AGREE ..................... , D 
AGREE ............................................ , D 
NEUTRAL ....................................... , D 
DISAGREE ...................................... , D 
STRONGLY DISAGREE .............. , D 
36. The application fees for a rapid assessment application ($1,500 - $3,000) 
make it unlikely that I could make a profit from bringing in a new plant 
speCIes. 
STRONGL Y AGREE ..................... , D 
AGREE ............................................ , D 
NEUTRAL ........•................................ , D 
DISAGREE ...................................... , D 
STRONGLY DISAGREE .............. , D 
37. The application fees for a full assessment application ($30,000 - $45,000) make 
it unlikely that I could make a profit from bringing in a new plant species. 
STRONGLY AGREE ..................... , D 
AGREE ............................................ , D 
NEUTRAL ....................................... , D 
DISAGREE ...................................... , D 
STRONGLY DISAGREE .............. , D 
38. With HSNO in place I feel confident that plants which could become 
environmental weeds will be kept out of New Zealand. 
STRONGLY AGREE ..................... , D 
AGREE ............................................ , D 
NEUTRAL ....................................... , D 
DISAGREE .............................. ~ ....... , D 
STRONGLY DISAGREE .............. , D 
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39. HSNO is restricting the development of the nursery industry in New 
Zealand. 
STRONGLY AGREE ..................... , 0 
AGREE ............................................ , 0 
NEUTRAL ....................................... , 0 
DtSAGREE ...................................... , 0 
STRONGLY DISAGREE .............. , 0 
40. Commercial nurseries are more likely to smuggle plants into New Zealand than 
home gardeners. 
STRONGLY AGREE ..................... , 0 
AGREE ..................... ~ ...................... , 0 
NEUTRAL ....................................... , 0 
DISAGREE ............ ~.......................... 0 
STRONGLY DISAGREE ............... 0 
41. . MAF Quarantine Service is unlikely to detect smuggled plant material. 
STRONGLY AGREE ...................... 0 
AGREE ............................................. 0 
NEUTRAL ........................................ 0 
DISAGREE ....................................... 0 
STRONGLY DISAGREE ............... 0 
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Section C 
Biosecurity in New Zealandfocuses on protecting many aspects of New Zealand life 
from animal pests, plant pests, and diseases. How important are the following to you? 
Please tick the responses that best represent your answers. 
42. Protecting human health from diseases. 
VERY IMPORTANT ...................... , 0 
IMPORTANT .................................. ' 0 
NEUTRAL ....................................... , 0 
UNIMPORTANT ............................. 0 
VERY UNIMPORTANT ........ o 
43. Protecting native plants, animals, and ecosystems from pests and diseases. 
VERY IMPORTANT ....................... 0 
IMPORTANT ........ ; ........... : .............. 0 
NEUTRAL ....................................... , 0 
UNIMPORTANT ............................ , 0 
VERY UNIMPORTANT ................. 0 
44. Protecting primary industry from pests and diseases. 
VERY IMPORTANT ....................... 0 
IMPORTANT .................................. , 0 
NEUTRAL ....................................... , 0 
UNIMPORTANT ............................. 0 
VERY UNIMPORTANT ................. 0 
45. Protecting New Zealand from bioterrorism. 
VERY IMPORTANT ....................... 0 
IMPORTANT .................................. , 0 
NEUTRAL ....................................... , 0 
UNIMPORTANT ............................ , 0 
VERY UNIMPORTANT ................. 0 
46. Protecting resources important to Maori from pests and diseases. 
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VERY IMPORTANT ....................... 0 
IMPORTANT ................................... 0 
NEUTRAL ........................................ 0 
UNIMPORTANT ............................. 0 
VERY UNIMPORTANT ................. 0 
ERMA assesses the negative effects that new plant species might have on New 
Zealand. How important do you think it is that ERMA consider the following in 
their assessments? Please tick the responses that best represent your answers. 
47. Risks to human health. 
VERY IMPORTANT ....................... 0 
IMPORTANT ................................... 0 
NEUTRAL ........................................ 0 
UNIMPORTANT .. , ...... ~ ................... 0 
VERY UNIMPORTANT ................. 0 
48. Risks to native ecosystems. 
VERYIMPORTANT ....................... 0 
IMPORTANT ................................... 0 
NEUTRAL ........................................ 0 
UNIMPORTANT ............................. 0 
VERY UNIMPORTANT ................. 0 
49. Risks to primary industry. 
VERYIMPORTANT ....................... 0 
IMPORTANT ................................... 0 
NEUTRAL ........................................ 0 
UNIMPORTANT ............................. 0 
VERYUNIMPORTANT ................. 0 
50. Risks to resources important to Maori. 
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VERY IMPORTANT ....................... 0 
IMPORTANT ................................... 0 
NEUTRAL ........................................ 0 
UNIMPORTANT ............................. 0 
VERY UNIMPORTANT ................. 0 
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Section D 
This section concerns plant smuggling. Some people are concerned that plant 
importers who are frustrated with HSNO might smuggle plant material into New 
Zealand. Others do not think this is happening. 
51. In your opinion what most discourages people from smuggling plant material 
into New Zealand? If you tick more than one, please rank in order of 
importance with '1' being 'most important'. 
Desire to 'do the right thing' ................................................ 0 
Embarrassment of being caught smuggling ........................ 0 
Financial penalties for smuggling ....................................... 0 
Other (Please specify) 
52. Are you aware of instances where new plant species or species not listed on the 
Plant Biosecurity Index have come into New Zealand illegally? 
YES 
NO 
o 
o 
Go to Question 53 
Go to Question 54 
53. What do you think were the main reasons that these plant species were imported 
illegally? If you tick more than one, please rank in order of importance with '1' 
being 'most important'. 
Importer did not know that they needed to declare the plant material 
Importer felt the application fees were too high .............................................. . 
Importer felt the application process would be too bureaucratic , ................... . 
Don'tknow ........................................................................................................ . 
Other (Please specify) 
o 
o 
o 
o 
54. Persons who intentionally smuggle new plant species into New Zealand may be 
fined up to $500,000. Do you view this penalty as: 
A good deterrent against smuggling , .......... . 
An ineffective deterrent , .............................. . 
Too severe .................................................... . 
o 
o 
o 
55. So far, prosecutions for smuggling plant materials have resulted in fines ranging 
from several hundred dollars to several thousand dollars. For example, one 
127 
'-.---.. <-~ ... -":'< •• -' 
person was fined $4,000 for smuggling seeds into New Zealand. Do you view 
this penalty as: 
A good deterrent against smuggling ............ 0 
An ineffective deterrent ,............................... 0 
Too severe ..................................................... 0 
56. If you have any additional comments that relate to any portion of this 
questionnaire please write them below: 
.-..,'~ ~'. <.:: •• u''': ~ 
:~:~~::;:":1~::;':;-~: 
~ . . -. - ;-
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CONSENT FORM 
Importing "new" plant species: 
Nursery industry responses to New Zealand's approach 
I have read and understood the description of this research project. I understand that 
participation in the research is voluntary. I agree to fill in a questionnaire, and I 
consent to publication of the research results in a thesis with the understanding that 
my responses will be kept completely confidential. 
Date: Signed: ____________________________ __ 
-----------
Thank you for your time and effort! 
Please return your questionnaire in the reply paid envelope provided. 
If the envelope has been mislaid, please forward the questionnaire to: 
Freepost 36 
Sarah Clinehens 
Environment, Society and Design Division 
P.O. Box 84 
Lincoln University 
Canterbury 
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Appendix C: Quantitative Research Methods 
A quantitative, postal questionnaire was developed for the second phase of the 
thesis research (the questionnaire is displayed in Appendix B). This approach was 
suitable because accurate responses to sensitive questions and an affordable means of 
data collection were important. Respondents are more likely to provide accurate 
answers rather than socially desirable ones when filling in a postal questionnaire (de 
Vaus, 1995, p. 110). Because the sample was dispersed throughout New Zealand, a 
postal questionnaire was the most affordable way to reach the sample (Sapsford, 1999, 
p. 108). 
In many circumstances postal questionnaires result in lower response rates than 
telephone interviews (Sapsford, 1999,p. 110). However, researchers have found that 
postal questionnaire response rates are competitive with telephone interviews if the 
research topic is germane to the sample being surveyed and the· sample is from a 
homogenous population (de Vaus, 1995, p. 107). As my sample met both of these 
criteria it was appropriate to use postal questionnaires. 
I constructed the set of measures contained in the questionnaire because none 
were available from the literature that suited my research questions. The questionnaire 
included 53 structured questions and two open-ended questions. The structured 
questions consisted of Likert-style statements and dichotomous, categorical questions. 
The questionnaire explored motivations for importing plants and the industry's 
familiarity with the plant importation process under HSNO and ERMA. Attitudes and 
beliefs towards the design and delivery of HSNO were investigated by focusing on 
relevant aspects ofHSNO's values, rules, and tools identified in my qualitative 
research. Several questions dealt with smuggling and penalties for noncompliance. 
Relevant demographic data describing the respondent and the nursery they represented 
were also collected. After pre-testing the questionnaire on ten of the respondents 
interviewed during my qualitative research I made final modifications and posted the 
questionnaire to my sample. 50 
The population from which I drew a probability sample consisted of wholesale 
nursery owners andlor managers throughout New Zealand. I used the New Zealand 
Nursery Register (2003) as my sample frame because it provided the most 
comprehensive list of wholesale nurseries available (J.F. Kennerley, personal 
50 Pre-testing helps the investigator to identifY problems with the research instrument (Meredith & 
Lawley, 2000, p. 33). 
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communication, 15 August 2003). Unfortunately, the nursery register gave no 
indication of which wholesale nurseries were plant importers. A second limitation of 
the sample frame was that inclusion in the register was voluntary; it is possible that 
some wholesale nurseries in New Zealand were not listed in the sample frame. 
The sample frame contained 1,035 wholesale nurseries. I generated a systematic 
sample with a random start from my sample frame. 51 A power calculation was used to 
detennine my targeted sample size of210 cases (parameters used were: a = .05, 1 - P = 
.95, effect size = .5). Questionnaires were posted to 950 potential respondents to ensure 
that I would achieve my sample size. 52 Over-sampling was necessary to compensate for 
nurseries that would have to be excluded because they were not importers, and to 
compensate for the response rates typical of postal questionnaires. The literature 
reported response rates ranging from 30 percent 75 percent (Alreck & Settle, 1995, p. 
35; Babbie, 2001, p. 256; Dillman, 1978, p. 5; Miller, 1991, p. 152, 155). 
In order to reduce non-response bias I sought to maximise incentives to respond 
while minimising costs. 53 This tactic is premised on the theory of social exchange; 
namely that people will perfonn a particular action when the benefits of such action 
appear greater than the costs (Dillman, 1978, p.12). To reduce the costs of responding 
the cover letter and questionnaire were designed to be clear, concise, and aesthetically 
pleasing, and designed to ensure confidentiality. To provide incentives to respond I 
explained the purpose and importance of the research, offered a summary of research 
results to respondents, and offered respondents an opportunity to enter a draw to win a 
case of wine. A reminder postcard and a 'thank you' followed the questionnaire mail 
out. 54 
51 Generating a systematic sample with a random start entails randomly selecting an element within the 
sample frame and subsequently selecting every kth element for inclusion in the sample. The interval for 
selection is determined by dividing the total population by the sample size (Babbie, 2001, p. 197). 
Because the sample frame was alphabetically ordered I used Excel to randomly shuffle the cases in the 
sample frame before I generated the systematic sample. 
52 The sample size nearly includes the entire sample frame. It was not advantageous to incorporate the 
remaining 85 nurseries because this marginal increase in sample size would not affect the standard error 
(accuracy) of the sample while adding extra cost. See Rowntree (1981, p.94, 100). 
53 'Nonresponse bias' occurs when respondents choose not to fill in a questionnaire for reasons related to 
the research topic (Oppenheim, 1992, p. 106). If it is difficult to obtain information about 
nonrespondents, the researcher cannot be certain that the sample is representative. 
54 The approaches I used to design and administer my questionnaire were recommended in the literature. 
For question design see Miller, 1991, pp. 141 -143; Oppenheim, 1992, pp. 119 - 149; Dillman, 1978, pp. 
79 - 117; Alreck and Settle, 1995, pp. 89 - 142; Babbie, 2001, pp. 239 - 249. Sapsford; 1999, pp. 103 -
106; de Vaus, 1995, pp. 81 - 90. Format and presentation of a postal questionnaire to maximise response 
is discussed in Miller, 1991, p. 156; Oppenheim, 1992, pp. 103 -106; Dillman, 1978, pp. 120 -180; 
Alreck and Settle, 1995, pp. 183 -200; de Vaus, 1995, 116 - 119. Guidance on inducements is given by 
Alreck and Settle, 1995, pp. 200 - 205; Dillman, 1978, p. 171; de Vaus, 1995, p. 118; M. Kilvington, 
personal communication, 1 July 2003. 
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Appendix D : Qualitative Data Themes 
Views of HSNO's Views of Agents Motivations for 
GoalsN alues Importation 
Want more respect from 
Nursery Operators feel their Agents. Noted incidents of Consumers desire 
imports pose little/no risk to disrespect (T12 p. 4; T 13, p. new types of plants 
NZ (T 11, p. 3; T19, p. 7, T3, 8; A 14, p. 2) T 3-4, AI-3, A 9-3, 
p. 3; T24, p. 4) T 11-9 
ERMA should value plant T 16-3,4, T 19-7, T 
enthusiasts' expertise and 21-1, 
Nursery operator identified consult them (16 p. 9; T 13 p. 
risk of bringing in weed seed 6, 8;T 22 p. 2; T 3 p. 2) Gardeners love 
as contaminant T 13-5 plants, love 
ERMA should encourage, collecting new 
HSNO is result of "greenies" teach, be more friendly T 19 p. speCIes 
pressure T 12, p.3, T 13 p. 2 3 T 12-1,3,9, T 22-5, 
T 23-1,9 
NZ has many species already, ERMA unconcerned about 
many with weed potential. plant importers' problems Plant societies 
NZ does not need any new T 18-2, T 23-2 depend on 
species A 5,p. 3 . international 
Weeds low on ERMA's list of contributions of seed. 
Agree with HSNO's goals to priorities A 1-6, A 2-10 T 10-1, T 12-2 
keep environment, primary 
industry safe, protect New Negative views of ERMA - Importers usually 
Zealand (T 16, p. 5,6, 7; 20 p. focuses too. much on details, have economic 
1, 6, T 22, p. 1 ; T 23 p. 6 not able to get important stuff motive import (can 
T 11 p. 5; T24p. 3) done quickly. AI-II charge more T 16-5) 
T 10-1, T 13-1, T 24-
Plants should be screened for ERMA should be realistic, not 2 
weed potential idealistic when pursuing Growers - new 
T 11-6, T 12-4 HSNO goals T 13-2 species for 
production 
Shipping containers much HSNO too rigid, should be efficiencies A 16-4 
bigger threat than plant more 'broad minded'T 11-2 
imports 24-4 Growers - want to 
HSNO should not rely too develop new variety 
much on narrow science views T 20-1 
T24-5 
Frustrations with MAF, 
hassles, delays with plant 
import standards, no flexibility 
(agar mixed in tissue culture), 
better testing finds more 
viruses etc. 
T 13-4, T 16-2, T 21-7,21-13, ',-_._-.,' ... -",.. 
T 23-3, T 24-1,5 
,.""j 
People at top in MAF are 
good, but inspectors not T 21-5 
132 
Respondents' views Respondents' views Perceived 
about Rules about Tools Outcomes ~ •• 1 ••••••• ~%.5:'..;~;':':;~::;;: 
of HSNO/ MISe 
Amount of application fees 'Doing the right thing' is Restricting development 
(may) discourage compliance the only incentive to of nursery industry T 
A 1-8, A 2-5,6, A 4-6, A 5- comply. A 2-7,4-8,5-9 22-6 
3,9, T 10-4, T 11-2, A 14-4, T If you want a plant badly 
16 p. 3,6, 17-2, T 21-11, T 23- enough you might go Loss of m~rket 
6 through the HSNO opportunities for 
application process nurseries A 4-11, 7-4 
Costs make it difficult for T 10-5 
researchers to import Hard for small grower to 
A 4-11, T 11-9, T12-2, T13-3, HSNO is hard to enforce import under HSNO T 
T16-5, T19-2, T 20-1, T 22-3, A 2-7 12-1 
23-2 Growers experimenting 
Enforce penalties on a few less T 24-6 
High cost of applying under smugglers in order to boost 
HSNO will limit amount of compliance Plant enthusiasts find it 
new material coming in, A 9-3, T 24-6 more difficult to get new 
damage industry b/c speCIes 
consumers want new plants - Concerned about smuggling A 7-4, T 16-8,9 
plant fashions T 16-3 A 1-9, 5-3, 10-4, T 16-6 
HSNO is working well 
Can afford HSNO fees - for Nurserymen worried that T 14-2 
low risk appsT 21-10 disease may enter NZ on 
smuggled material 
Should not be user pays A 4-6, T 16-6, T 22- 4 Prohibited list did not 
A 2-7, T 10-4, 11-5 consider risks to 
T 13-3 (unless fees lower), T Larger nurseries likely to environment - ag 
20-1, T 24-3 (unless first comply because if they got focused. 
mover protected) caught smuggling this A 1-2, A 2;-1 
User should pay because user would damage their 
benefits from import business, harm their Plant exports should 
A 7-4,9-3, T 12-4 industry also be screened A 1-4 
A 14-4, T 19-4, T 21-14, T 7-5, T 13-8, T 19-8, 17-6, T 
22-3 ,23-6 (but fees too high) 24-6 'Rough and ready' 
Easiest to smuggle seeds interim system worked 
PBI is incomplete A 5-3 well to screen out weeds 
T 3-1, T 10-2, T 11-3,5, T 12- A 2-2 
7 People will hide/mislabel 
T 16-3, T20-1, T22-2, T23-5 seeds Risk assessment 
A 5-9, 7-3, T 23-8 involves biology. 
PBI has mistakes in it. No Considering benefits is a 
authorities A 4-2 Keen plant people most political decision and 
likely to smuggle should be kept separate. 
BPI made in a rush T 20-1 T 16-6, T 24-6 A 1-8 
Access to PBI - must buy, this Reports of smuggling Nursery was consulted 
. . I only smuggle plants that I during HSNO design IS expenSIve. , "- .-.... ~;'-' .. 
T 10-4 know pose no risk process 
T 10-4, T 12-5 T 11-2, T 20-1 
Need better mechanism for 
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updating BPI than S 26 Knows of smuggling - rare Nursery industry is 
Process is not 'user friendly' cycads in contravention of getting smaller as 
Too complex CITES T 21-9 consumers are attracted 
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T 13-3, T19-2, 3, T 22-3, T to other hobbies and 
23-3,4,5 Smuggling happens (but middle size companies 
very hard to quantify how finding it harder to 
Too much bureaucracy T 3-6, much smuggling is going compete - need to 
T 13-2, T 19-3 on A 17-5,6) T 24-6, A 25- produce plants more and 
7 more cheaply T 11-7 
Process is a lot of work for Dishonest behaviour when 
applicant T 21-12 plant society members We were not consulted 
asked to record species they when HSNO was 
App requires lots of research - had to update the PBI T 12- designed - not a lot of 
and it should - 8 commercial input 
We've had too many mistakes T 12-2, T 13-2, T 17-1 
in the past A 14-3 More smuggled plant 
material entering NZ Should return to 
Confusion about rules and 7-3 prohibited list approach 
roles of ERMA, MAF - told T 12-4, 7, T 18-3 
respondent incorrect Would be difficult to 
infonnation smuggle and sell widely Acceptance may come 
T 13-4, T17-1, TI8-1, T23-2, commercially with time. Big change 
A 4-6,7-9 T 21-14 from the old regulations. 
6-3, 7-3 
Low awareness ofHSNO may MAF border security does 
be reducing compliance good job - is hard to 
A 5-9, 7-6 smuggle A 14-4 
Dogs good at detecting A 
Plant importers not like other 25-2 
targets - often small scale A 25 gives excellent 
nursery people, plant description of how border 
enthusiasts - don't know security works for 
about HSNO and not likely to passengers and mail 
comply T 20-1, A 7-1, T 24-6 
First mover should be 
protected 
T 3-8, A 4-7 T 11-2, 5, T 21-
11, T 23-6, T 24-3 
Notified apps take time - may 
be deterrent to applying 
A 7-6 
Plants should be approved at 
species level, not genus 
A 4-5,9-1, T 12-7 
Some plants should be 
approved at genus level 
T 3-6, T 12-2 ; ::, -,", .. ~-
Including Maori perspective 
into decision making is 
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difficult because corporate 
culture and Maori culture 
clash 
A 8-10 
ERMA demands expertise that 
is not available - get 
taxonomist to prove species in 
NZ T 12-8 
Effort of applying may deter 
people - prompt them to 
smuggle. 
A 14-3 
Cost, bureaucracy etc. 
increases risk of 
noncompliance 
T 13-3, 17-2,23-8 
HSNO is "inviting" 
smuggling T 22-2 
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